

OCT 29 1984

WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT  
RELATIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF WISCONSIN

BEFORE THE MEDIATOR/ARBITRATOR

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 In the Matter of the Petition :  
 of :  
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 SOUTHERN LAKES UNITED :  
 EDUCATORS, COUNCIL 26, NEA, :  
 WEAC : Case III  
 : No. 31699 MED/ARB-2297  
 To Initiate Mediation-Arbitration : Decision No. 21497-A  
 Between Said Petitioner and :  
 :  
 JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7, :  
 TOWNS OF NORWAY AND RAYMOND :  
 (DROUGHT SCHOOL) :  
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APPEARANCES: MARY M. HORTON, Executive Director, Southern Lakes United Educators, appearing on behalf of the Association.

KENNETH COLE, Wisconsin Association of School Boards, appearing on behalf of the District.

ARBITRATION AWARD

Joint School District No. 7, Towns of Norway and Raymond (Drought School), hereinafter referred to as the District or Board, and Southern Lakes United Educators, Council 26, NEA, WEAC, hereinafter referred to as the Association, were unable to resolve their negotiations over the provisions to be included in a new 1983-1985 Collective Bargaining Agreement to replace the Collective Bargaining Agreement which covered the 1982-1983 school year and, on June 9, 1983, the Association filed a petition with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) for the purpose of initiating mediation-arbitration pursuant to the provisions of Section 111.70(4)(cm)6. of the Wisconsin Statutes. The WERC investigated the dispute and, upon determination that there was an impasse which could not be resolved through mediation, certified the matter to mediation-arbitration by Order dated March 14, 1984. The parties thereafter selected the undersigned from a panel of mediator-arbitrators submitted to them by the WERC and the WERC issued an Order, dated May 1, 1984, appointing the undersigned as mediator-arbitrator. The undersigned endeavored to mediate the remaining issues in dispute on July 25, 1984 and all such issues were resolved, except for the salary schedules to be in effect for each of the two years of the agreement. Both parties agreed to modify their final offers to eliminate the issues resolved and, by prior agreement of the parties, a hearing was conducted on the remaining issues in dispute on the same date. Post-hearing briefs and reply briefs were filed and exchanged by September 24, 1984. Full consideration has been given to the evidence and arguments presented in rendering the award herein.

THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE

Although mediation proved successful in resolving a number of issues related to staff reduction provisions and extra curricular pay, the parties were unable to resolve their

dispute over the salary schedule to be in effect for 1983-1984 and the salary schedule to be in effect for 1984-1985. Neither party modified its final offer with regard to the proposed salary schedules and the undersigned will therefore be required to select the total final offer of the Association or the District in order to resolve that dispute.

The 1982-1983 salary schedule is attached hereto and marked Appendix A. Said schedule contains a BA base of \$12,350; contains ten lanes representing levels of educational attainment from possession of a BA degree to a Master's degree plus 18 credits; has 12 experience steps in the first 3 educational lanes, 14 experience steps in the fourth educational lane, and 17 experience steps in the remaining educational lanes; and contains a schedule maximum salary of \$22,400. The steps vary in value by dollar amounts ranging from \$450 to \$600 as a teacher progresses through the steps and through the lanes of the schedule.

For the 1983-1984 school year the Board proposes to eliminate the entry level salary figures on the 1982-1983 salary schedule and renumber the steps, 1 through 11 accordingly. In addition, the District proposes to increase the salary figures at each cell (including the new entry level cells) by \$80. Thus, under the Board's proposal the new BA base will be \$12,830; the total number of steps will be reduced by 1 in each lane of the schedule; and the dollar value of the increments between steps and between lanes will remain the same.

In the second year of the agreement the Board proposes to again eliminate the salary figures in the "new" zero step of the 1982-1983 salary schedule and renumber the steps accordingly. In addition, the District proposes to add \$200 to each cell, including the entry level cells. These proposed changes would cause the BA base to be increased in the second year of the agreement to \$13,450; would reduce the number of steps by 1 in each lane; and would maintain the same dollar differences between steps and lanes.

Viewed differently, the Board's proposal would increase the salary base by \$530 in the first year of the agreement and by \$650 in the second year of the agreement. In terms of its practical impact upon the approximate 10 employees holding the 8.3 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions in the bargaining unit, they each will move forward 2 steps in each year of the agreement and receive an additional \$80 and an additional \$200 in each year of the agreement. Assuming no turnover of staff<sup>1/</sup>, the average increase per employee under the Board's offer would be \$992.05 or 6.53% in the first year and \$1056.14 or 6.53% in the second year, according to the Association's calculations. In reviewing these numbers it should be noted that 4.3 of the 8.3 positions held in 1982-1983 were in the BA lane and 1 each were at the BA+6 step 4, BA+30 step 4, BA+30 step 11, and MA step 9, respectively. The turnover involved 2 full-time and one-half time employees in the BA and BA+6 lanes.

The Association proposes to make no structural changes

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<sup>1/</sup> In fact, 1 full-time employee left prior to the 1983-1984 school year and 2 full-time employees left prior to the start of the 1984-1985 school year.

in the 1982-1983 salary schedule. Instead, it proposes to add \$1,000 to the BA base and to each cell of that schedule for the 1983-1984 school year. In the second year of the agreement, the Association proposes to increase the BA base and each cell of the schedule by an additional \$950.

Under the Association's proposal, each full-time member of the bargaining unit who returns for each of the 2 years would receive \$1,000 plus the value of the increment applicable to their step in the first year and \$950 plus the value of the increment applicable to their step in the second year. Again, assuming no turnover of staff from the 1982-1983 school year, the average salary increase per full-time teacher would amount to \$1,383.73 or 9.59% in the first year and \$1,406.02 or 8.45% in the second year, according to Association calculations.

According to Association calculations, the projected cost of the two proposals (based upon the "cast forward" staff assumption) would be 7.05% for the first year and 6.68% for the second year under the Board's final offer and 9.98% for the first year and 8.52% for the second year under the Association's final offer. In terms of actual cost of the final offers, the Association points out that the District has reduced the total number of positions by approximately 8 tenths of 1 FTE and suggests that it is possible that the employees who left the District will be replaced by employees at lower steps in the salary schedule.

#### BOARD'S POSITION

In its arguments, the Board cites the above percentage calculations provided by the Association and argues that its offer is more appropriate and should be selected because it is the equivalent of settlements in school districts that are similarly situated. According to the Board, the financial circumstances of the District, in terms of costs and resources, do not support an increase in its offer and the relative magnitude of the salaries already paid in the District do not suggest that a "catch up" argument is appropriate.

According to the Board, the school districts which should be considered comparable for purposes of salary comparisons, are those districts which are geographically proximate and which have the same educational structure and are similar in size. According to the Board, there are eight such districts, consisting of the feeder schools for Waterford Union High School and Union Grove Union High School, all of which are located in Racine County. According to the Board, these districts are geographically proximate, share the same educational structure, and are relatively small in terms of enrollment. In support of its position on comparables, the Board cites the decisions of two other arbitrators involving

tax levy rate of 6.54 mills is also one of the highest tax rates for the 8 districts in question. This is so, according to the Board, even though the equalized valuation per member is among the lowest of the same group. Other data shows that the District has a pupil-teacher ratio which is lower than any of the comparables, except for Kansasville-Dover.

According to the Board, it gave consideration to the above described financial circumstances in making its offer and rejecting the Union's offer. It is argued that the absence of similar financial data in support of the Association's expanded sets of comparables makes it impossible to determine whether such additional comparisons should in fact be made.

With regard to the "benchmark" comparisons contained within the Association's exhibits, the Board argues that such comparisons are not particularly appropriate in this case. This is so because no teacher in the District is at a maximum salary level and in fact no teacher is at the other benchmark levels relied upon by the Association.

According to the Board, the salary levels in the District for 1982-1983 were comparable at all levels with the other districts it relies upon. Only 2 of those districts had higher maximum salaries during that year and similar results are obtained through comparisons at other salary schedule levels. According to the Board, if it believed that it was desirable to argue benchmark comparisons, it "could have added any number of steps to the schedule to produce the appropriate dollar and percentage increases." The real question, it argues, is whether the increase offered by the Board of approximately 7% in each year compares favorably with increases offered by the other school districts it relies upon.

Utilizing data submitted by the Association, the Board argues that the percentage settlement figures contained therein support the reasonableness of the Board's offer. That data shows that 5 of the 7 districts claimed comparable provided 1983-1984 salary increases ranging from a low of 6.09% at Waterford-Rochester to a high of 7.46% at Raymond. According to the Board, none of these percentage increases is "remotely reflective" of the Association's offer.

The Board acknowledges that the dollar increases received by teachers in some of the other districts are not equivalent but argues that this is the result of the experience of the faculty in a particular school district as well as the degrees and credits earned by the particular teachers involved.

The Board also contends that the <sup>total</sup> percentage increase reflected in its offer is generally supported by the Association's data with regard to settlements for all area K-3 feeder districts. Only 1 or 2 of those settlements tend to support the Association's offer, it is contended. Thus, according to the Board, its offer in terms of percentage increase, is very comparable to other voluntary settlements.

The District makes the following reply to arguments raised by the Association in its brief:

1. The Association argument that its offer more "adequately" compensates teachers is irrelevant since the issue is not the "adequacy" of compensation and there is no evidence in the record with regard to that concept. In terms of comparisons to voluntary settlements the District's offer should be favored.

2. While the Board does not argue that it is unable to pay the increases sought by the Association, it does argue that it is a "high cost District" and that such costs will be even higher if the Association's offer is accepted.

3. The Association's claims with regard to the "pattern of settlement" beg the issue as to what is the appropriate or correct pattern to be reviewed. The Board agrees that certain data with regard to the "pattern of settlement" relied upon by the Association is accurate and that data reflects a pattern of settlements of basically 7.5% increases. While the Board acknowledges that its offer may be slightly below this level, it argues that the Union's offer is too large to be justified.

4. The benchmark comparisons and dollar increase comparisons made by the Association are not reliable. In particular, dollar increases are greatly influenced by existing salary levels in the districts compared to. Since data demonstrates that, on the average, other school districts have staff members with greater years of service and possibly more education, the Board should not be required to grant increases of the same dollar magnitude as those districts with more mature teaching staffs.

Finally, in conclusion, the Board asks that the arbitrator consider the evidence concerning percentage increases and competitiveness of existing salary levels and find that the Board's offer should be selected.

#### ASSOCIATION'S POSITION

According to the Association, the issue in this case can be stated simply as whether the base salary for the 1983-1984 year should be increased from \$12,350 to \$13,350 and to \$14,300 for the 1983-1984 year, as the Association proposes, or whether it should be increased to \$12,880 and \$13,450 as the Board has proposed. (Viewed in this light, the proposed increases in the base represent 8.1% and 7.1% under the Association's proposal and 4.3% and 4.4% under the Board's proposal.)

The Association relies upon a large quantity of comparable data consisting of information concerning salary schedules in all of the CESA Number 18 school districts, for which it has data. There are 38 such school districts, in addition to Drought. The Association also has presented data with regard to 3 "subsets" of school districts located within the area serviced by CESA Number 18. One group consists of 24 additional K-8 school districts which feed the 6 union high school districts located within CESA Number 18. Another group consists of 2 of the other 3 K-8 feeder schools which, like Drought, feed the Waterford Union High School District. The third subset consists of 9 school districts, also located within CESA Number 18, for which the Association has data and which, in the Association's view, are similar in size to Drought, based upon FTE faculty and enrollment.

The Association urges acceptance of its proposed comparable groupings based on the claim that they represent legitimate "intra industry" comparisons, since the employees perform the same work, and because at least 1 arbitrator<sup>3/</sup> has characterized

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3/ See Lake Geneva, Decision No. 29372 (Petri)

such intra industry comparisons as the single most important criterion for wage determining standards. The feeder schools are comparable because they, like the District, feed into union high schools; the feeder schools to Waterford Union High School include Drought; and the schools of similar size are comparable to Drought for that reason alone, it is argued.

Drawing upon data contained in its numerous exhibits, the Association first argues that its offer is more reasonable, compared with area settlements. The Association cites several arbitration awards placing emphasis upon area settlement patterns and argues that the dollar increase and percentage increase data drawn from the Association's comparisons and the 3 subsets therein, support its offer as being more reasonable than the District's.

Secondly, the Association argues that its offer is more reasonable based upon the 7 benchmarks generally utilized in mediation-arbitration proceedings involving teacher salary schedules. According to the Association, these 7 benchmarks have been cited by arbitrators, particularly Arbitrator Yaffe, as far more reliable and predictable for purposes of establishing reasonable and undistorted salary schedules. The use of benchmarks more accurately compares actual earning power of employees, it is argued. On the other hand, comparisons based on total package costing is only valid, in the Association's view, when all of the staff from the prior year returns. Further, the Association argues, the actual cost of teachers' salaries for the first year of the agreement would be slightly less than the actual cost of the prior year under the Board's offer and \$2,115 more under the Association's offer, because of the District's decision to reduce the physical education teacher position from 100% to 20%.

The Association also reviews each of the statutory criterion and concludes that they are either inapplicable in this case or actually support the Association's offer. According to the Association, the Board is not prohibited by law from implementing the Association's offer and the tentative agreements which the parties have reached in bargaining have no particular relevance to the salary issue. The interests and welfare of the public are best served when teachers have high morale and are engaged in educational activities rather than concerned about erosion in their wages, hours, and working conditions in comparison to other teachers in other districts. The Committee on Teaching and Teacher Education in Wisconsin recently emphasized the critical importance of the classroom teacher in quality education and it is contrary to the public interest to diminish morale of teachers by failing to pay them comparable wages.

The Association notes that the District does not claim an inability to pay the salary levels requested in the Association's offer and this position is understandable in view of the Association's evidence that the actual additional cost in the first year of the agreement will be less than \$3,000. While the District has attempted to show that per pupil cost is higher than elsewhere, the Association questions the District's consistency by introducing a news article comparing districts in other counties, even though it has relied on 7 other K-8 districts in Racine County. Also, the Association points out that the newspaper article dealt with a "projected" figure for 1982-1983, made by a private organization, rather than the actual per pupil cost as reflected in other Board exhibits. Thus, it is argued the real dispute in this case is the Board's "willingness" to pay.

Utilizing average dollar increase figures for each year, contained within its exhibits relating to CESA Number 18 schools and the 3 subsets, the Association argues that its proposed increases are much closer to those averages, under the comparison criterion. The Association claims that Drought teachers have also experienced erosion in their comparative positions at the benchmarks over the past 5 years and that the Board's offer would further erode that position, whereas the Association's offer would maintain or slightly improve that position.

With regard to increases in consumer prices, the Association argues that the appropriate measure of such increases is the CPI for Milwaukee from June 1983 through June 1984, which reflects an increase of 7.2%. Based upon this comparison the Association argues that its 9.59% offer would maintain comparative salary position and allow some "catch up" in lost earning power over the last 5 years.

In terms of overall compensation, the Association claims that the District does not provide dental insurance and that this fact causes it to compare unfavorably under this criterion, even among the 7 feeder schools relied upon by the District, it is alleged.

According to the Association, there have been no pertinent changes during the pendency of this proceeding and there are no other factors which are relevant to its resolution.

In its reply brief the Association takes issue with the arguments asserted by the District in support of its comparisons, the reasonableness of its salary schedule, the relevance of benchmark comparisons in this dispute, and its comparison of increases, based on percentage rather than dollar increase figures. Further, the Association expands upon its argument to the effect that the District's rank will fall under the Board's offer. It summarizes its rebuttal arguments as follows:

"In conclusion the following facts must be considered:

- "1. The District has attempted to tailor their set of comparables to support a minimal wage increase for the teachers while arbitrators have agreed that multiple groups of comparables are appropriate in this area.
- "2. The Board refers in generalities about the economic circumstances of the District but never supports its arguments with solid evidence. The Association believes this is an attempt to conceal their real feeling of unwillingness to pay the teachers.
- "3. The District claims benchmark comparisons inappropriate in this dispute, but uses benchmark comparisons to support its position.
- "4. Dollar increases, not percentage increases, more accurately compare wage settlements.
- "5. If the Board's offer is adopted, the teachers will lose their ranking at every benchmark in almost everyone of the comparable groups. The teachers at Drought have a right to maintain their ranking. The Association offer, if adopted, will maintain their ranking but not significantly improve it.

"The Association has put forth great effort in presenting the data which supports its position. On the contrary, the Board presents an inconclusive case which is really an attempt to conceal their unwillingness to pay the teachers.

"The Association believes that all of the evidence and data supports its position and that its final offer should be selected."

#### DISCUSSION

As a general proposition, the undersigned agrees with the Employer, that the most appropriate group for "intra industry" comparison purposes in the case of a K-8 feeder school district, consists of other proximately located K-8 feeder schools of similar size. Unfortunately, the relative scarcity of such available comparisons often requires some resort to data from less proximate districts and to districts which are either K-12 or larger in size in order to insure that the comparisons are reliable.

In this case, there are a number of Union high school districts within fairly close proximity and, as a consequence, there are as many as 24 K-8 districts to draw upon for comparison purposes. While there is considerable variation in size among such districts, the Association's data also breaks the K-8 districts down for comparison purposes, thereby offering some basis for checking on the validity of the data reflected in the larger group of all K-8 districts in CESA Number 18.

The 8 K-8 districts relied upon by the Board have certain advantages over the larger group of all K-8 districts in the area served by CESA Number 18, because of their relative geographic proximity. However, at least one of those districts, North Cape, is not deemed reliable for purposes of comparison, even though it is a sister district for purposes of feeding Waterford Union High School. This is so because there is apparently no collective bargaining agreement and the available data concerning the "salary schedule" at North Cape is somewhat sketchy and in an unreliable form.

For these reasons, the undersigned has considered all of the available data concerning K-8 feeder districts in CESA Number 18, but attempted to give greater weight to the data relating to K-8 districts which are closest in proximity and size. However, no effort has been made to reconstruct the data provided by the parties into new groupings and the data provided is considered to be in a generally usable form as presented.

The question of which districts should be utilized for comparison purposes in this proceeding is, in some ways, far less significant than the question which basis of comparison should be given greatest or controlling importance on the facts in this case. Thus, the evidence and arguments provide ample comparisons based upon relative rank at selected benchmark points, average dollar increases and average percentage increases in salary at selected benchmark points, and average total salary increases and cost increases, measured in percentage terms. However, depending on whether you focus on average dollar increases or percentage dollar increases for example, the available data tends to favor one offer or the other.



When the implications of the comparative data are split or otherwise ambiguous there are no universal or easy answers to the dilemma thus presented, and each case must be reviewed on its own facts.

In this case, if the undersigned were to focus on the average percentage increase in salary or the average percentage increase in cost (using the cast forward assumption) the data would favor the District. Thus, even though the percentage increase in salary and the total percentage cost under the Board's offer is somewhat low in comparison to the figures for many of the schools in the various K-8 groupings, the same percentages, under the Association's proposal, are further from the norm. On the other hand, based upon benchmark comparisons of rank and actual salary increases, the Association's final offer is more reasonable than the Board's final offer.

Both sides argue that the others' bases for comparison are distorted, in part due to the small size of the work force and the relative importance of actual placement on the salary schedule. In the view of the undersigned, such considerations are indeed of considerable importance in resolving this dispute.

The Board faults the Association's data with regard to rank comparisons (and other comparisons) at the benchmark points because there are no employees at "any"<sup>4/</sup> of the benchmark positions. However, as the Association points out, there are valid reasons for utilizing a consistent basis of comparison in the case of salary schedules, so long as care is taken to take note of any aberrations in a given schedule which might distort such analysis.<sup>5/</sup> Those rank comparisons tend to show that, under the Board's proposal, the District's rank will slip in a number of areas, whereas, under the Association's proposal, rank is generally maintained. A similar result is obtained when one compares the benchmark positions based on salary increases.

In the view of the undersigned, the Board makes a partially valid point when it criticizes certain of the Association's benchmark comparisons dealing with salary increases and percentage increases. In the case of the BA, MA and schedule maximums, there are not only no employees at those steps, but the comparisons of salary increases and percentage increases are distorted due to the fact that the District has proposed to reduce the number of steps, thereby causing the increases offered to look disproportionately small. However, even if the increases at the top steps of the schedule are considered to be equivalent of the other steps, i.e., 1 step plus \$80 and \$200 rather than simply \$80 and \$200 as shown in the Association's exhibits, the benchmark comparisons would still favor the Association, when viewed in terms of average dollar increases or percentage increases. Perhaps more significant, based on the peculiar facts in this case, are comparisons based upon actual teacher placement, which also support the Association's offer.

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<sup>4/</sup> In fact, there is at least one position at the BA Step 7 and, of course, new hires will possibly be hired at one of the various entry level points.

<sup>5/</sup> See the discussion in the next paragraph concerning the distortion caused in some of the Association's analysis which is attributable to the fact that the Board has proposed to shorten the salary schedule, a proposal which, in itself, would appear to have considerable merit in this case.

For example, the undersigned has compared the Association's proposal and the Board's proposal for the first year at each of the 9 cells of the salary schedule where the 1982-1983 staff would be located, based upon the cast forward method of analysis, with the 1983-1984 salary schedules for the 6, K-8 districts relied upon by the District which the undersigned considers to be valid comparisons (Washington-Caldwell, Waterford, Kansasville-Dover, Raymond, Union Grove, and Yorkville). In each case the Association's proposed salary schedule is much closer to the 1983-1984 salary level at each of those schools, with the notable exception of Kansasville-Dover, which also granted a large percentage increase in 1983-1984.

Also, according to the Board, the Association's arguments which are based upon average dollar increases, are possibly distorted in this case, due to problems with placement. On the face, this argument would appear to have some merit, especially when one considers that a majority of the teachers who taught in the 1982-1983 school year were in the first two BA lanes. However, a closer analysis of this argument does not support the District. The maximum salary increase which would be generated under the Board's offer would be equal, in the first year, to the dollar value of 2 increments plus \$80 for an employee moving to the new, top step of the salary schedule or schedule maximum. That increase would only amount to \$1,280, which is less than the average increase in many districts. This is due to the "flat dollar" nature of the increases generated under the Board's proposal, which, of course, is true in both years of the agreement. Many other moves in the higher lanes and near the top of the schedule would generate even lower increases in the first year, equal to \$1,180, \$1,080, \$1,030, and \$980 respectively. Thus, even if the employee distribution were scattered more evenly throughout the schedule, the average dollar increase under the Board's offer would compare unfavorably with many other K-8 districts.

The above analysis convinces the undersigned that even though a percentage salary increase or percentage total cost increase analysis would tend to favor the District's offer, a closer analysis of the actual impact of the parties' respective offers tends to favor the Association's offer in this case. While the Association's offer would appear to be a little on the high side, it is viewed as more reasonable based upon the important comparability criterion. While the available data for the second year is somewhat inconclusive, there is no indication in the record that the Association's proposal will put the District ahead, in terms of actual salary schedule, of other comparable K-8 districts. Further, a review of the arguments discloses that the application of the other statutory criteria does not require a different outcome.

The cost of living criterion does not lend particular support to either offer. Both offers propose increases which are well above the current rate of change in the various measures of the cost of living. However, the record does not establish to what extent past increases in the District have or have not kept pace with the rate of inflation. On the other hand, the comparative data in the record, especially that dealing with the existing salary levels and salary increases being granted to employees who hold comparable positions in comparable districts, constitutes the best available measure of the reasonableness of the parties' respective offers under this criterion.

Finally, the Board has advanced several arguments related to the small size of the District and the relatively high per pupil cost and millage rate. Because the pupil enrollment

in the District is small, the current teacher/pupil ratio is low, at least under the existing class structure. However, class size and matters relating to class structure are not bargainable and are generally within the control of the District. For this reason, the undersigned does not believe that the Association can be required in collective bargaining to accept lower than average salaries in order to maintain such a beneficial arrangement. The parties may, of course, voluntarily agree to bargain with regard to such matters. Absent such bargaining and agreement the undersigned believes that the Association is entitled to seek competitive salaries on behalf of the staff, regardless of class size.

Furthermore, a closer analysis of the cost per pupil and millage rates discloses that, notwithstanding the relatively low teacher/pupil ratio in the District (second of 8), the District was third from the top in per member cost and millage rate in 1982-1983. In 1983-1984 the District took measures to reduce the personnel costs associated with per pupil costs and it, of course, retains flexibility to make other changes based upon its assessment of the educational policies and priorities which it desires to pursue.

For the above and foregoing reasons the undersigned renders the following

AWARD

The Association's final offer relating to salary schedules and their implementation, submitted to the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, shall be included in the parties' 1983-1985 Collective Bargaining Agreement, along with all other provisions which were agreed to by the parties for inclusion therein during their negotiations and the mediation in this case.

Dated at Madison, Wisconsin this 26th day of October, 1984

*George R. Fleischli*

George R. Fleischli  
Mediator/Arbitrator

Placement 52/83

1982-83 Salary Schedule - Drought - Appendix B

	B.A.	+6	+12	+18	+24	+30	MA	+6	+12	+18	+24	+30	+36
0	12350	12550	12750	12950	13150	13350	13550	13750	13950	14150			
1	12800	13000	13200	13400	13600	13800	14000	14200	14400	14600			
2	13250	13450	13650	13850	14050	14250	14450	14650	14850	15050			
3	13700 <sup>.5</sup>	13900	14100	14300	14500	14700	14900	15100	15300	15500			
4	14150 <sup>1</sup>	14350 <sup>1</sup>	14550	14750	14950	15150 <sup>1</sup>	15350	15550	15750	15950			
5	14600	14800	15000	15200	15400	15600	15800	16000	16200	16400			
6	15050 <sup>1.3</sup>	15250	15450	15650	15850	16050	16250	16450	16650	16850			
7	15500 <sup>.5</sup>	15700	15900	16100	16300	16500	16700	16900	17100	17300			
8	15950	16150	16350	16550	16750	16950	17150	17350	17550	17750			
9	16400	16600	16800	17000	17200	17400	17600 <sup>1</sup>	17800	18000	18200			
10	16850	17050	17250	17450	17650	17850	18050	18250	18450	18650			
11	17300	17500	17700	17900	18100	18300 <sup>1</sup>	18500	18700	18900	19100			
12	17800	18000	18200	18400	18600	18800	19000	19200	19400	19600			
13				18900	19100	19300	19500	19700	19900	20100			
14				19100	19600	19800	20000	20200	20400	20600			
15					20200	20400	20600	20800	21000	21200			
16					20800	21000	21200	21400	21600	21800			
17					21400	21600	21800	22000	22200	22400			
18													

APPENDIX A

FTE 4.3  
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