STATE OF WISCONSIN

BEFORE THE WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

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In the Matter of the Petition of	:
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WISCONSIN COUNCIL 40,	:
AFSCME, AFL-CIO	:
	:
Involving Certain Employes of	:
	:
DANE COUNTY	:
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Case 13 No. 35962 ME-52 Decision No. 22976-A

<u>Appearances:</u> <u>Mr. Jack Bernfeld</u>, Staff Representative, Wisconsin Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 5 Odana Court, Madison, WI

Ms. Judith Toole, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Dane County, City-County Building, 210 Monona Avenue, Madison, Wisconsin, appearing on behalf of Dane County.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER CLARIFYING BARGAINING UNIT

Wisconsin Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO having, on November 6, 1985, filed a petition requesting the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission to clarify an existing collective bargaining unit of employes, by determining whether three recently reclassified positions titled Administrative Services Supervisor I, (formerly Administrative Legal Secretary, Administrative Assistant I, Administrative Legal Secretary, District Attorney's office) should be included in said unit; and hearing on the matter having been conducted on January 27, 1986 in Madison, Wisconsin before Examiner William C. Houlihan, a member of the Commission's staff, and a transcript of the proceedings having been received by February 5, 1986; and the parties having filed post-hearing briefs by March 24, 1986; and the Commission having considered the evidence and arguments of the parties and being fully advised in the premises hereby makes and issues the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. That Dane County is a municipal employer which has offices located in the City-County Building, 210 Monona Avenue, Madison, Wisconsin.

2. That Wisconsin Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, hereinafter the Union, is a labor organization which has offices located at 5 Odana Court, Madison, Wisconsin.

3. That the County and the Union are signatories to a 1984-85 collective bargaining agreement which confers voluntary recognition upon the Union as follows:

ARTICLE I Recognition

The Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for all employes as hereinafter defined except the following: Supervisory employes; law enforcement employes of the Sheriff's Department; non-clerical employes of the Highway, Exposition Center and Airport Departments; confidential employes; professional employes as defined by Wisconsin Statutes 111.70 and craft employes so certified by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, for the purposes of conferences and negotiations with the Employer, or its authorized representative on question (sic) of wages, hours and other conditions of employment.

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4. That sometime prior to September of 1985 the County had a series of audits conducted; that among the positions audited were the positions of Administrative Legal Secretary, Administrative Assistant I, and Administrative

Legal Secretary, District Attorney's office; and that as a consequence of the audit the County concluded that the three positions were supervisory in nature and thereafter treated them as excluded from the bargaining unit.

5. That the County thereafter submitted a resolution, Resolution No. 97, to it's Board to reclassify the three positions in question; that those three positions were all reclassified on or about September 20, 1985 to a common classification, Administrative Service Supervisor I; and that the Administrative Service Supervisor I classification is an existing classification within the organizational chart of the County.

6. That prior to the reclassification, Joyce Armson was an Administrative Legal Secretary, a position which she held since 1984; that Rebecca Cascio was an Administrative Assistant I with the Extension, a position she held for a period of three years; and that Sharon Durst was an Administrative Legal Secretary with the District Attorney's office, a position she held since 1978.

7. That on November 5, 1985, the Union filed a petition to clarify the bargaining unit referenced in paragraph 3 above, requesting that the three positions referenced in Findings of Fact 4, 5, and 6, above, be included in the bargaining unit; and that the County opposes inclusion on the basis that the positions are supervisory.

8. That the County's Criminal/Traffic Division employs approximately 37 people including attorneys, other professional staff, a paralegal, Victim/Witness Specialist, First Offender Specialist, clerk typists, and Administrative Assistant; that the District Attorney serves as Department Head and that there are two Deputy District Attorney's, one of whom, Fred Erhardt, exercises supervisory authority.

9. That Sharon Durst oversees the work of 14 clerical employes of the Criminal/Traffic Division; that she has solely conducted the pre-hiring interviews and effectively recommended the hire of the only two original clerical hires in the last three or four years; that she has solely conducted the pre-transfer/promotion interviews on seven occasions in the last three or four years; that she screens applicants, rejects applicants and effectively recommends selection of transfer/promotion applicants; and, that her recommendations relative to hiring, promotion, and transfer are made to Fred Erhardt and that they have never been rejected.

10. That Durst makes non-routine work assignments to clerical employes, transfers work from employe to employe, and evaluates the clerical employes on an annual basis; that she approves requests for time off including vacation and sick leave; that she has exercised this authority to deny requested vacation and to request a medical slip from an employe experiencing medical problems; that she has exercised and exercises the authority to authorize and assign overtime; that she secures and terminates Limited Term Employes, and that on at least one occasion she has terminated a Limited Term Employe for failing to meet Departmental expectations; that she schedules and conducts office meetings; that she has an office with an observational window which overlooks the work area; that she does little if any clerical work; and that following her reclassification she earns more than do the clerical employes of the Department.

11. That, to date, there have been no grievances nor any serious discipline meted out; that she did on one occasion Durst prepared a written reprimand for Erhardt to issue and he did so on her recommendation; that she has verbally reprimanded clerical employes for coming in late and/or improper personal use of the telephone; and that Durst possesses supervisory authority in sufficient combination and degree to render her position supervisory.

12. That the Dane County Extension office employs approximately 14 people including Extension Agents, maintenance employes, and clerical staff; that the Department Head, Tom O'Connell, manages the Department; that Rebecca Cascio spends about 10% of her time providing administrative and clerical support for O'Connell.

13. That in addition to the clerical work, Cascio is the contact person for the Extension Building and as such is responsible for building-related problems such as heating and plumbing; that Cascio provides substantial training on word processing equipment and has budgeting and accounting responsibilities. 14. That Cascio oversees the work of four permanent status clerical employes and 1 Limited Term Employe in the Extension Department, 1 permanent status clerical employe in the Land Conservation Department, and 2 permanent status maintenance employes assigned to the building.

15. That Cascio has, without input from her Department Head, hired 4 Limited Term Employes since March of 1985; that she has participated in the hiring of 2 permanent status clerical employes by sitting on a hiring committee composed of herself, the Department Head, and the agent whose work was involved, and that the committee achieved consensus relative to who was to be hired; that she assigns workload in other than routine matters; that she can, and on two occasions has, approved overtime for clerical employes; that she approves use of vacation and sick leave for clerical employes and in the exercise of hat authority she has denied vacation requests; that she does not schedule vacations for custodians; that clerical employes calling in sick call her; that she completes annual evaluation forms on the clerical staff and maintains personnel files; that for clerical employes she has the authority to set maintenance priorities; that in response to work site problems she has effectively recommended a rotation of assignments which had the effect of redistributing workload and assignment; that she has scheduled lunch breaks to provide an orderly noon hour; that she has, on occasion, directed clerical employes to redo work which she has regarded as substandard; that she has the authority to adjust certain grievances for clerical employes; and that with her reclassification Cascio earns more than do the clerical employes.

16. That no one has been terminated at the Extension; that Cascio has never denied a merit increase; that there has never been a grievance filed; that there has been no disciplinary action taken with the exception that Cascio once issued a verbal reprimand which was not significant enough to be placed in the employe's personnel file; and that Cascio possesses supervisory authority in sufficient combination and degree to render the position supervisory.

17. That the Family Court Commissioner's office is headed by Ralph Guerin, Family Court Commissioner; that in addition to Guerin, the office consists of 3 Assistant Family Court Commissioner, Joyce Armson, the Administrative Services Supervisor I, five permanent status clerical employes, and I Limited Term Employe; and that, except in the absence of Guerin, none of the Assistant Family Court Commissioners exercises any supervisory authority.

18. That Armson oversees the work of the 5 permanent status clerical employes and the Limited Term Employes; that she assigns all work, and that work assignments are predicated upon Armson's assessment as to the capabilities of the employes involved; that she has formulated and issued written work rules relative to appropriate work attire, no smoking on the job, and no beverages near the word processing equipment; that while the no smoking policy is a County policy, and the beverage restriction was an idea of the Court Commissioner and the dress restrictions reflected Armson's view of appropriate attire; that she screens the work of the clerical employes and if dissatisfied with the quality requires the work to be redone; that she can transfer work between clerical employes; that she completes annual evaluation forms regarding the clerical employes; that she has, at least on one occasion, screened transfer requests including conducting pretransfer interviews of applicants, checking references, and making the ultimate selection; that she has hired four or five Limited Term Employes; that she does very little clerical work; that she effectively recommended adding a clerical position to the Department; and that following her reclassification she earns more than do the clerical employes of the Department.

19. That there has not been a serious disciplinary situation in the Family Court Commission's office; but that Armson has verbally cautioned clerical employes about the propriety of their attire and about their personal use of the telephone; that Armson believes that she would need Guerin's approval before issuing a suspension or discharge; that there have been no grievances filed by any clerical employe in the Department; and that Armson possesses supervisory authority in sufficient combination and degree to render the position supervisory.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. That the three occupants of the Administrative Services Supervisor I classification who were the subjects of this proceeding, Sharon Durst, Rebecca

Cascio, and Joyce Armson are supervisors and therefore not "municipal employes" within the meaning of Sec. 111.70(1)(o) of the Municipal Employment Relations Act,

2. That, because of their supervisory status, the three positions described above are not appropriately included in the collective bargaining unit described above in Finding of Fact 3.

ORDER CLARIFYING BARGAINING UNIT /1

That the three positions in the Administrative Services Supervisory I classification, currently occupied by Sharon Durst, Rebecca Cascio, and Joyce Armson are hereby excluded from the collective bargaining unit described above in Finding of Fact 3.

Given under our hands and seal at the City of Madison, Wiseqnsin this 16th day of September, 1986. WISCONSTA EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION By Herman Torosian, Chairman al Gratz, Commissioner 3 Danae Davis Gordon, Commissioner

1/ Pursuant to Sec. 227.11(2), Stats., the Commission hereby notifies the parties that a petition for rehearing may be filed with the Commission by following the procedures set forth in Sec. 227.12(1) and that a petition for judicial review naming the Commission as Respondent, may be filed by following the procedures set forth in Sec. 227.16(1)(a), Stats.

227.12 Petitions for rehearing in contested cases. (1) A petition for rehearing shall not be prerequisite for appeal or review. Any person aggrieved by a final order may, within 20 days after service of the order, file a written petition for rehearing which shall specify in detail the grounds for the relief sought and supporting authorities. An agency may order a rehearing on its own motion within 20 days after service of a final order. This subsection does not apply to s. 17.025 (3)(e). No agency is required to conduct more than one rehearing based on a petition for rehearing filed under this subsection in any contested case.

227.16 Parties and proceedings for review. (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, any person aggrieved by a decision specified in s. 227.15 shall be entitled to judicial review thereof as provided in this chapter.

(a) Proceedings for review shall be instituted by serving a petition therefor personally or by certified mail upon the agency or one of its officials, and filing the petition in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for the county where the judicial review proceedings are to be held. Unless a rehearing is requested under s. 227.12, petitions for review under this paragraph shall be served and filed within 30 days after the service of the decision of the agency upon all parties under s. 227.11. If a rehearing is requested under s. 227.12, any party desiring judicial review shall serve and file a petition for review within 30 days after service of the order finally disposing of the application for rehearing, or within 30 days after the final disposition by operation of law of any such application for

(Footnote 1 continued on Page 5.)

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(Footnote 1 continued from Page 4.)

rehearing. The 30-day period for serving and filing a petition under this paragraph commences on the day after personal service or mailing of the decision by the agency. If the petitioner is a resident, the proceedings shall be held in the circuit court for the county where the petitioner resides, except that if the petitioner is an agency, the proceedings shall be in the circuit court for the county where the respondent resides and except as provided in ss. 182.70(6) and 182.71(5)(g). The proceedings shall be in the circuit court for Dane county if the petitioner is a nonresident. If all parties stipulate and the court to which the parties desire to transfer the proceedings agrees, the proceedings may be held in the county designated by the parties. If 2 or more petitions for review of the same decision are filed in different counties, the circuit judge for the county in which a petition for review of the decision, and shall order transfer or consolidation where appropriate.

(b) The petition shall state the nature of the petitioner's interest, the facts showing that petitioner is a person aggrieved by the decision, and the grounds specified in s. 227.20 upon which petitioner contends that the decision should be reversed or modified.

(c) Copies of the petition shall be served, personally or by certified mail, or, when service is timely admitted in writing, by first class mail, not later than 30 days after the institution of the proceeding, upon all parties who appeared before the agency in the proceeding in which the order sought to be reviewed was made.

Note: For purposes of the above-noted statutory time-limits, the date of Commission service of this decision is the date it is placed in the mail (in this case the date appearing immediately above the signatures); the date of filing of a rehearing petition is the date of actual receipt by the Commission; and the service date of a judicial review petition is the date of actual receipt by the Court and placement in the mail to the Commission.

MEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER CLARIFYING BARGAINING UNIT

INTRODUCTION

The Union and the County are signatories to a 1984-85 collective bargaining agreement wherein the Union is recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of employes of the County with specified exceptions, including supervisors. The Union has petitioned the Commission to clarify the existing unit by including 3 positions titled Administrative Service Supervisor I (formerly Administrative Legal Secretary, Administrative Assistant I, and Administrative Legal Secretary, District Attorney's office). At hearing, the parties stipulated that the only issue to be determined is whether Joyce Armson, Rebecca Cascio, and Sharon Durst, the incumbents, are supervisors.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

It is the view of the Union that the supervisory authority of the individuals in question is "de minimus" in nature. At most, the Union would concede that the three are leadworkers and not supervisors within the meaning of the statute.

The County sets forth a lengthy review of record testimony relative to the duties and responsibilities of the three individuals whose positions are at issue. The County contends that all three persons have the authority to effectively recommend hiring, including promotion or transfer, discipline and discharge. Each is alleged to direct and assign work. They are treated as supervisors by those under them. Two others exercise supervisory authority in their respective areas. All three are paid as supervisors and none of them spends much time performing the same work as the employes supervisory and appropriately excluded from the collective bargaining unit.

DISCUSSION

Section 111.70(1)(o)1., Stats., defines a supervisor as follows:

As to other than municipal and county fire fighters, any individual who has authority, in the interest of the municipal employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other employes, or to adjust their grievances or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.

In determining whether a position is supervisory, the Commission gives consideration to the following factors:

1. The authority to effectively recommend the hiring, promotion, transfer, discipline or discharge of employes;

2. The authority to direct and assign the work force;

3. The number of employes supervised, and the number of other persons exercising greater, similar or lesser authority over the same employes;

4. The level of pay, including an evaluation of whether the supervisor is paid for his skills or for his supervision of employes;

5. Whether the supervisor is primarily supervising an activity or its primarily supervising employes;

6. Whether the supervisor is a working supervisor or whether he spends a substantial majority of his time supervising employes; and

7. The amount of independent judgment exercised in the supervision of employes. 2/

Not all of these factors need be present in any given case, but a sufficient combination of said factors must be present for the Commission to find an employe to be a supervisor. 3/

The record establishes that Durst has exercised substantial authority and discretion in the hiring process. She effectively recommends the hiring, transfer, and promotion of permanent status employes and hires and fires Limited Term Employes with little or no oversight. On a daily basis she assigns work to numerous clerical employes and monitors the use of vacation and sick leave benefits, authorizes and approves overtime and generally oversees the work of numerous people. Her work appears to be primarily supervisory, and while Erhardt possesses more supervisory authority, it appears that Durst does the direct supervision of clerical staff and that Erhardt is removed from direct supervision of the clerical staff.

Cascio has done less hiring, but participates in all hiring decisions and, acting alone, has hired a number of Limited Term Employes. She has never really exercised supervisory authority over the custodial employes and serves in more of a "lead" capacity with respect to them. However, her ability to assign workload, approve overtime, control the use of benefits, evaluate staff, review and control the quality of work product including the ability to direct that work be redone, when coupled with her input into hiring decisions suggest that hers is a supervisory position vis a vis the clerical employes.

Similarly, Armson assigns work, formulates work rule policies that dictate on the job behavior of certain employes, controls the quality of the clerical's work product, evaluates their performance, and, at least on one occasion, made the meaningful decision as to who among competing applicants, would be allowed to transfer into the Department. She has, acting alone, hired 4 or 5 Limited Term Employes. It was her uncontradicted testimony that based upon her conclusions as to productivity and efficiency, a new position was authorized for the Department. It appears that Armson does all of the direct supervision of the clericals. The Family Court Commissioner appears to be removed from such supervision and not to be involved with day-to-day matters.

The Commission concludes that Durst, Cascio and Armson exercise sufficient supervisory authority to warrant the conclusion that they are supervisors within the meaning of Sec. 111.70(1)(0)1., Stats, and an order that they shall remain excluded from the bargaining unit.

Dated at Madison, Wisconsin this 16th day of September, 1986.

WISCONSIN EMPLOTMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION Bγ Torosian, Chairman ler man ЛI ľла Marshall L. Gratz, Commissioner æ ore UZ. Danae Davis Gordon, Commissioner

^{2/} City of Kiel (Police Department), Dec. No. 11370-A (WERC, 3/83); Milwaukee County (Sheriff's Department) Dec. No. 22519 (WERC, 4/85).

^{3/} Dodge County, Dec. No. 17558-C (WERC, 2/81); Juneau County, Dec. No. 18728-A (WERC, 1/86); School District of Tomahawk, Dec. No. 22495 (WERC, 3/85).