

RECEIVED

MAY 9 1984

STATE OF WISCONSIN  
BEFORE THE MEDIATOR/ARBITRATOR

WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT  
RELATIONS COMMISSION

-----  
In the Matter of the  
Mediation/Arbitration Between

BRILLION FEDERATION OF TEACHERS  
AFT, LOCAL 3310, WFT, AFL-CIO

and

BRILLION PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT  
-----

Case VI  
No. 32138 Med/Arb-2417  
Decision No. 21079-A

APPEARANCES:

Greg Weyenberg, Staff Representative, Wisconsin Federation of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO, appearing on behalf of Local 3310 WFT.

Michael, Best & Friedrich, by Thomas W. Scrivner, appearing on behalf of the Brillion Public School District.

ARBITRATION HEARING BACKGROUND:

On November 14, 1983, the undersigned was notified by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission of appointment as mediator/arbitrator, pursuant to Section 111.70(4)(cm)6 of the Municipal Employment Relations Act in the matter of impasse between the Brillion Federation of Teachers, AFT, Local 3310, WFT, AFL-CIO, referred to herein as the Union, and the Brillion Public School District, referred to herein as the District or the Employer. Pursuant to petition and statutory requirements, a public hearing was held on January 17, 1984, followed by mediation. During mediation, the parties resolved the co-curricular issue by agreeing to a 5.25% increase in the present schedule, however, they were unable to resolve all items at impasse, thus, an arbitration hearing was held on February 2, 1984. At that time, the parties were given full opportunity to present relevant evidence and make oral argument. The proceedings were not transcribed, however, post-hearing briefs were filed with and exchanged through the mediator/arbitrator on March 1, 1984. While both parties were allowed the opportunity to file reply briefs, only the Union filed one and it was transmitted to the District's representative on March 20, 1984.

THE ISSUE:

The issue which remains at impasse between the parties involves the salary schedule. The final offers of the parties are attached as Appendix "A" and "B".

STATUTORY CRITERIA:

Since no voluntary impasse procedure was agreed to between the parties regarding the above impasse, the undersigned, under the Municipal Employment Relations Act, is required to choose the entire final offer of one of the parties on all unresolved issues.

Section 111.70(4)(cm)7 requires the mediator/arbitrator to consider the following criteria in the decision process:

- A. The lawful authority of the municipal employer.
- B. The stipulations of the parties.

- C. The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the unit of government to meet the costs of any proposed settlement.
- D. Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of municipal employes involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, hours and conditions of employment of other employes performing similar services and with other employes generally in public employment in the same community and in comparable communities and in private employment in the same community and comparable communities.
- E. The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known as the cost-of-living.
- F. The overall compensation presently received by the municipal employes, including direct wage compensation, vacation, holidays and excused time, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and stability of employment, and all other benefits received.
- G. Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings.
- H. Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service or in private employment.

THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES:

While the parties agree Denmark, Freedom, Hilbert, Mishicot, Reedsville, Valders and Wrightstown, all districts within the Olympian Athletic Conference should be used as comparable districts in this dispute, they differ over the inclusion of Chilton, Kiel, and New Holstein, as well as Gibraltar and Sevastopol. The Union proposes Chilton, Kiel and New Holstein be considered as primary comparables and that Gibraltar and Sevastopol be considered as secondary comparables while the District argues none of these districts should be included within the comparable pool. The Union cites as reason for inclusion of these districts their close geographic proximity to Brillion and the fact that past arbitration decisions involving other districts within the Olympian Athletic Conference have used them as comparables. In response, the District contends that when other arbitration decisions included them among the comparables, it was by mutual agreement of the parties, a situation not present here. It then adds the arbitrator should rely upon recent arbitration case law which supports the view that members of the athletic conference are the appropriate comparables.

In addition to differing over the comparables, the parties also disagree as to what is the appropriate base for costing the salary proposals. Both parties agree that "catch up" was a factor in the settlement reached in 1982-83 when a split schedule was implemented. They now differ, however, over whether the current package cost should be arrived at by using the salary base at the end of the 1982-83 agreement or by using the weighted average of the 1982-83 split schedule as the base. The District contends recent arbitration decision have determined the weighted average is the more appropriate method of determining overall costs. In addition, the District argues that if the Union's method of costing is used, teachers would receive an increase which would never accurately be reflected. The Union, on the other hand, argues its method of costing should be used since it takes into account the parties' efforts to provide "catch up" for the teachers in 1982-83. It continues that if the

weighted average is used to determine the percentage increases and is used to ascertain the reasonableness of the offers as they relate to the comparable districts, it offsets any effort which was made by the parties to provide "catch up" in the previous year.

As to the merits of the issue, the District asserts its offer is more reasonable relative to the comparables and relative to the cost of living increases in the past year. It also argues its offer more accurately favors the interest and welfare of the public. Stating there is no need for "catch up" in 1983-84 since it resolved the disparity in salaries in 1982-83, the District contends its offer for 1983-84 substantially maintains Brillion's salary ranking among the comparables. In addition, it states that while a one-year comparison of the final offers do not conclusively establish either offer as more reasonable, if the two-year increase is considered, its offer is the more reasonable of the two. It continues the same holds true if overall economic packages are reviewed.

The District maintains the reasonableness of its offer is further established when the overall salary increase is compared to the conference averages at the key benchmark positions. It contends such a comparison shows its offer exceeds the average at the BA Base position; is closer to the average at the BA Maximum position, and is about the same as the Union's at the Schedule Maximum position. While it notes that the situation is reversed at the MA Base and MA Maximum positions, it dismisses these differences declaring the "comparatively modest" impact at the masters level only affects six of the District's 53 teachers, a minority not sufficient to establish the Union's offer as more reasonable.

In addition to asserting the comparables support its position, the District argues the salary structure proposed by the Union is another reason to find the District's offer more reasonable. While noting it agreed to percentage increases in the increments and columns for 1982-83, the District maintains this agreement was reached because the numbers fit the overall increase the District was willing to agree upon and argues the agreement reached in 1982-83 should not be a binding part of the formal salary structure since it is a substantial change from the structure which previously existed. Concluding that the salary schedule for the past 20 years of collective bargaining within the District has not incorporated a salary schedule with percentages; that different percentages were agreed upon in each phase of the split schedule in 1982-83; that the percentages now sought by the Union are greater than the average of the percentages agreed to in the split schedule; that the weighted average of the percentages in the split schedule more closely approximates the District's final offer; that 1982-83 negotiations did not produce any agreement that percentages would be used in the future, and that percentages in the salary schedules are noticeably absent among the comparable districts' schedules, the District posits the Union's proposal would significantly affect the bargaining relationship between the parties and should be rejected.

In regard to the cost of living data, the District asserts the information most pertinent is that which prevailed for the period of May, 1983 through early October, 1983 when the parties were negotiating the reopener. Declaring the Consumer Price Index shows that during this period of time the percentage increase was 2.01% for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers and 1.95% for All Urban Consumers, the District asserts that not only does its offer exceed the cost of living increase by nearly 5% but that the Union's offer is over four times the increase. Consequently, it concludes its offer is the more reasonable.

The District concludes that the comparables and the cost-of-living data support for its position underscores why the interest and welfare of the public are favored by the District's offer. Stating public sector negotiations must reflect the economic reality of the

community, the District declares the available data regarding private sector settlements; the wage freezes within the area; the high levels of unemployment; the falling inflation rates; the decline in revenue sources for local units of government, and the difficulties inherent in local tax increases are all reason to favor the District's offer as it relates to the interest and welfare of the public.

Finally, the District argues the Union's position regarding overall compensation should be ignored. Stating that the parties have negotiated wage and benefit packages mutually acceptable for the past 20 years, the District posits the lack of disability insurance or a fully paid health insurance should not be used as reason for acceptance of the Union's position since they have voluntarily agreed to the benefit level they now have through the give and take of bargaining.

The Union, contending that the District's offer would give the teachers the lowest increases in dollar amounts per teacher and total package percentage, as well as destroy much of the "catch up" that was gained in 1982-83, argues its offer is more reasonable since it maintains the existing salary schedule structure and it more closely maintains the traditional benchmark positions occupied by the District. Asserting the vertical increment structure negotiated in the 1982-83 "catch up" agreement was necessary to provide a more competitive level of compensation, the Union posits that the District's offer, which deviates from the structure negotiated, would substantially erode the BA and MA lane comparisons. It continues that its offer is far more reasonable since it attempts to maintain the competitiveness of the salary schedule and adds its offer must also be considered the most equitable since the District has failed to offer any reasonable explanation for its attempt to modify the current structure.

Comparing total package percentage increases among those districts the Union considered primary comparables, the Union concludes the District's offer, using the District's calculations in costing, provides the teachers with the lowest increase among all the comparables. Adding, however, "percentages may not be the best judge of fairness to measure the offers", the Union also argues a review of dollar increases per teacher may be more significant in determining which offer is more reasonable. Using such a review, the Union concludes the District offers a dollar package offer per teacher which is lower. In contrast, it states its offer is much closer to the average received by the primary comparables and is, therefore, more reasonable.

The Union also argues its offer is preferred when it is measured against the traditional benchmark salary positions. Stating the Phase II increase in the 1982-83 settlement provided the teachers with a return to a more traditional salary ranking among the comparables, the Union then asserts its 1983-84 offer, as opposed to the District's offer, more closely maintains the traditional position. The Union continues the District's effort to tie the 1983-84 settlements to those of 1982-83 should be rejected since the results are misleading due to the fact that the parties attempted to provide the teachers with "catch up" in 1982-83 and such a linkage would totally ignore the effect of the settlements which occurred among the comparables between 1978-79 and 1982-83.

Finally, the Union rejects the District's arguments pertaining to private sector comparisons. It asserts the data used by the District is incomplete and vague and, therefore, should not be considered. It concludes that based on the data provided by the District it cannot be surmised that the District's offer is more favorable to the interest and welfare of the public. In juxtaposition, the Union argues the interest and welfare of the public must also be considered as it relates to educational reform and reasons that it is in the best interest of the public to maintain competitive teacher salaries at a time when governmental studies are calling for higher salaries in order to improve the educational system.

DISCUSSION:

Before the merits of the issue in dispute can be discussed, it is necessary to determine which set of school districts comprises the comparables and whether the year-end figure or the weighted average of the previous year's settlement should be used as the base for determining the reasonableness of the increase provided in the final offers. As to the comparables, it is determined the athletic conference districts shall comprise the appropriate set. The Union argued Chilton, Kiel, and New Holstein should also be included among the comparables, not only because they are similar in size to the athletic conference districts and geographically near but because these districts have been included in other arbitration decisions involving districts within the conference. While both of these arguments are persuasive, the three districts were not included among the comparables for several reasons. The addition of New Holstein to the comparables would have resulted in the addition of a district which would have been larger than any district the parties mutually agreed were comparable. Second, a review of the data provided for Kiel indicated the information appeared to be incorrect since the benchmark salaries at the MA Base, MA Maximum and Schedule Maximum remained the same in 1981-82 and 1982-83. While the salaries could have remained constant during that two-year period of time, it does not seem likely, therefore error was suspected. Further, a review of the arbitration decisions cited in support of their acceptance as comparables indicates that these districts were included as comparables only where they were mutually agreed upon by the parties. Finally, it was decided there was no need to include districts beyond those mutually agreed upon in this matter since information regarding the settlements in all of the conference districts was available and it was sufficient to establish a settlement pattern for the area.

More important to determining the reasonableness of the final offers of the parties is determining which figure will be used as the base in calculating the increase. The District cited many arbitration decisions which they argued concluded the total dollar increase was the most important consideration in determining the reasonableness of the offers. Included among those decisions was one written by this arbitrator. After reviewing that decision, as well as the others cited, it is concluded the fact situation in this matter differs substantially from those in the other decisions. Of primary importance in this matter is the fact that the parties both agree the 1982-83 increase in wages achieved through a split salary schedule was to allow "catch-up" for the teachers. The purpose of "catch-up" is to give a salary increase which makes up for a long-term lag behind salaries of comparable position or which recognizes that a position has been underpaid in the past. In this case, the parties agreed the teachers had fallen behind in compensation among the comparables and they had made an effort to correct this situation in 1982-83. If the weighted average of the 1982-83 increase in wages is used as the base for determining the size of the 1983-84 increase, the net effect would be to negate any concept of "catch-up" which occurred in 1982-83. Consequently, it is concluded the year-end figure in the salary schedule is the more appropriate figure to use in determining the reasonableness of the offers.

When the year-end figures are used to determine the reasonableness of the offers, it is concluded the Union's offer is more favorably supported by the comparables. An analysis of the data provided by the parties for 1978-79, 1981-82, and 1982-83 shows the significant change in rank and drop in compensation teachers within the District experienced and lends credibility to the parties' intent to provide "catch-up" in 1982-83. While the 1982-83 increase in salary does not return the teachers to the position they had maintained in previous years, it does reflect a ranking and level of compensation which both parties thought reasonable since they voluntarily agreed to the 1982-83 increase in wages. Thus, when the 1982-83 wage offers were

compared for the purposes of establishing reasonableness, they were compared with the rank and compensation achieved in 1982-83. An analysis of the final offers, as shown on page 7, shows the District's offer more constantly and more significantly deviates from the standard set in 1982-83.

In analyzing the benchmarks as they relate to the average of the comparable districts, it is concluded the District's offer is only more reasonable at the BA Base benchmark. At the BA Base, the District's offer more closely approximates the previous year's position in comparison to the average but results in a drop in rank from 7th position to 8th position. The Union's offer, while it maintains the previous year's rank, would narrow the difference from the average established as acceptable in 1982-83.

At the BA Maximum benchmark, both offers result in a drop in compensation over the difference from the average which existed in 1982-83 and a drop in rank. The District's offer, however, causes a more significant change. The District's offer results in a \$478.00 drop in compensation from the position established in 1982-83 and causes a drop in rank from 3rd to 5th. The Union's offer causes a \$50.00 drop in compensation and a drop in rank from 3rd to 4th among the comparables.

At the MA Base, both the District's offer and the Union's offer result in the same decrease in compensation and drop in rank since the offers are \$3.00 apart at this benchmark. The significant difference between the offers occurs, however, at the MA Maximum and Schedule Maximum benchmarks. At the MA Maximum benchmark, while both offers widen the difference from the average as previously established, the District's offer more significantly widens this gap. The District's offer results in a \$548.00 drop in compensation and a drop in rank from 3rd to 4th and the Union's offer causes a \$101.00 drop in compensation but maintains rank.

The same type of disparity occurs at the Schedule Maximum benchmark. Here, too, both offers increase the difference from the average as established in 1982-83 but the District's offer causes the greater change. The District's offer not only changes the spread from \$350.00 below the average to \$1,322.00 below the average (an increase of \$972.00), but it causes a drop in rank from 4th to 6th position. The Union's offer, on the other hand, while it also widens the difference from the average and causes a drop in rank from 4th to 5th position, causes less deterioration of comparability among the schedules.

The District has argued the changes at the MA Maximum and Schedule Maximum benchmarks should not be determinative of which offer is more reasonable since so few teachers are in these benchmark positions. While schedules frequently are modified to meet the demands of the current teaching staff, which can cause distortions in salaries at various points on the salary schedule, it is important for the salary schedule to reflect comparable distribution increases throughout the schedule. Thus, although only a few teachers may receive the wage increase proposed at the MA Maximum and Schedule Maximum benchmarks, the impact of the District's offer on these benchmark positions must be given as much consideration as the impact of the offer on the rest of the schedule. Consequently, in reviewing the five benchmark positions, it is concluded that while the District's offer is more reasonable at the BA Base and both offers have the same effect at the MA Base, the Union's offer is more reasonable at the BA Maximum, MA Maximum, and Schedule Maximum benchmark positions.

Not only does a comparison of the salary to the average compensation among the districts show the Union's offer to be more reasonable, but a comparison of the increment increases, both in dollars and percentages, as shown on page 8, also supports the Union's offer.

COMPARISON OF FINAL OFFERS TO AVERAGE SALARY INCREASE  
RELATIVE TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR'S POSITION

	BA Base		BA Maximum		MA Base		MA Maximum		Schedule Maximum	
	1982-83	1983-84	1982-83	1983-84	1982-83	1983-84	1982-83	1983-84	1982-83	1983-84
Denmark	12,875	13,450	21,250	22,439	13,775	14,500	22,690	24,140	22,690	24,140
Freedom	12,925	13,575	20,939	22,127	15,252	16,019	25,333	26,743	26,496	28,372
Hilbert	12,700	13,350	16,795	17,805	13,900	14,700	21,775	23,175	22,375	23,850
Mishicot	12,800	13,250	19,328	20,571	14,080	14,840	21,120	22,724	21,120	23,519
Reedsville	12,715	13,400	18,355	19,340	13,615	14,900	20,665	22,325	20,665	22,625
Valders	12,400	13,300	19,495	20,815	13,200	14,500	20,925	22,675	21,325	23,075
Wrightstown	12,800	13,500	19,160	20,220	13,800	14,500	20,760	21,820	21,560	22,620
Average	12,745	13,404	19,332	20,474	13,946	14,851	21,895	23,372	22,319	24,072
Brillion	12,600	$\frac{13,250}{13,300}$	19,656	$\frac{20,320}{20,748}$	13,734	$\frac{14,500}{14,447}$	21,969	$\frac{22,750}{23,197}$	21,969	$\frac{22,750}{23,197}$
Difference	-145	$\frac{-154}{-104}$	324	$\frac{-154}{274}$	-212	$\frac{-351}{-354}$	-74	$\frac{-622}{-175}$	-350	$\frac{-1322}{-875}$

COMPARISON OF DOLLAR & PERCENT INCREASE  
IN INCREMENTS FOR 1983-84

	BA Base		BA Maximum		MA Base		MA Maximum		Schedule Maximum	
Denmark	575	4.5	1189	5.6	725	5.3	1450	6.0	1450	6.0
Freedom	650	5.0	1188	5.7	767	5.0	1410	5.3	1876	7.1
Hilbert	650	5.1	1010	6.0	800	5.8	1400	6.0	1475	6.6
Mishicot	450	3.5	1243	6.4	760	5.4	1604	7.1	2399	11.4
Reedsville	685	5.4	985	5.4	1285	9.4	1660	7.4	1960	9.5
Valders	900	7.3	1320	6.8	1300	9.8	1750	7.7	1750	7.7
Wrightstown	700	5.5	1060	5.5	700	5.1	1060	4.9	1060	4.9
Average	659	5.2	1142	5.9	905	6.5	1476	6.3	1710	7.6
Mean	650	5.1	1188	5.7	767	5.0	1450	6.0	1750	7.7
Brillion	650	5.2	664	3.4	766	5.6	781	3.6	781	3.6
	700	5.6	1092	5.6	763	5.6	1228	5.6	1228	5.6

At all benchmark positions, except the BA Base, the Union's offer more closely approximates the mean and average increases. Consequently, as to comparability, it is concluded the Union's offer is the more reasonable.

As important as maintaining schedule comparability is the reasonableness of the offers as they relate to the cost of living and the effect of the offers on the interest and welfare of the public. Both offers, as they relate to the cost of living increase expressed by the Consumer Price Index are reasonable, however the Consumer Price Index is not the only measure of the cost of living. When settlement percentages among the comparables are considered it is concluded the Union's offer is more reasonable.

PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF TOTAL PACKAGE

District	District's Figure	Union's Figure
Denmark	7.9%	8.3%
Freedom	7.6%	8.4%
Hilbert	8.1%	7.6%
Mishicot	7.3%	7.9%
Reedsville	8.3%	8.8%
Valders	10.4%	10.6%
Wrightstown	7.5%	8.5%
Average	8.2%	8.6%
Brillion		
District's Offer	5.1%	5.1%
Union's Offer	7.0%	7.0%

Both the District's figures and the Union's figures were used for the comparison since the numbers differed slightly.




Finally, it cannot be concluded that either offer will have an adverse effect upon the interest and welfare of the public. While the District cited some settlements among private sector businesses within the area and indicated there was high unemployment, there was no showing that the economy in general, or the unemployment status within the area was any different than the conditions which prevail among the comparable districts. Without such a showing, it cannot be concluded that implementation of the Union's offer will have a harmful effect upon the community since its offer is no different than comparable settlements.

Since it was determined that the Union's offer was more reasonable based on comparability and the cost of living and that there was no showing that implementation of the Union's offer would have an adverse effect upon the community, it was concluded that it was not necessary to address the question raised by the Union regarding the changing of the status quo in the salary schedule structure. Thus, having reviewed the evidence and arguments and after applying the statutory criteria and having concluded the Union's offer is more reasonable when all the criteria are considered, the undersigned makes the following:

AWARD

The final offer of the Union, along with the stipulations of the parties which reflect prior agreements in bargaining as well as provisions of the predecessor collective bargaining agreement which remained unchanged during the course of bargaining, are to be incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement for 1983-84 as required by statute.

Dated this 26th day of April, 1984.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Sharon K. Imes  
Mediator/Arbitrator

SKI:mm

APPENDIX "A"

FINAL OFFER

BRILLION FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

LOCAL 3310 AFL-CIO

- 1) HEALTH INSURANCE - Group health and accident insurance will be provided. Employees desiring coverage would pay the first \$5.00 of single coverage and the first \$10.00 of family coverage per month. Thereafter, the board would pay up to a maximum of \$45.40 a month for the single plan and \$130.68 a month for the family plan. Any cost beyond this would be paid by the employees.

- 2) CO-CURRICULAR - INCREASE PRESENT SCHEDULE BY ~~5.555%~~ 5.25%

*Beverly Loofboro*  
*Jan. 17, 1984*

- 3) SALARY - (Present Structure) - Increase BA Base to \$13,300.

*Beverly Loofboro*  
*Oct. 6, 1983*

.....  
 .....

THE TEACHER GRID FILE IS BFT1  
 BASE SALARY IS \$ 13300  
 WHICH IS 5.556 PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVER  
 THE \$ 12600 BASE  
 HORIZONTAL INCREMENT IS 3 PERCENT  
 VERTICLE INCREMENT IS 4 PERCENT

	VR	BR	BR+12	BR+24	BR+36	BR
7						
8						
9	0	\$13,300	\$13,699	\$14,098	\$14,498	\$14,497
10	1	\$13,832	\$14,247	\$14,662	\$15,078	\$15,077
11	2	\$14,364	\$14,795	\$15,226	\$15,642	\$15,637
12	3	\$14,896	\$15,343	\$15,790	\$16,204	\$16,237
13	4	\$15,428	\$15,891	\$16,354	\$16,766	\$16,817
14	5	\$15,960	\$16,439	\$16,918	\$17,328	\$17,397
15	6	\$16,492	\$16,987	\$17,482	\$17,890	\$17,977
16	7	\$17,024	\$17,535	\$18,046	\$18,382	\$18,357
17	8	\$17,556	\$18,083	\$18,610	\$18,874	\$19,137
18	9	\$18,088	\$18,631	\$19,174	\$19,446	\$19,717
19	10	\$18,620	\$19,179	\$19,730	\$20,010	\$20,297
20	11	\$19,152	\$19,727	\$20,282	\$20,590	\$20,877
21	12	\$19,684	\$20,275	\$20,866	\$21,162	\$21,457
22	13	\$20,216	\$20,823	\$21,430	\$21,734	\$22,037
23	14	\$20,748	\$21,371	\$21,994	\$22,306	\$22,617
						\$22,197

## APPENDIX "B"

Appendix A

BRILLION PUBLIC SCHOOLS - SALARY SCHEDULE

— Increment  
— Column

Increment STEP	\$505 BA	\$520 BA+12	\$535 BA+24	\$545 BA+30	\$550 MA
Years of Experience					
0	\$13,250	\$13,665	\$14,085	\$14,295	\$14,500
1	13,755	14,185	14,620	14,840	15,050
2	14,260	14,705	15,155	15,385	15,600
3	14,756	15,225	15,690	15,930	16,150
4	15,270	15,745	16,225	16,475	16,700
5	15,775	16,265	16,760	17,020	17,250
6	16,280	16,785	17,295	17,565	17,800
7	16,785	17,305	17,830	18,110	18,350
8	17,290	17,825	18,365	18,655	18,900
9	17,795	18,345	18,900	19,200	19,450
10	18,300	18,865	19,435	19,745	20,000
11	18,805	19,385	19,970	20,290	20,550
12	19,310	19,905	20,505	20,835	21,100
13	19,815	20,425	21,040	21,380	21,650
14	20,320	20,945	21,575	21,925	22,200
15					22,750

ATHLETIC AND EXTRA-CURRICULAR SALARY SCHEDULE

Increase all phases by ~~5~~ 5.25%

Jan 13, 1984  
Richard J. Coast

ARTICLE VII

INSURANCE

- A. Group health and accident insurance will be provided. Employees desiring coverage would pay the first \$5.00 of single coverage and the first \$10.00 of family coverage per month. Thereafter, the board would pay up to a maximum of \$45.40 a month for the single plan and \$130.68 a month for the family plan. Any cost beyond this would be paid by the employees.
- B. The board will continue to make group life insurance available to teachers as offered by the Group Insurance Board of the State of Wisconsin and shall continue to pay the employer cost for its personnel pursuant to statute.

Oct 6, 1983

Richard J. Coast

Salary Only.	\$ 1,060,275
\$ increase	70,491
% increase.	7.12

Total Salary & Fringe.	1,315,234
Total \$ increase.	91,408
Total % increase.	7.47