Interest Award Summaries 1992-93

Marathon County (Department of Social Services)

Case 182 INT/ARB-5913 Decision No. 27032-B (Imes, 07-01-92)

Union offer selected.

The issues before the Arbitrator were: family illness, health insurance, wages and adjustments. The major issue involved the Employer’s proposal to increase the employe deductibles in the health insurance. In addition, the parties were in dispute over what the appropriate comparables should be. The Employer argued for contiguous counties while the Union argued for counties similar in size and economic circumstances. The Arbitrator selected the contiguous counties and considered size, adjusted gross income per capita, unemployment statistics, full market value of each County, County levy, the geographic proximity, demographics and likelihood of sharing common labor market. The Arbitrator acknowledged, as argued by the Union, that the Employer here is among the largest and most financially well off of the contiguous counties but was more persuaded by the common labor marketplace in selecting the contiguous counties.

On the issue of wages the Arbitrator concluded the wage increase established by either offer was not determinative of the dispute. Further, the Arbitrator did not find the County’s arguments on its family leave proposal pursuasive and thus the Union’s position was more reasonable. On the health insurance changes, both parties agreed this was the major issue before the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator found that despite the County’s claim, the changes proposed by the County were significant, and with the potential for a large number of employes to be affected, the wage adjustments offered by the County in addition to the across-the-board increases were not a sufficient quid pro quo. The Arbitrator also found that increasing the deductibles as proposed would only insure that employes would pay more and have no impact on reducing insurance costs because the evidence established that costs were increasing due to more insureds and catastrophic claims were increasing. Also, the Arbitrator concluded that the comparables did not support the Employer’s proposal for the larger deductibles.

Marathon County (Department of Social Services)

Case 181 INT/ARB-5912 Dec. No. 27031-B (Friess, 07-03-92)

Union offer selected.

The issues before the Arbitrator were: family illness, health insurance, wages and adjustments. The Arbitrator ranked the issues as follows: health insurance (highest/major), family illness leave (next/major), and wages and wage adjustments (lowest/minor).

On the issue of wages the Arbitrator concluded neither offer on the wage increase was found to be more reasonable and that the wage issue carried less weight. On the family illness leave proposal the Arbitrator found that a change was needed as argued by the County, the language change is ambiguous and would probably not remedy the problem, and the change would place an unreasonable burden on the employes and Employer alike. On the health insurance changes the Arbitrator concluded that there was not an internal settlement pattern and that the external comparables strongly supported the Union offer. Ultimately the Arbitrator found the Union final offer to be the more reasonable.

Marathon County (Parks Department)

Case 183 INT/ARB-5922 Dec. No. 27033-C (Stern, 07-03-92)

Union offer selected.

The issues before the Arbitrator were: family illness, health insurance, wages and adjustments. The parties were also in dispute over the appropriate comparables. The County argued for contiguous counties while the Union argued for counties more similar in size. The Arbitrator came up with his own comparables based more on size, as follows: City of Wausau buttressed by Wood and Portage counties and the cities of Marshfield, Wisconsin Rapids and Stevens Point.

On the issue of wages the Arbitrator concluded the Union’s offer on the wage increase was slightly preferable when measured against the statutory criteria. On the family illness leave proposal the Arbitrator found that the grounds were not sufficient to warrant making the changes proposed by the County. On the health insurance changes the Arbitrator concluded that there was not an internal settlement pattern and that the external comparables supported the Union offer. The Arbitrator also concluded that when the City of Wausau is looked at as a primary comparable, the Union offer was preferable. Ultimately the Arbitrator selected the Union’s final offer.

Eau Claire School District

Case 45 INT/ARB-6072 Dec. No. 27161-A (Krinsky, 07-06-92)

Employer offer selected.

Two issues are in dispute: wages and comparables. The wage dispute is stated above. As to comparables, the Employer argued use of the athletic conference as the primary comparables. The Union argued that two conference schools, Menomonie and Chippewa Falls, and the Chippewa Valley Technical Institute should be the primary comparable group, with the other conference schools as secondary comparables.

The Employer argued that two economic factors, the shutdown of the City’s biggest employer and an increase of 333 students in the District, required economy and efficiency in its wage offer, while the Union argued that other units of government affected by the plant shutdown were giving wage increases similar to the Union’s final offer. The Union also argued that non-school governmental jurisdictions in the geographic area favored its offer. The Employer argued that the figures for the comparable group should be discounted because they included wage adjustments. The main area of disagreement involved costing of the 1% lift given in the first year, with the Employer arguing that the parties agreed that said lift would be applied to the costing of the bargain in the second year, while the Union argued it never agreed to accept 1% less in the second year than that received by the Employer’s other bargaining units.

The Arbitrator concluded that the conference schools and Chippewa Valley Technical Institute were the primary comparables. The Arbitrator concluded that the pressures of the plant shutdown and the increased student enrollment were such that increased attention should be paid to efficiency and economy where possible, which favored the Employer’s offer. The Arbitrator determined that greater weight should be applied to internal comparables than to non-school governmental jurisdictions in the geographic area, which favored the Employer’s offer. The Arbitrator found that the Employer’s wage rates rank it in the top half of the conference, favoring the Employer’s final offer, while the percentage increases given by the comparable schools favored the Union’s offer. The Arbitrator concluded that the Employer could legitimately weigh the 1% lift given in 1990-91 when it calculated what bargain would be appropriate for 1991-92.

Based on the above, the Arbitrator selected the Employer’s final offer.

Wisconsin Indianhead VTAE District

Case 46 INT/ARB-6156 Dec. No. 27114-A (Yaffe, 07-13-92)

Union offer selected.

At issue, in addition to the general salary increase in each year, were Union proposals to increase credit reimbursement/lane incentives from $40 to $50 per credit on the salary schedule; to increase WRF to 6.1% effective July 1, 1991, before a stipulated increase to 6.2% on January 1, 1992; to extend for two years the sunsetting early retirement provision; and to change the break point between full paid and pro-rata insurance for project teachers from working 50% of a full schedule to working at least 17.5 hours or more per week for a total of 38 weeks.

The Arbitrator determines that the primary comparables shall be the three contiguous VTAE Districts, Chippewa Valley, Northcentral and Nicolet, with a secondary set geographically proximate to the District, consisting of Western Wisconsin, Mid-State, Fox Valley and Northeast.

The District’s percent per cell offer and the Union’s dollars per teacher offer are closer to the comparables average. At “the traditionally compared benchmarks” (BA maximum, MA 10th step, MA maximum and schedule maximum), both parties’ offers leave these employes thousands of dollars behind the comparable average, justifying some catch-up adjustment and the Union’s proposed increase in the credit reimbursement rate, and making the Union’s salary offer the more reasonable of the two.

The comparables and the parties’ history of differing treatment of project employes both support the health insurance status quo proposed by the District. The comparables support the Union’s WRF implementation date proposal. While the parties intended the early retirement program to expire at the end of their last agreement, the Union’s position is more reasonable because the program was designed to save the District money, a majority of the comparables have similar programs, and there is no persuasive reason why the program should not be continued. The District’s total package proposal is more in line with comparable averages and the cost of living than the Union’s. The District has also demonstrated both a need to moderate spending in order not to jeopardize instructional programs and the superiority of its health and dental coverages to those of the comparables.

The District’s offer would prevail if its salaries for senior teachers were not so out of line with the comparables. However, that disparity with the comparable averages is so great that the Union’s total package must prevail.

City of Beloit

Case 102 INT/ARB-5909 Dec. No. 27009-B (McAlpin, 07-15-92)

Union offer selected.

Only wages were in dispute.

Although the Union argued that the tax levy had risen only modestly over the last five years and actually lowered in the last two years, the Arbitrator favored the City’s argument regarding the interest and welfare of the public because this was the first in a series of interest arbitrations involving the same community.

The Arbitrator preferred the Union’s position when compared to external comparables for 1991. There were only two settlements for 1992, but they favored the Union’s position. Regarding the internal comparables, the City argued that it has had a pattern of internally consistent settlements over the years, and the police settled for 4% in 1992, and the Fire Department settled for 4% in both 1991 and 1992. The Arbitrator found that there was not enough of a pattern established to determine the outcome here, due to the partial settlement of one internal unit.

In weighing the two factors left – the impact on taxpayers and the external comparables – the Arbitrator found that the external comparables demonstrated that the Union’s position was the more reasonable of the two offers.

Genoa City Joint School District No. 2

Case 9 INT/ARB-5732 Dec. No. 27066-A (Petrie, 07-15-92)

Union offer selected.

In this initial contract covering the years 1989 through 1992, the parties ultimately arbitrated the impasse items consisting of health insurance, dental insurance, life insurance, leaves of absence and wages. On the first issue, leave policies, the Employer proposed a seven consecutive work day corridor on long-term disability benefits, attributable to personal illness after the exhaustion of paid sick leave, with a maximum benefit of $2,000 per month until age 70. On this issue, the Union proposed no corridor on such benefits and a maximum benefit of $6,500 per month until age 70. The second leave policy issue involved the annual deduction for sick leave utilization. The Employer proposed an annual deduction of 33% of the individual’s prorated base salary multiplied by the number of sick leave days utilized in excess of nine days. The Union proposed a 25% deduction level. The second area of dispute between the parties was in their respective insurance proposals. The first insurance issue involved health insurance, where the Union proposed that the Employer pay the full monthly premium for single or family plan coverage for full-time employes, and that those part-time employes working 20 or more hours per week during the school year receive a prorated amount equal to their level of employment. The Employer proposed that for full-time employes it pay up to $336 and $132.46 per month for family and single coverage, respectively, during the 1989-90 and the 1990-91 school years, with the 1991-92 premium payment determined by increasing the 1990-91 premium by 15%, and with any excess monthly premiums paid by the covered employes. The Employer proposed to pay 50% of the above premium for part-time employes working more than 20 hours per week, with the covered employes responsible for the balance of the monthly premium. In the area of life insurance, the Union proposed that the Employer pay the full premium for group life insurance approved by both parties in the face amount of each employe’s annual salary rounded up to the next $1,000. The Employer proposed to pay up to 21 cents per month per $1,000 of salary rounded to the next $1,000 for a group life insurance plan approved by the Employer. In the area of dental insurance, the Union proposed that the Employer pay the full monthly premium for single or family plan dental coverage and that those part-time employes working 20 or more hours per week during the school year receive a prorated amount equal to their level of employment. The Employer proposed that for full-time employes it pay up to $37.54 and $13.13 per month for family and single coverage, respectively, during the 1989-90 and the 1990-91 school years and up to $39.20 and $14.48 per month during 1991-92 with any premium increases beyond these levels paid by the covered employes on a payroll deduction basis. For employes working at least half time but less than full time the Employer proposed to pay up to $18.77 and $6.57 per month for family and single coverage for the 1989-90 and the 1990-91 school years and up to $19.60 and $7.44 per month for the 1991-92 school years with any premium increases beyond these levels paid by the covered employes on a payroll deduction basis. Finally, in addition to the above issues, the final offer of the Employer proposed insurance language addressing such subjects as changes of health and dental insurance carriers, health insurance for probationary employes, the application of labor contract versus health insurance contract provisions, and the following limitation in the area of health insurance: “No employe shall make any claim against the Genoa City School District for additional compensation in lieu of, or in addition to, the cost of his coverage because he does not qualify for the family plan.” The final issue between the parties involved wages. In the first year, the Employer proposed an approximate 4% across-the-board increase with the Association proposing an approximate 5% increase. In the second year, the Employer proposed an approximate 4% across-the-board increase while the Union proposed an approximate 5% increase. In the third year, the Employer proposed an approximate 4% across-the-board while the Union proposed an approximate 5.5% increase.

The essence of the Union’s argument was that its offer focused on equity, parity with other support staff, clarification of contract language, and the codification of many of the parties’ long-standing practices. The Association argued that external comparables consisting of organized support personnel geographically proximate to Genoa City were appropriate; the Association further argued internal comparables with the school district administration and its teachers. The Association argued that the greatest arbitral weight should be accorded comparison with other schools in the same athletic conference which are geographically proximate and which also employ organized employes. It was the position of the District that the Arbitrator’s responsibility is to select the final offer which, under the statutory criteria, most closely approximates the voluntary settlement the parties would have reached had they been able to do so. The District argued that its offer should be selected because it was fair and competitive; that it provided for fair and competitive wages; that the health insurance premium sharing proposal is supported by internal comparables; is an extension of the status quo, and is supported by area external school district comparables. The proration of health insurance coverage for part-time employes is supported by internal comparables, by area external school district comparables, and by Walworth County and Village of Genoa City comparables. The dental insurance proposal is supported by internal comparables. The ancillary language portions of the final offer are based upon considerations of contract language consistency. The wage rates are competitive with the primary external comparables, and that the wage increase proposals are supported by settlements in Walworth County and by the Village of Genoa City.

Key to the Arbitrator’s award was his finding that the athletic conference constitutes an appropriate intra-industry comparison group, thus constituting the primary comparables in this dispute. The Arbitrator regarded the position of the Union as favored in the medical insurance dispute, based upon the comparables, and the fact that the Employer historically paid 100% of the premium for these employes and continues to do so for its non-represented administrative employes. The Arbitrator found for the Union’s position on the dental insurance area on the same basis and also on the life insurance issue. The Arbitrator found the Union’s position more reasonable on the wage issue, based on the intra-industry comparables. The Arbitrator was unable to assign significant weight to either position on the paid sick leave and long-term disability issues. On balance, the Arbitrator found the Union’s position to be favored and selected its offer.

Coleman School District

Case 25 INT/ARB-6269 Dec. No. 27231-A (Friess, 07-16-92)

Consent Award

The issues resolved in the consent award, besides salary, were: (1) The 1992-93 school calendar; (2) the Board’s contribution toward health and dental insurance premium for both school years; (3) the Board’s contribution toward the employe’s share of the Wisconsin Retirement Fund; (4) paid personal leave; and (5) extra-curricular compensation. The parties also agreed to resolve a then-pending grievance.

Marathon County (Health Department)

Case 186 INT/ARB-5932 Dec. No. 27036-B (Imes, 07-16-92)

Union offer selected.

In addition to the above wages, the District also proposed placing the Dental Hygienist at the same pay level as the Sanitarian 1 effective July 1, 1992; placing the Dental Hygienist classification at the same wage level as the Public Health Nurse. The Employer also proposed increasing all rates for the classification of Public Health Environmental Sanitarian by 3% effective July 1, 1992. The Union also proposed putting the Dental Hygienist at the same pay level as the Sanitarian 1 effective July 1, 1991, and moving the Dental Hygienist to the same wage level as the Public Health Nurse on July 1, 1992.

Other issues in dispute before the Arbitrator were use of sick leave for family illness, increased health insurance deductibles and a managed care program, modifying the mileage reimbursement language and wages.

The Arbitrator first dealt with the issue of wages and stated that while the Employer contended that a internal settlement pattern had been established the facts showed that while there were settlements with five groups of County employes, both including represented and non-represented, the number of employes constituted less than 20% of the County work force. The units representing the largest number of County employes had not settled and were in arbitration, and when looking at the packages offered those groups that have settled, they did not appear similar to the cost adjustments involved in the instant case. The Arbitrator also found that the external comparable settlement rate was higher than the 4.1% cited by the Employer. Also the Union’s offer was not found to be excessive by the Arbitrator and even after taking into account the differences in the wage adjustment proposed, there was approximately 1/2% difference in the parties’ wage offers. Given these facts, the Arbitrator concluded the Union’s offer with respect to the wage rate increase was more reasonable.

With regard to the rate increases proposed for Sanitarian 2, the Arbitrator concluded that the rate being offered by the Union when compared with that of comparable counties was less in two of the four positions that the Union’s offer was more reasonable.

With respect to the issue of mileage, the Arbitrator noted that neither party strongly argues its position and the reasonableness of the offer will not be discussed nor will it weigh heavily in deciding which of the two final offers is more reasonable.

On the issue of use of sick leave for family illness, the Arbitrator concluded that the dispute arose as a consequence of the County’s attempt to redefine “serious” and restrict the employes’ use of sick leave for family illnesses. In addition to seeking a change in the definition of what constitutes “serious,” the County was also proposing to limit the amount of time that an employe may take for family illness. It asserted this change was needed to serve the interests and welfare of the public to present the possibility of having insufficient staff to complete the needed work. However, the Arbitrator concluded that there was no evidence to show that the benefit has affected the interests and welfare of the public or the Employer’s operations, and thus was unpersuasive. The Arbitrator noted that the Employer was still able to review requests for leave related to family illness and determine the reasonableness of the request, thus avoiding abuse of the language. For these reasons the Arbitrator found the Union’s position on the issue to be more reasonable.

On the issue of changes to the health insurance plan proposed by the County, the Arbitrator concluded, contrary to the County, that the changes being sought were significant. For example, the changes proposed by the County with respect to the employe deductible had the potential to result in an additional $400 per employe out-of-pocket expenses before being eligible for health care coverage for a third of the employes in the bargaining unit. To offset that potential out-of-pocket loss the County offered a $282 increase in Step D and prorated adjustments on other steps. Because there was not sufficient additional information upon which to determine the impact of those changes on employes, the Arbitrator stated it was difficult to conclude that that increase was an adequate quid pro quo for the additional changes in health insurance. The Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s proposal was preferred since both parties have agreed to a managed care program because the Union’s increased deductible was more reasonable when compared with the external comparables. Furthermore, the Arbitrator concluded that the evidence did not establish a need for the type of change being sought by the Employer and that there was no evidence that employes have abused the benefit or that the County’s burden with respect to providing the benefit is different from that of comparable counties, or that an internal settlement pattern has been established with regard to changes in health insurance. Thus, the Arbitrator concluded the Union offer to be the more reasonable.

In conclusion, because the Arbitrator determined the Union’s offer more nearly conformed to the statutory criteria regarding the wage issue, the wage adjustment issue, the family illness leave issue and health insurance issue, the Union’s offer in its entirety was found to be more reasonable and therefore selected.

Barron County (Department of Social Services)

Case 95 INT/ARB-5907 Dec. No. 27060-A (Petrie, 07-17-92)

Employer offer selected.

Rather than accept the Union’s argument to divide the eight contiguous counties into primary and secondary comparables, the Arbitrator concluded that the eight contiguous counties should continue as the appropriate comparables.

Only two issues were in dispute: longevity pay for Social Worker II’s and a longer probationary period for new hires.

The Arbitrator rejected the Union’s argument that the lack of promotional opportunities for Social Worker II’s should be addressed by its longevity proposal, pointing out that the Arbitrator’s authority was limited to the statutory criteria set forth in Sec. 111.70(4)(cm)7, Stats. The Arbitrator found that the longevity proposal standing alone exceeded those comparables that had a longevity pay provision and that the Union’s wage rates without longevity at 7 and 14 years exceed the comparables with longevity included by $1.96 per hour and $2.43 per hour, respectively. The Arbitrator concluded that the Union failed to establish a basis for its longevity proposal.

On the issue of the probationary period increase from 6 months to one year, the Arbitrator found that the County’s arguments were not persuasive, but because this issue was of far less importance than the longevity issue, the Arbitrator selected the County’s final offer.

Oconto County (Sheriff’s Department)

Case 99 MIA-1634 Dec. No. 27070-B (Gallagher, 07-28-92)

Employer offer selected.

The sole issues between the parties concerned the wages of Deputy Sheriffs and Investigators (14 of the 29 bargaining unit employes). The parties agreed to give the remaining unit employes 5% across the board in 1991 and 4% across the board in 1992, consistent with the increases granted in the Employer’s other bargaining units.

The parties disagreed regarding comparables — the Employer used ten County employers (Door, Florence, Forest, Langlade, Lincoln, Marinette, Shawano, Menomonee, Vilas, Oneida) in Northeastern Wisconsin as well as the City of Oconto. The Union used five County employers (Door, Marinette, Langlade, Lincoln, Shawano) as their comparables. The Arbitrator found both sides’ arguments regarding comparables relevant but noted that he would give more weight to counties of similar size without ignoring smaller counties.

The Arbitrator found the Employer’s proposed wage rate for Deputies of 5% was more reasonable than the Union’s at 5% plus 20 cents. With regard to the Investigators, the Arbitrator found the County’s offer of an extra 45 cents to catch up to comparable Investigators, was justified and that the Union’s 26 cents in proposed catch-up was insufficient to remedy the disparity. Finally, the Arbitrator noted that the County’s offer exceeded the cost of living, and awarded the Employer’s final offer.

Southern Door School District

Case 23 INT/ARB-6208 Dec. No. 27131-A (Friess, 08-08-92)

Union offer selected.

The only issue in dispute is salary. The Arbitrator, noting that the two offers differed by .4% of total compensation costs in the first year and 1.1% the second year, found both offers to be reasonable. The Arbitrator rejected the District’s argument that the Association offer was per se unreasonable because total package increases were higher in the second year of the contract.

The Association objected to two types of District exhibits, i.e., newspaper articles and the District’s survey of private employers. The Arbitrator admitted both types of exhibits, but, concerned about the general nature of the exhibits in the former and reliability of the exhibits in the latter, did not give great weight to these exhibits.

Three previous arbitration awards accepted the Packerland Athletic Conference as the primary comparable and so did the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator accepted the Association’s argument that certified final offers should be included in “settlement” data; concluded that there were sufficient settlements to create a discernible pattern; and found that the comparable teacher settlements were entitled to be given the greatest weight of all the statutory criteria.

The Arbitrator concluded that if all the employers won the pending arbitration awards in the comparables, the District’s offer would be below the average of all but one comparable settlement. The Arbitrator rejected the District’s argument that its lower salary offer was more reasonable because the District had higher total package increases. The Arbitrator did not find that local economic factors exempted the District from providing an average wage increase.

Winnebago County (Sheriff’s Department)

Case 195 MIA-1591 Dec. No. 27087-A (Petrie, 08-08-92)

Employer offer selected.

In addition to wages, the Union proposed language changes regarding the use of only written warnings and oral warnings that have occurred in the past 12 months from the most recent infraction in progressive discipline scheme. Both parties suggested a change in the work schedule of Detective Sergeant, Detective, Welfare Fraud Investigator and Juvenile Officer employes. The Union proposed a 5-2, 5-2, 4-3 work week rotation retaining the status quo paid lunch period each day, while the County proposed a 5-2 work week covering Monday through Friday (261 work days per year) with an unpaid lunch. Finally, both parties proposed to add language to the contract prohibiting transfers between the Patrol Division and the Corrections Division unless the employe met the training requirements for a patrol position and competed successfully as a new hire. The dispute on this issue related to the effective date for this provision which the Union proposed for January 1, 1992, while the County proposed a date of January 1, 1990.

The County argued preliminarily, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling in Manitowoc County v. Local 986-B, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, issued June 11, 1992, should control this case. The County asserted that the Association’s final offer could not be selected because its proposals were illegal regarding maintaining a 5-2, 5-2, 4-3 work schedule for certain employes and its proposal to require the Sheriff to transfer Corrections Officers hired before January 1, 1992 to Patrol Officer openings. The Arbitrator rejected these arguments. He held that because these Union proposals were not “clearly illegal in any and all probable applications,” a determination of the parties’ rights regarding these subjects should be dealt with in a different forum.

The Arbitrator then considered the merits of the parties’ dispute, noting that the significant differences between the parties revolved around the non-economic language issues. Regarding the County’s proposed change from the status quo in the work week for those employed in the Detective Division, the Arbitrator found that the County’s 25 cents per hour increase ($500 per year) to these employes failed to constitute an adequate quid pro quo for the work week change, in light of the fact that these employes would lose 244 paid lunch breaks per year under the County’s proposal and there was no proposal contained in the County’s final offer to allow the affected employes to refuse to accept on-call weekend and holiday work. On this point, the Arbitrator found that the Union’s offer should be strongly favored over the County’s.

Regarding the parties’ dispute concerning the training and transfer of Corrections Officers to Patrol Officer positions during the period January 1, 1990 to January 1, 1992, the Arbitrator concluded that neither party had made a persuasive case, and he found that this item would not be accorded determinative weight in the selection process.

The Arbitrator then considered the wage offers as well as external comparables. The parties had disagreed on the comparables. The Arbitrator noted that in a prior case between the parties, Arbitrator Weisberger had found that Brown, Fond du Lac, Manitowoc, Outagamie, Sheboygan and Winnebago Counties as well as the City of Oshkosh were appropriate comparables while Arbitrator Gundermann, also in a prior case between these parties, had found comparable only the above-named County units. The Arbitrator herein found the broader (Weisberger) group appropriate.

The Arbitrator found that when compared with the average monthly rates of the comparables for Detective Division employes and Top Patrol officers, neither offer was favored and that the wage issue, therefore, could not be assigned determinative importance. The Arbitrator noted that given the different base periods used by each party for its COL analysis and the built-in inaccuracies of the index, he could not ascribe determinative weight to the COL factor, although he noted that the County’s offer was slightly favored for selection due to the lack of hard evidence to support the Union’s proposed adjustments for Corporals and Detectives. The Arbitrator noted, however, that the Union’s extra 1% wage increase proposal was supported by the internal comparables.

Finally, with regard to the change in progressive discipline, the Union’s offer was favored regarding this item, based on negotiations history criterion. In sum the Arbitrator found that the Union’s offer was more reasonable, largely because the County had failed to propose and adequate quid pro quo for its proposed change in the work schedule for Detective Division employes.

Monticello School District

Case 12 INT/ARB-6167 Dec. No. 27177-A (Krinsky, 08-11-92)

Employer offer selected.

The only issues in dispute are salary and retiree insurance. The parties and the Arbitrator agree that the primary comparable is the Stateline Athletic Conference. The Association argued that since only four of the nine districts in the athletic conference had settled, the Arbitrator should look at the settlements in other contiguous districts. The Arbitrator accepted the District’s argument that the other settlements should not be used because the Association did not provide the Arbitrator with sufficient information to establish the validity of any such comparison. The Arbitrator questioned the validity of using an analysis which presumed the outcome of pending arbitrations since it was possible that voluntary settlements could occur which would not reflect either certified final offer.

The Arbitrator found that the District’s serious economic problems warranted the conclusion that the interests and welfare of the public favor the District’s lower wage offer, but did not find this factor to be controlling. The Arbitrator rejected the Association’s argument that catch-up was necessary to overcome relative deterioration in wages which resulted from voluntary settlement. In the face of the Association’s argument that the size of both offers is greatly reduced by the changeover in staff, the Arbitrator accepted the District’s argument that the cast forward method of costing is appropriate.

The District’s wage offer was selected as being more reflective of comparable settlements. The Arbitrator did not find that the Association demonstrated a need to have a provision in the contract which allowed retirees and their spouses to continue on the District’s health insurance plan at their own expense, nor did the Association demonstrate that such provisions were common in comparable districts.

City of Stevens Point (Police Department)

Case 75 MIA-1562 Dec. No. 26954-B (Vernon, 08-11-92)

Employer offer selected.

The sole issues in dispute were economic. The Union addressed only wage rates, while the City addressed wage rates and proposed that effective 1-1-91, the City would provide the base income continuation plan offered by the Department of Employee Trust Funds.

The Union contended the following jurisdictions compose the appropriate comparables: Marathon, Wood and Portage counties coupled with the cities of Wausau, Marshfield and Wisconsin Rapids. The Union argued that its split increase was necessary to match wage increases among the comparables. Internal comparables were discounted by the Union as being irrelevant to determining the wages of law enforcement personnel either at the bargaining table or through interest arbitration. Beyond this, the Union argued that its increase furthered the public interest by maintaining the morale of incumbent officers, and offering an inducement for the best officers to stay with the City. The Union dismissed the income continuation benefit proposed by the City as unsupported by the comparables and offered by the City only to meet the eligibility requirements of the plan. The Union also contended its offer fit well within the cost of living in light of settlements among the comparables.

The City focused on internal comparability. Noting that it had an established history of maintaining consistent internal settlements and that it had settled with five other bargaining units, including its fire fighters, at its proposal, the City concluded that its offer should be favored unless it could be proven that adoption of its offer “would have the impact of creating significant differentials in wage levels as they relate to external comparables.” The City restricted those external comparables to the cities of Marshfield, Wausau and Wisconsin Rapids. The Union could not, the City contended, prove that the City’s offer would create adverse wage differentials with these comparables. While noting that its package was slightly below the relevant CPI index for the two years, the City argued that its proposal was closer to the increase in that index than was the Union’s.

The Arbitrator favored the Union’s slate of comparables, in spite of differences in duties between police officers and deputy sheriffs, due to the limited number of similarly sized cities. The Arbitrator accepted the Union’s contention that law enforcement employes should not be limited to comparison with other City employes due to differences in skills, duties, working conditions and labor market. The Arbitrator would not, however, dismiss internal comparability as a relevant factor, in light of the parties’ bargaining history and the settlement with the fire fighters. While noting that the Union’s offer was, in percentage terms, more comparable externally, the Arbitrator also noted that the City’s wage rates were, under either offer, higher than average. While the case was a close one, the Arbitrator concluded that adherence to the internal pattern did not prejudice Union represented officers among the external comparables, and that the City’s offer was slightly more reasonable. The Arbitrator placed little emphasis on the City’s income continuation proposal, noting that it could not be said it detracted from the City’s relatively more reasonable wage offer.”

Kewaskum School District

Case 21 INT/ARB-6110 Dec. No. 27092-A (Petrie, 08-11-92)

Employer offer selected.

The primary issue was the salary schedule. An issue of “significantly less immediate importance than the salary impasse,” but one on which both parties had “strongly based opinions” concerned the District’s proposal to increase, over the two years, the employe’s contribution to the health insurance premium from 3.5% to 5%. A minor issue involved mileage reimbursement. The Arbitrator relied, contrary to the Union’s position, on the Eastern Wisconsin Athletic Conference as “the primary intraindustry comparison group,” and found consideration of the comparables and the cost of living supported the Employer. Consistent with the parties’ negotiating history, the Arbitrator compared average dollar increases per teacher and percentage adjustments to the salary structure. Award to the Employer.

City of Edgerton (Police Department)

Case 26 MIA-1641 Dec. No. 27179-A (R.J. Miller, 08-12-92)

Union offer selected.

There were essentially two issues: work schedule and part-time officer rate. In addition to the comparables cited by both parties, the Arbitrator agreed with the Union’s inclusion of Stoughton, which had been used in the parties’ last interest arbitration, and Fontana/Geneva, based on its comparable size and the same geographic area.

The Union proposed to go from an 8 hour shift schedule to an 8 1/2 hour shift with a wage freeze in 1992 as a quid pro quo. The additional hours would result in the Union’s proposal costing approximately $13,199 more over the three-year period than the City’s offer of status quo on the schedule and 4$ on wages each year.

Although the City argued it had lost many of its industrial jobs and was turning into a retirement community, the Arbitrator concluded that the City had not shown it was experiencing such an economic disaster that would preclude awarding the Union’s proposal. As to comparability, the City’s offer was more comparable to settlements reached in comparable communities than the Union’s 6.22% increase due to the proposed schedule change. However, the comparable communities all have schedules generating more annual hours than the City’s present schedule, resulting in Edgerton’s police personnel being last in the comparables in terms of annual compensation. The Arbitrator found that bargaining history also supported the Union’s proposal. The parties had reached a tentative agreement on the same schedule at one point in their prior negotiations, but eventually went to arbitration. While the arbitrator in the prior arbitration ultimately found for the City on the basis of its entire final offer, he had found the Union’s proposed schedule more reasonable based on bargaining history. Such bargaining history shows that the Union’s proposed schedule was fair and reasonable and was within the parties’ expectations. The Arbitrator also noted that the Union’s proposed schedule would provide the City and its citizens with additional police service and would facilitate better communications between shifts due to the overlap. Further, the City had lost six officers over the past few years due to the low compensation, and it has caused a number of its officers to work part-time in order to maintain their standard of living. The Arbitrator concluded that the Union had demonstrated the need for the change and had offered an appropriate quid pro quo.

As to the wage rate for the part-time officer, the Union proposed he be paid the same as the full-time officers ($12.54/hr.) while the City proposed a starting rate of $8.33/hr. and a maximum of $10.69/hr. effective January 1, 1992 (the present rate was $9.00/hr.). The City’s proposed starting rate would be the lowest in the comparables and the Union’s proposal would make it one of the highest. Thus, comparability was not conclusive as to either offer on this issue. The Arbitrator considered bargaining history to significantly favor the Union’s position. The parties had tentatively agreed on the rate the Union proposed, and the City withdrew from the tentative agreement after the City Council rejected the parties’ tentative agreement. The Arbitrator found that the tentative agreement indicated the proposal was within the parties’ expectations for a voluntary settlement. Further, the Union’s proposal better recognized the experience and qualifications of the current part-time officer and was more likely to prevent turnover in that position.

Luxemburg-Casco School District

Case 12 INT/ARB-6205 Dec. No. 27168-A (Briggs, 08-16-92)

Employer offer selected.

In addition to the salary and extra-curricular issues, the Employer proposed to change existing language regarding health insurance payments made on behalf of early retirees. The status quo had provided that the Employer would pay “$1,000 for one year and up to five years health insurance up to age 65.” The Employer proposed to add “at the same rate paid to active employes” after the phrase “health insurance,” quoted above.

The Employer’s proposal would result in its paying only 90% of the premium cost instead of the full cost of the premium for the first five years of retirement up to age 65 it had previously paid. The Union sought to maintain the status quo on early retirement whereby retired teachers paid none of the premium cost during the referenced time period.

The parties also disagreed regarding the proper pool of comparables — the Union urged continued use of the Door-Kewaunee Insurance Consortium (Algoma, Denmark, Gibraltar, Kewaunee, Luxemburg-Casco, Sevastopol, Southern Door, Sturgeon Bay) while the Employer urged the use of that consortium as well as Mishicot, Oconto and Oconto Falls School Districts.

The Arbitrator noted that in a 1987 decision by Arbitrator Fleischli, Fleischli had found the Door-Kewaunee Insurance Consortium schools appropriate as well as Mishicot School District. Thus, the Arbitrator herein found these to be appropriate primary comparables, and that secondary comparables should be Oconto and Oconto Falls.

The Arbitrator noted that only two of the eight primary comparables had settled 1991-92 salary figures, based on settlements reached at the beginning of calendar 1991; that four of these primary comparables were in interest arbitration; that although District teachers had previously ranked from 6th to 11th at the benchmarks among the primary and secondary comparables, the Union’s final offer was only one one-hundredth of a percentage point from being as high or higher than those offered by the above-mentioned four schools in interest arbitration. The Arbitrator further noted that there was no evidence to show that an unusual turnover rate or unfilled openings existed among the Employer’s teachers and that both parties’ offers reflected increases from approximately 2% to 3.2% per year greater than the cost of living for the years in question.

The Arbitrator found that the extra-curricular issue was not hotly contested between the parties and he found it not determinative of the case. Rather, the Arbitrator held that the determinative issue between the parties was the early retirement issue on which the Employer had the burden of persuasion as it had proposed a change in the status quo. The Arbitrator found that there was no need for the Employer to offer quid pro quo for its proposed change, noting that the retired teachers employed in the comparable schools generally received much less in early retirement and sick leave payout benefits than the teachers of Luxemburg-Casco and that health care costs had been spiraling. The Arbitrator also observed that currently employed teachers paid 10% of their insurance premiums, while retired teachers paid nothing. In these circumstances, the Arbitrator selected the Employer’s final offer as the more reasonable offer.

Marathon County (Courthouse)

Case 184 INT/ARB-5923 Dec. No. 27034-B (Chatman, 08-26-92)

Union offer selected.

In addition to the above wages, the parties also stipulated to move the Building Maintenance Worker classification from level 8 to level 10 and the Clerical Assistant classification from level 3 to level 4.

Other issues in dispute before the Arbitrator related to an increase in health insurance deductibles, implementation of a managed health care program, wage adjustments and limitations on the use of sick leave for family illness.

The Arbitrator chose to deal first with the issue of use of sick leave for family illness. He commented that the Employer’s proposal restricted the employes’ utilization of sick leave for family purpose from a theoretical 12 days per year to 2 days per year. He commented also that the Employer never presented any evidence or testimony that it intended to disestablish a clearly existent past practice. He believed that the Employer always had the right and prerogative to review the use of family leave regardless of the past practices. However, his review of the issue led him to conclude that there was a need for a consistent and impartial definition of the contract term “serious” as evidenced by the grievances and grievance arbitrations that previously had been conducted pursuant to disputes surrounding usage of sick leave for family illness. He concluded that the Employer’s proposal to eliminate the language entirely and insert a 16 hour per year maximum was an overreaction to the problem, particularly because the Employer presented no evidence of employe abuse. Thus, the Arbitrator concluded that the status quo on the existing agreement was preferred on the issue of use of sick leave for family illness.

The second issue addressed by the Arbitrator related to the Employer’s proposal to increase the health insurance deductibles for employes. The Arbitrator commented that the primary documents supporting the Union’s case were self serving and were commissioned by the Employer to arrive at a pre-determined conclusion, and thus lacked any probative value. In addition, the Employer’s position was further damaged by its failure to provide any explanation regarding utilization of the substantial fund balance on the existing self-insurance plan. He noted that the Union’s position on the issue of larger deductibles evidenced a “dim and reluctant recognition that employees support of health care payments is and will be an increasing obligation.” He noted that the family insurance increases from 1987 to 1989 were substantial, that Marathon County has the highest percentage of the population under 14 years of age of any of the comparable counties, and that this was an indication of the increasing and continuing obligation of the County. Thus, he concluded the Union’s proposal on the issue of health insurance was inadequate and the Employer’s position was preferred.

With regard to comparability, the Arbitrator noted that the parties had mutually agreed on a comparable group which comprised roughly contiguous counties.

With regard to the issue of wages, the Arbitrator noted that the Employer’s offer for July 1, 1991, exceeded slightly the Union’s offer for the mid-year increase. However, the Union’s larger offer was tied to incorporating the limitation on family sick leave usage. The Arbitrator concluded that inasmuch as the Employer’s proposal on family sick leave usage was flawed and that the Union’s position was preferred, it followed that the Employer’s wage proposal also failed and that the Union’s position was preferred.

Overall, the Arbitrator found that the County’s proposal to change the family sick leave usage language without demonstrating that an attempt had been made to define the terminology governing the use of that benefit was an omission that was too serious to pass. Therefore, the Arbitrator concluded that because the law does not permit separability of issues that the Union’s final offer was selected.

Delavan-Darien School District

Case 21 INT/ARB-6161 Dec. No. 27152-A (Yaffe, 08-31-92)

Union offer selected.

Issues presented for resolution were: wages, retirement benefits, health and dental insurance additions, reimbursed college credits, and total package compensation. District wished to use Athletic Conference plus three contiguous districts. Association relied solely on Athletic Conference. The Arbitrator adopted the District’s comparables, citing their geographic proximity and use in prior arbitrations. Most significant comparison of wages requires analysis of what teachers moving through the schedule will be paid in future years compared to comparable teachers. Comparing schedules, District salary schedule structure perpetuates serious problems for experienced teachers, creating increasingly unfair disparities. The Arbitrator found that it was unfair to require teachers to work 5 to 9 extra years before they receive comparable salaries. Association’s proposal is unnecessarily costly and results in high salaries at the top of the schedule. Neither proposal is given positive consideration or weight in the selection of final offers.

Regarding health and dental insurance, Association’s proposal is more reasonable given District’s relatively low health and dental costs and comparables on dental, especially orthodontia and crowns.

On retirement benefits, Arbitrator found comparables support Association’s position. Same conclusion for tuition reimbursement.

With respect to total packages, Arbitrator determined that the value of the Association’s proposal was significantly closer to comparable average than the District’s. Association’s final offer better brings the District into the mainstream of comparable salaries and benefits. Quid pro quo argument is inapplicable because no exceptional or unusual benefits being sought, Association simply asking that employes be brought into the comparable mainstream.

Mayville School District

Case 19 INT/ARB-6141 Dec. No. 27105-A (Petrie, 09-02-92)

Employer offer selected.

The dispute included, in addition to wages, issues over payments to Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS), and early retirement. The parties differed over the external comparables to be used, with the District arguing that the Flyway Athletic Conference (composed of Campbellsport, Horicon, Lomira, Markesan, North Fond du Lac, Oakfield, Rosendale-Brandon and Mayville) be the primary group, and a secondary group be non-athletic conference districts within a 25 mile radius (Beaver Dam, Dodgeland, Hartford UHS, Hustisford, Kewaskum, Slinger and Waupun). The Association urged that the primary group be those in Dodge County — Beaver Dam, Dodgeland, Horicon, Hustisford, Lomira and Mayville. Based on two prior arbitration awards, the Arbitrator found that the 15 districts, including both the athletic conference schools and those located within a 25 mile radius, comprised the comparison group, and no distinction between primary and secondary was appropriate.

The Association argued that both its proposals to increase the level of the WRS contributions and to extend the teachers’ early retirement program were a continuation of the status quo, while the District maintained that both proposals represented a change without justification for such change. The Arbitrator found that the Association’s proposal to increase the contributions from 6.0% to 6.1% in the first year and 6.2% in the second year was not a substantial change in the status quo, but the proposal to extend the early retirement program for another two years was a substantial change, because the program expired by its own terms and the parties intended it to be a one-time opportunity. The Arbitrator favored the Association’s position on WRS and the District’s position on early retirement where the Association failed to make a case for its extension beyond its negotiated expiration date.

The Arbitrator found the District somewhat below and the Association somewhat above the average two year salary increases for the comparables, with the District being a little closer in average dollar increases. Thus, he favored the wage offer of the District. The cost of living, while having little weight in this proceeding, favored the Employer.

City of Marshfield (Police Department)

Case 90 MIA-1588 Dec. No. 27038-A (Kessler, 08-31-92)

Union offer selected.

This award utilized the comparables established in an earlier arbitration award: Wausau, Stevens Point, Wisconsin Rapids, Marathon County, Wood County and Portage County.

Both parties offered identical base wage proposals, but the City also offered an increased shift differential and life insurance. The crucial difference between the offers was in the health insurance proposal. The Union proposed the maintenance of the status quo: the Greater Marshfield Plan (a health maintenance plan) to which the Employer would contribute 85% of the premium. The City proposed a change to a Blue Cross/Blue Shield health insurance with a deductible payment to which the City would contribute 90% of the premium. The City also proposed additional dental benefits. During the life of this contract, the City’s offer would cost approximately $83,000 more than the Union offer.

The Arbitrator found a slight preference for the City’s offer in the light of other comparable communities which generally had health insurance with deductibles, co-payment requirements and dental coverage. On the other hand, the Arbitrator found the internal comparables, the other City employes, favored the Union offer since the preponderance of City employes had not accepted the changed health benefit. The Arbitrator rejected the City’s argument that it had offered a sufficient quid pro quo for the change in the health insurance and he also concluded the circumstances were not sufficiently compelling to alter the trade off the parties had previously bargained: relatively low wages were offset by generous health benefits. The Arbitrator chose the Union’s final offer.

Genoa City Joint School District #2

Case 10 INT/ARB-5830 (Yaffe, 09-09-92)

Union offer selected.

The parties disagreed on their comparability grouping, wages, health insurance and retirement.

The Arbitrator determined that the comparability grouping should be expanded to include the Delavan-Darien School District, since it was not distinguishable in size or proximity from the agreed-upon comparables. The fact that the settlement in that district was arguably unusual did not provide a basis for excluding it from the comparable grouping, since an anomalous settlement is a risk inherent in the process.

The Association’s wage proposal was more comparable to those in area schools, after adjusting it to reflect the formula used by the parties to account for insurance costs. The two-year wage increases proposed by the Association were $100 above the average, while the District’s two-year proposal fell $450 below the average. Further, the Association was entitled to seek a schedule adjustment to help correct substantial inequities at the schedule maximums.

There was substantial support for the Association’s proposal to increase the District contribution for part-time teachers on the basis of a 50% contribution for those between .50 and .70 FTE and 70% for those between .70 and 1.00 FTE. Although there was no quid pro quo offered for the change from the existing 50% contribution for part-time teachers over .50 FTE, a proposal to bring the Employer into line with a well-established settlement pattern does not require an offsetting concession.

The District proposed to pay 6.0% towards the employes’ WRS contribution. The Association proposed full payment. The Arbitrator concluded that there was no support for either party’s proposal on WRS contribution. The external comparables did not support the Association’s request for full payment, but the internal comparable, at 6.1% for support staff, showed the District to be unreasonable. Thus neither party’s offer on WRS was given weight in arriving at an award.

Since the Association’s package costs were much closer to the average of the comparables, and since the Association’s wage and health insurance proposals were preferable under the statutory criteria, the final offer of the Association was selected.

Ashwaubenon School District

Case 25 INT/ARB-6178 Dec. No. 27189-A (Oestreicher, 09-14-92)

Employer offer selected.

The sole issue was the level of wage increase over the two-year period.

There was also a dispute over the appropriate comparables. The Arbitrator selected the comparables established in a previous arbitration. Accordingly, Howard-Suamico, DePere, West DePere, Seymour and Pulaski were found comparable. The Arbitrator also concluded that the remaining districts in the Bay Conference and Green Bay School District could not be ignored, but that occurrences in those districts were of limited value.

Both parties relied heavily in this proceeding upon comparisons of their wage offers with settlements and resulting wage schedules in the school districts in the Athletic Conference. The Union compared the offers in terms of percentages, while the Employer compared the impact of both offers in terms of total package increases measured in dollars. Both parties noted that Ashwaubenon has historically been a salary leader in the geographic area, paying the highest wages at all benchmarks except BA Maximum. Each party insisted that because of that historic relationship, its methodology was preferable. Both parties also addressed the fact that the Ashwaubenon teachers are very experienced; just one-fourth of the teachers fit on the salary schedule, with the remainder off the schedule receiving longevity increments.

The Arbitrator found that the Board’s wage offer of 10.44% over the two-year period was more comparable to the settlements in the conference than the Union’s two-year offer of 11.73%. His basis for doing so was that he found insufficient evidence to support the Union’s argument that the adoption of the Board’s offer would result in serious salary erosion to the Ashwaubenon teachers vis-a-vis their comparables. In so finding, he acknowledged that while there was some erosion when the offers are measured in terms of percentage increases, he felt this erosion was outweighed by the Board’s dollar increase, which he characterized as “substantial.” The Arbitrator concluded that even with the adoption of the Employer’s offer, the Ashwaubenon teachers would continue being wage leaders.

Village of East Troy

Case 35 INT/ARB-5882 Dec. No. 27176-A (Malamud, 09-21-92)

Employer offer selected.

Partially because this was a first contract, there were numerous issues in dispute, including: wages, longevity payments, health insurance, benefits for part-time employes, protecting unit work, seniority rights and maintenance of benefits.

The Union proposed broadening the list of comparable communities to include the Cities of Shullsburg and Fontana on Lake Geneva. Because of its proximity and size the Arbitrator added Fontana on Lake Geneva to the list of comparable communities.

Regarding wages, the Arbitrator found the two-tier wage proposal of the Employer to be troubling because of the resulting disparity. The Arbitrator was also concerned that the wage rate would be impacted based upon employes’ participation in health insurance. The Arbitrator was troubled by the Union’s proposal to raise the lower paid clerical employes to the top rate and then apply the across-the-board increases. This proposal would generate an increase of 17% to 20% in the first year of the contract. The Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s proposal for a single, rather than a two-tier wage schedule, was preferable. When comparing the rates for the employes in question with other comparable communities and considering the other components of the offers, the Arbitrator concluded that the Union received a slight preference on the wage issue.

Regarding the longevity provisions, the Arbitrator favored the Union’s position which was to maintain the single-tier program currently in existence, rather than the Employer’s proposal of creating a two-tier system which would greatly extend the time it would take new employes to reach the longevity maximum.

Several issues were argued in each of the party’s health insurance proposals. The Arbitrator found that the Employer’s position regarding insurance deductibles and not providing health insurance for part-time employes was strongly preferable to the Union’s position. The Arbitrator reasoned that the positions taken by the Employer were strongly supported by the group of comparables.

The Arbitrator identified that the Union failed to establish a minimum number of hours to be worked in order for part-time employes to receive pro-rata vacation and sick leave. As a result, the Village’s proposal to refrain from offering these benefits on a pro-rata basis was preferable.

Union proposals regarding protection of unit work did not take into account the small size of the unit and operational necessities. As a result, the Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s proposals were not supported by the statutory criteria. The Arbitrator also concluded that the Union was unable to substantiate the need for a maintenance of standards’ provision and a provision to pay employes for performing work in a higher classification, at the rate of the higher classification.

While finding difficulties with both the Union’s and the Employer’s positions, the Arbitrator concluded that the Employer’s offer would be least disruptive.

Rhinelander School District

Case 33 INT/ARB-6212 Dec. No. 27136-A (Vernon, 09-21-92)

Union offer selected.

Wages and health insurance were the only issues in dispute. Finding that the insurance issue was “controlling” and that the wage issue was not that significant, the Arbitrator stated that his ruling would be predicated on whose insurance proposal was most reasonable.

The Employer proposed to change from the current up-front $75 deductible and yearly aggregate of $300 per family to an 80-20 co-pay.

The Arbitrator rejected as “irrelevant” the Union’s argument about the Employer’s self-funded health plan because the plan must be judged based on the merits of its benefits and not necessarily on its administration.

The Arbitrator found that the Employer’s proposal was not supported by external comparables because only 5 of the 16 comparable school district’s insurance plans had an 80-20 co-pay feature and that, furthermore, the Employer’s co-pay proposal departed from other co-pay plans because it would “cut deeper” into an employe’s “pocket” since none of the other plans subjected the basic plan to a 20% co-pay and since only two of them subjected physician benefits to such a feature.

In such circumstances, he ruled that the Employer had to offer a significant enough quid pro quo to change the status quo, but that the Employer had not done so because its wage offer by only an “insignificant margin” exceeded the average wage settlements at some other school districts and because its offer of a Section 125 plan “does little.”

As for the private sector, the Arbitrator stated that “this comparison is not as valuable as comparisons to other teachers because the labor market in the private sector has little in common with the labor market for teachers.”

Saying that the Employer uses “major surgery” rather than needed “first aid” to cure its insurance costs, the Arbitrator selected the Union’s offer on this basis.

Brown County (Department of Social Services)

Case 467 INT/ARB-6302 Dec. No. 27240-A (Gundermann, 09-28-92)

Employer offer selected.

The parties to this dispute entered into a two-year agreement covering the period January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1992. Within that agreement was a Memorandum of Understanding entitled “Reopener of the Economic Support Specialist Rate of Pay Adjustment,” which provided for collective bargaining over the rates of pay of the Economic Support Specialist employes with interest arbitration as the impasse mechanism should the parties’ bargaining lead to impasse. Pursuant to that reopener, the parties entered into bargaining and did hit impasse over three aspects of the wage issue: (1) the size of the wage increase; (2) the number of step increases; and (3) retroactivity. With respect to the three issues, the parties proposed identical starting rates of pay. The Association has step increases after 6, 12, 24, 36, 48 months, 8 12 and 16 years. The Association’s 1992 ending top rate if $11.59. The County offer has rate increases after 6, 24, 36, 48 months, 8, 12 and 16 years. The County top rate is $11.39. The Association wage increase takes effect the first payroll of 1991. The County wage progression takes effect September 29, 1992.

It is the Association’s position that this arbitration is the result of special circumstances and a realization by the parties that the wage scale for ESS II workers has to be increased. That realization is the by-product of a very high turnover brought about by a very high case load for experienced ESS workers. The Association argues that ESS workers are grossly underpaid. The Association’s proposed increase after one year experience is based on the Association’s position that when an ESS worker changes classification from ESS I to ESS II (following one year), the responsibilities of the ESS worker increase substantially. The Association proposed the following counties as comparables: Dane, Douglas, Dunn, Jackson, Kenosha, Marinette, Milwaukee, Oconto, Racine, Sheboygan and Waupaca. The Association contended it would be grossly unfair to penalize the Union because the parties were unable to reach agreement and proceed to arbitration by not making the increases retroactive. The County denied there was any evidence of a need to catch up the pay of ESS II workers. The County argued that the prevailing wage rate increases for both City and County government units was 4% in both 1991 and 1992, and that that was the across-the-board adjustment given the employes in this unit. It is the County’s position that the causes of turnover were due to the nature and volume of work, and that the Employer has responded by increasing the ESS II staffing by 6 employes. The County proposed a group of comparables consisting of the following counties: Calumet, Fond du Lac, Manitowoc, Outagamie, Sheboygan and Winnebago.

The arbitrator noted that this case is somewhat different from most interest arbitration cases in that it arises out of a specific contractual provision contained in the parties’ labor agreement. The arbitrator noted that any increase contemplated by the parties following the internal audit would be in addition to the 4% per year wage increase negotiated for 1991 and 1992. Due to the nature of this dispute, internal equity is less significant than it might otherwise be in an interest arbitration. The Arbitrator, following the lead of three prior arbitrations, selected the following counties as comparables: Fond du Lac, Manitowoc, Outagamie, Sheboygan and Winnebago. The Arbitrator was sympathetic to the Association’s argument that an increase was justified after 12 months. However, the fact is that the County’s proposed 6-month rate exceeds any of the 12-month rates, 18-month rates, and 24-month rates paid by any of the comparable counties. The Arbitrator concluded that employes are receiving more money earlier than are their counterparts in the comparable counties. Based on that analysis the evidence supported the County’s position. The Arbitrator found no basis for awarding additional compensation to the employes based on the comparables. The Arbitrator was somewhat sympathetic to the Union’s contention that it was entitled to retroactive pay but unwilling to select the Association’s final offer because of his view that the County’s was more reasonable. The Arbitrator found for the County.

Cassville School District

Case 9 INT/ARB-6050 Dec. No. 27188-A (Baron, 10-03-92)

Employer offer selected.

The Association’s attempt to correct an omission of a specific statement regarding vertical/horizontal increments on the first year’s schedule was rejected by the Arbitrator. Although it was harmless error and not intended to alter the salary structure, the District did not agree to accept the change, and the Arbitrator accepted only the final offers certified by the WERC.

The Association proposed that the primary comparable group be the CESA #3 region with settled contracts, and the District proposed the Blackhawk Athletic Conference as the comparable group. Both groups had been used in the past by the parties. The Arbitrator accepted the athletic conference, based on similarity in student enrollment, geographic proximity, full-time equivalent employes, operating costs, tax base, and economic characteristics. Settlement status is not a factor in comparability, and when parties are faced with limited settlements, greater emphasis is placed on other statutory factors.

If the comparable settlements of wages alone were used, the Association’s offer would be preferable, but there were no voluntary settlements for the second year of the contract. Thus the Arbitrator looked at overall compensation and found that the District was the only one paying the full insurance premiums for both single and family plans. The Arbitrator placed heavy emphasis on this fact, and concluded that the total package approach made the District’s package offer more reasonable than the Association’s.

The Association’s proposal to increase increments caused the Arbitrator some concern, particularly its proposed increase of 100% in Steps 0-6 and a 40% increase in Steps 7-12, as well as a 257% increase in B-C lanes and a 386% increase in D-F lanes. The Association offered no quid pro quo for this substantial change and failed to prove that it was necessary.

The District’s offer was also preferred when looking at the cost of living and the interests and welfare of the public, based on the poor agricultural economy and high rate of unemployment. The Arbitrator found the District’s offer also preferable based on settlements by other public sector employes. The Arbitrator granted the District’s motion to strike additional settlement information which the Association attached to its initial brief, as the parties agreed to close the record as of the date of the hearing.

Village of Spencer

Case 9 INT/ARB-5971 Dec. No. 27037-A (Krinsky, 10-07-92)

Union offer selected.

The Village proposed the deletion of the Extra Contract Agreement provision which prevents the Village from entering into an agreement with any other labor union or individual employes as to the employes represented by the Union, and the deletion of the Subcontracting provision which restricts the Village’s right to subcontract. The Union proposed the status quo be maintained with respect to all items except wages.

The Arbitrator used as comparables the jurisdictions that both parties advocated, Rothschild and Schofield, as well as other jurisdictions chosen on the basis of their proximity, population, tax value and tax rates: Cadott, Cornell, Stanley, Thorp and Neillsville. In considering contract language, the Arbitrator also used Wisconsin Rapids, Marshfield and Weston.

The Village argued that the deletion of the provision restricting subcontracting was necessary to allow it to subcontract the operation of the waste water treatment facility because only a subcontractor had the skills to bring the operation into compliance with state and federal regulations. It stated it had an agreement with its prospective subcontractor to hire its active employes and it would guarantee reemployment of the employes should the subcontracting arrangement fail. In contrast, the Union disputed that the public’s interests would be served by the subcontracting, and asserted the employes would suffer hardships if there were subcontracting.

Although the Arbitrator concurred that the public interest might be better served if the Village contracted for managerial and technical expertise for the facility, he was not convinced that the work of the bargaining unit had to be contracted out in order to comply with state and federal guidelines. Review of the comparables indicated that although the majority of other contracts did not have restrictive subcontracting provisions, such restrictions did exist in some contracts. Ultimately, the Arbitrator concluded that the Village had not demonstrated sufficient compelling need to delete the subcontracting provision nor had it demonstrated that its offer contained a sufficient quid pro quo for deleting a long-standing provision of voluntary origin. The greater wage offer made by the Village could not be considered a quid pro quo because it was never presented as such in bilateral negotiation, and the assurances regarding employment rights of bargaining unit employes could not be considered because they were not part of the final offers. The Arbitrator concluded that the provision restricting subcontracting should not be deleted and that issue was treated as the overriding issue of the dispute. The Arbitrator chose the Union’s final offer.

Manitowoc School District

Case 40 INT/ARB-6206 Dec. No. 27226-A (Rice, 10-12-92)

Employer offer selected.

At issue were the Association’s proposals to improve retiree health insurance and to increase the District’s WRF employe-share pick-up from 6.0 to 6.2%; and the District’s proposals to reduce the time in which teachers submit grades from five to three days after the end of a marking period and to eliminate a provision allowing employes to opt to be paid July and August paychecks in late June of each year.

The retiree insurance issue dominated the dispute, rendering the other issues comparatively inconsequential. The District proposed maintaining the existing provision of $100 per year payable in cash or health insurance premiums upon retirement of an employe with 15 years of service. The Association proposed Employer payments of 11/12 of retiree health premiums up to 4,800 family/24,000 single each year until after five years or age 65.

Primary comparables were the athletic conference districts. Secondary comparables were Appleton, Kaukauna, Kimberly, Menasha, Neenah, Oshkosh and Two Rivers. Statewide averages were considered but given lesser weight than the primary and secondary comparables groups.

Internal comparables supported the District. External comparables supported the Association, “hands down,” because teacher unit comparisons were given much more weight than the contrary indication from major private sector employers. While early year costs of the Association’s proposal are not unreasonable, the cost escalates significantly each year for five years.

The Association’s proposal is without merit because the Association has not offered any quid pro quo to buy the change. The Association’s proposal would increase the Employer’s health insurance costs, yet the Association has steadfastly rejected District proposals to control those costs.

While the Arbitrator tends to agree with the Association that there need not be a quid pro quo where equity and urgent circumstances support a requested improvement, the Arbitrator found no urgent circumstances proven to support the improvement requested in this case. The Association has not shown a real need for the change. There is no problem getting teachers to retire and no surplus of staff to be reduced.

Belmont Community School District

Case 12 INT/ARB-6253 Dec. No. 27200-A (Malamud, 10-16-92)

Employer offer selected.

The issues in dispute were wages, insurance, extra-duty pay, voluntariness of extra duty and when snow days were to be made up.

The parties disagreed as to what constituted the appropriate set of comparables, but the Arbitrator concluded it was unnecessary to identify the precise comparables and refrained from establishing the comparables in this case.

With respect to wages, the Arbitrator by “benchmark” analysis found that the Employer’s salary levels at the base benchmarks were above average but at the maximum benchmarks were below average and concluded that the Union’s proposal on wages was strongly preferred.

On the issue of insurance, in 1991-92 the difference between the offers was approximately $8 per month for family coverage, the Employer at $412.52 and the Union at $420. In 1992-93, the Employer proposed to pick up 85.443% of the total health and dental insurance premium and the Union proposed that the Employer pay 115% of the 1991-92 premium. The Arbitrator found that the Union’s proposal was a change in the status quo without a quid pro quo. In 1990-91, the Employer’s contribution was 85.4%, and for 1991-92, 85.44% and for 1992-93, 85.443%. The Union urged that its proposal should be viewed as a demand for payment up to 115%, but the Arbitrator noted that the certified offer did not contain those words and the Arbitrator could not alter the final offer of either party. The Arbitrator pointed out that 115% of the 1991-92 premium could well provide that the Employer would pay 100% of the premium, if the 1992-93 premium cost was less than the Union had projected. This would be a substantial change in the status quo without any proposal in return. The Arbitrator found that there was strong support for adoption of the Employer’s offer on insurance. The Arbitrator found the other issues had little impact in selecting a final offer. The Arbitrator concluded that the negative effect of the Union’s proposal on insurance tipped the balance in favor of the Employer’s final offer, and accordingly, the Arbitrator selected the Employer’s final offer.

Glidden School District

Case 26 INT/ARB-6191 Dec. No. 27244-A (Malamud, 10-22-92)

Union offer selected.

Both parties propose the 5% per cell salary increases each year, a 5% extra-curricular increase in the second year, a mileage reimbursement increase from 20 to 27 cents and an increase in the sick leave payout upon separation from $10 to $20 for accumulated sick days from the 25th through 100th day.

At issue are the District’s proposed cap on its health insurance dollar contributions at a dollar amount 5.5% above the agreed 1991-92 full dollar amounts ($351 and $146.74) for 1991-92; and layoff language distinguishing a layoff from a non-renewal and providing notice of layoff must be given before April 1. Also at issue is the Union’s proposed first year extracurricular increase of 7.5% in the first year, compared with the District’s proposal of 5%.

The Arbitrator stated that he found it unnecessary to establish the comparability pool given the nature of the issues presented. He utilized a group of twelve districts for comparison purposes in this award.

The District presented compelling evidence that its mill rate is high relative to the low income of the District’s residents. However, the existing insurance provision has permitted the District a free hand to change to self-funding which flexibility might become more of an issue if the employes are required to contribute to the plan. Moreover, the Arbitrator finds that the District’s offer will not have the effect of containing the rate of increase of health insurance premiums and that it offers employes a little protection against the risk that they will be adversely financially impacted by rapidly rising premiums. In addition, the comparability criteria support selection of the Union’s proposal, and the District offers no quid pro quo for its proposed change in the layoff language.

The Union’s request for a 7.5% extra-curricular increase in the first year and its failure to offer a quid pro quo for its proposed sick leave payout improvement are negatives for the Union’s final offer.

Balancing those factors, the District’s unsupported proposals are more significant than the Union’s unsupported proposals, such that the Union’s offer is preferred overall.

Mt. Horeb Area School District

Case 14 INT/ARB-6159 Dec. No. 27198-A (Michelstetter, 10-22-92)

Employer offer selected.

The Arbitrator concluded that the District’s final offer for the second year was heavily favored when applying the comparison criterion. Also, when the additional benefits sought by the Association are considered and the weight of the two years is evaluated, the offer of the District was preferred.

In addition to wages the issues that were in dispute before the Arbitrator concerned personal leave, grievance procedure, WRS contributions, early retirement and sick leave payout upon retirement.

Oneida County (Sheriff’s Department)

Case 85 MIA-1649 Dec. No. 27160-B (Flaten, 10-23-92)

Union offer selected.

In addition to the wage issue, the County proposed to change the existing holiday provisions so that each employe would be allowed 10 floating holidays per year to be scheduled with the consent of the Sheriff (or designee) on or before January 31, 1992. The Union proposed to maintain the existing arrangement under which employes essentially enjoyed the right to schedule and cancel the 10 contractual holidays without the consent of management and without a scheduling deadline.

The County argued that the holiday provision constitutes an administrative nightmare and a potential source of additional overtime expense, and that the County was offering this unit an extra .5% in wages as a quid pro quo for the holiday procedures change. The County also relies, in part, on holiday procedures in effect among its other internal comparables.

The Union asserted that the County has failed to sustain its burden of showing that a legitimate problem exists that warrants changing the existing arrangements which have been in the parties’ agreement for some 15 years, and that the County’s proposal is a reasonable solution to such a problem. The Union also asserted that the Employer’s proposals would reduce the unit’s holiday benefits to the bottom of the external comparables.

The Arbitrator finds that the County is offering a .5% wage quid pro quo and that its total holiday benefit would meet or exceed those in effect in all of the immediately contiguous counties, though not that in the important comparable of the City of Rhinelander.

More compelling, however, is the County’s failure to prove that a legitimate problem exists which requires contractual attention and that the County’s proposal is reasonably designed to effectively address that problem. Here, the testimony of the Captain of Detectives was to the affect that there were no operational complications created by the current holiday scheduling procedures, and that the flexibility to shuffle holiday time off actually assisted rather than hindered the Department’s scheduling needs.

On that basis, the County has failed to justify a change in the longstanding holiday scheduling arrangements. Since both parties treated that issue as the principal one in the dispute, the Union’s offer was selected.

Mishicot School District

Case 8 INT/ARB-6200 Dec. No. 27193-A (McAlpin, 10-30-92)

Union offer selected.

The only issue in dispute is wages. However, the parties also disagreed over the appropriate comparables. The Employer offered a BA base of $21,070 and $22,012. The Employer would delete Sturgeon Bay from the comparability pool. The Union offered a BA base of $21.100 and $22,155.

The Employer argued that Sturgeon Bay should be removed from the comparability group since it has few economic or social ties to Mishicot and is no longer in the same athletic conference. The Union argued that the inclusion of Sturgeon Bay in the comparability group has stood the test of time, including three arbitration awards. The Union contended that the salary settlement pattern strongly supported its offer. The Employer argued that comparable settlements reached in the same time period as this case which are subject to the same economic and political environment supported the Employer’s offer.

The Arbitrator stated that the side arguing to remove a previously used comparable must establish a prima facia case for this change. The Arbitrator found that Mishicot and Sturgeon Bay are not similar in size and, based on almost any fair measure of comparability, they are not comparable for purposes of interest arbitration. The Arbitrator noted that present and likely future economic conditions should be considered by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator concluded that statewide teacher salary averages, non-teacher public and private sector salaries, and parochial teacher salaries should be given little if any weight. The Arbitrator determined that comparables are the determining statistics in this case. In terms of both salary only and total package, the Arbitrator concluded that even under the worst case scenario among all the comparables, including the unsettled ones, the Union’s offer was favored.

Monona Grove School District

Case 56 INT/ARB-6405 Dec. No. 27268-A (Michelstetter, 10-31-92)

Consent Award

In addition to wages, the parties agreed to establish an ad hoc insurance committee to study insurance and/or insurance related benefits for unit employes and retirees with recommendations to be made by March 15, 1993.

City of Wisconsin Rapids (Water Works & Lighting Commission)

Case 102 INT/ARB-6127 Dec. No. 27287-A (Stern, 11-03-92)

Union offer selected.

Three issues were in dispute: health insurance contributions (for active and retired employes), wages, and scope of the contract’s coverage in terms of “all work usually performed by such employees.”

The primary issue was found to be the Employer’s proposal that employes in this newly-organized unit pay, for the first time, 20% of any increases in the health insurance premium. This amount was also to be required of retired employes during their first three years of retirement. Previously, the Employer had paid the full premium.

The Arbitrator found that the Employer was engaging in an “end run” in this clerical and technical unit, using external comparables to try to “(use) a pattern follower to set a pattern for the historic pattern setter.” The Arbitrator found that the pattern setter in this relationship was the long-organized “line” unit, whose current contract preserved the 100% payment by the Employer. The Arbitrator acknowledged that other City of Wisconsin Rapids units had contracts requiring employe payment of from 5 to 10% of the premiums, but found that the controlling internal comparable was the line unit because the clericals’ and technicals’ wage and benefit increases had been “tied to” that unit for years. The Arbitrator rejected the Employer’s “end run” tactic under “Statutory criterion Section 111.70(4)(cm)(7)j which states:”

Such other factors not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours, and conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service or in the private employment.

The Arbitrator found that this issue was of “overriding importance” and that “Therefore, there is no need to issue findings on the other two issues.”

Lastly, the Arbitrator specifically avoided the selection of appropriate comparables and instead recommended that the parties develop a set of comparables in their next negotiations. He reasoned the appropriate comparables should be selected pursuant to statutory criteria without regard to which side would be helped by the inclusion of specific comparables. Practically, this can only be in bargaining and not in arbitration.

Sheboygan Area School District

Case 97 INT/ARB-5889 Dec. No. 27145-A (Tyson, 10-31-92)

Employer offer selected.

The three issues here centered on across-the-board wage increases, whether terminated employes are to be paid .50% of their accumulated sick leave up to a maximum of 11 days, and whether kitchen employes with the “Senior Citizen” meals program shall receive two (2) additional floating holidays to compensate them when they work on holidays or when school otherwise is not in session.

The Arbitrator rejected both parties’ list of primary comparables and ruled that he would consider all submitted information on other school districts’ custodial-maintenance employes, especially the larger schools. He also found that while some external comparables favored the Union’s proposal, internal comparables favored the Employer’s offer. He therefore ruled that the interests and welfare of the public do not favor either party’s wage offer.

Turning to severance pay for unused sick leave, the Arbitrator stated that there are two aspects to this issue, i.e., insurance v. wages, and that they present a recurrent and unreasonable dilemma. He further found that the Union’s proposal must be calculated as a deferred wage increase because the Employer must pay for it out at a later date because “an award for the Union will mean a real debt to employes.” He calculated this debt to be about $27,140 to $29,146 for 1992.

He further found that the Union’s offer was not supported by internal comparables and that it had not clearly established the need for such a change–one which the Arbitrator determined was not accompanied by the requisite quid pro quo.

The Arbitrator also found that the Union’s offer for two additional floating holidays for certain kitchen employes was not supported by either internal or external comparables; that any employes working over 600 hours a year were already receiving a major benefit in the form of pro-rated health insurance; and that their wages fare better than other kitchen employes.

He thus concluded that while the Union’s wage proposal “is somewhat more reasonable,” the same could not be said for either its sick leave severance proposal or its floating holiday proposal. He thus ruled that the Union had not offered a sufficient quid pro quo for its proposals, and he selected the Employer’s proposal.

Wisconsin Heights School District

Case 32 INT/ARB-6096 Dec. No. 27169-A (Michelstetter, 10-30-92)

Union offer selected.

The only issue in dispute was salary for both years. Using the District’s costing, the District proposed $1,719 salary only (6.1%) and $2,037 total package per returning teacher for 1991-92, and $1,253 salary only (4.2%) and $1,743 total package (4.4%) per returning teacher for 1992-93. The Association proposed $2,220 salary only (7.9%) and $2,697 total package (7.2%) per returning teacher for 1991-92, and $1,919 salary only (6.3%) and $2,290 total package (5.7%) per returning teacher for 1992-93.

Using the Capitol Conference as the comparables and considering the Union’s “catch-up” argument, the Arbitrator concluded that the teachers in Wisconsin Heights are paid somewhat less than their counterparts in other districts. In comparing the offers to the settlement of 4.5% on wages in the Village of Black Earth, the Arbitrator subtracted the value of the increment (.7%) on the basis it was payment for an increase in teaching experience and not a general increase. Further, a reasonable negotiator would predict that a teacher settlement would be slightly higher than that for a village. Thus, that comparison only slightly favored the District’s offer. Consideration of the CPI criterion also favored the District’s offer. With regard to the interest and welfare of the public, the Arbitrator concluded that the economy had affected the districts in the set of comparables much the same and yet two out of the three settlements for 1991-92 were much closer to the Union’s offer as to salary only and total package costs. Thus, for 1991-92 the comparables “very heavily” favored the Union’s offer. However, for 1992-93 there was only one settlement in the primary comparables and the economic downturn heavily affected the people in the District. The Arbitrator considered settlements in the secondary comparables and found they favored the Union’s offer, but that the settlement for the Village slightly favored the District’s offer and the CPI criterion heavily favored the District. He concluded that while the District’s offer for 1992-93 was slightly lower than it should be, it was slightly more preferable than the Union’s. However, when both years were viewed together, the Union’s offer was closer to appropriate.

Village of Hales Corners (Police Department)

Case 28 MIA-1717 Dec. No. 27315-B (Krinsky, 11-09-92)

Union offer selected.

The only issue in dispute was whether to amend the contract provision for personal leave to specifically prohibit its use for sleeping.

The Union proposed no change in the personal leave language, but took the position in a pending grievance that the current provision allowed an officer to use personal leave to sleep. The Village proposed to add a specific prohibition against using personal leave to sleep, consistent with its position on the grievance.

The Arbitrator concluded that neither party’s offer was more in the public’s interest than the other, as he did not feel either was likely to result in assuring that there will be a well-rested police force. As to comparisons with police in comparable communities, none of those contracts specifically banned the use of personal leave for sleep and it was not possible from the evidence to determine whether or not those other police departments allowed its use for sleep. Since the Village was proposing the change, it had the burden of showing its change was supported by the comparables. The Village did not meet its burden in that regard. The Arbitrator rejected the Village’s argument that its proposed amendment was only a clarification, and not a substantive change. He noted that there had been extensive discussions of the personal leave provision in the negotiations for the 1990-91 contract, including the number of days and the condition under which personal leave could be used. Whether personal leave could be used for sleeping was not discussed. The Arbitrator concluded from that bargaining history that the Village’s offer was not merely a “clarification.” Hence, the Village had the burden of demonstrating a need for the change. The Arbitrator noted that there had been two instances in the past where the issue of using personal leave for sleep had arisen and been discussed, but that neither party felt it was of sufficient importance to address in negotiations. The Arbitrator also concluded that in negotiating the changes in the personal leave provision for the 1990-91 agreement, there was no evidence presented to show a mutual intent to continue practices that may have developed under the old language. The fact that a grievance is pending before a grievance arbitrator is not a sufficient demonstration of a need to change the contract. Once the grievance is decided, the parties can decide whether the language needs to be changed and can address it in bargaining. Therefore, the Union’s final offer was selected.

Algoma School District

Case 18 INT/ARB-6278 Dec. No. 27239-A (Petrie, 11-10-92)

Employer offer selected.

The parties agreed upon the primary comparables: Algoma, Denmark, Gibraltar, Kewaunee, Luxemburg-Casco, Mishicott, Sevastopol, Southern Door and Sturgeon Bay.

The issues revolved around salary and health insurance benefits for retirees. On the latter issue, the Board proposed a change in the status quo from fully paid health, dental and life insurance for a ten year period following retirement to fully paid insurances for only a five year period following retirement with the premium amounts then capped and retired teachers thereafter paying any increases in premiums. The Union proposed no change in the status quo on this issue.

The parties agreed to leave the instant record open to receive the results of the Luxemburg-Casco and Southern Door interest arbitration proceedings.

The Arbitrator found the Union’s salary offer was to be preferred slightly over the Board’s offer, based upon the comparables, although the Arbitrator noted that the offers were “quite close to one another.”

The Arbitrator, however, did not find salary to be the determinative issue in this case. The Arbitrator preferred the Board’s offer on the issue of health, dental and life insurance premium payments for retirees because it had met its burden of proof and persuasion thereon. On this point, the Arbitrator noted that the Board had demonstrated an unanticipated and meteoric rise in health insurance premiums since the parties first negotiated this benefit into the labor agreement in the 1970s, and that the Union had resisted change in this area in negotiations. He also observed that even with the Board-proposed change, District retired teachers would still enjoy the best early retiree health insurance premium payment benefit of all the schools in the comparable group. The Arbitrator found that the Board did not need to support this proposed change by a specific bargaining quid pro quo regarding this determinative issue. Therefore, the Arbitrator selected the Board’s final offer as more reasonable.

Chippewa County

Case 175 INT/ARB-6230 Dec. No. 27277-A (Maslanka, 11-12-92)

Union offer selected.

The sole issue in dispute was health insurance. The Union proposed no changes. The status quo was that the County paid the full cost of health insurance premiums for employes hired before January 1, 1989; those employes hired after January 1, 1989, paid 20% of the premium for 24 months after their date of hire; and there was a $100 deductible per person/maximum $200 per family on the basic program. The County proposed that effective July 1, 1992, employes hired before January 1, 1990, would pay 3 1/2% for the single or family health insurance premium, increasing to 7% effective October 1, 1993; employes hired after January 1, 1990, would pay 20% of the single or family premiums; and there would be a $100 per person/maximum $300 per family deductible on the major medical and an 80% – 20% co-pay on the next $5,000 major medical coverage. The County also proposed to implement a Section 125 and 129 (IRC) plan. The County described the changes as including improvements in benefits and coverage, and because the Union did not address that contention, the Arbitrator assumed the plan contained those improvements.

Regarding the County’s argument that health insurance premiums and costs have increased dramatically in recent years, the Arbitrator assumed that likely was true for the comparables as well. The test was the cost of premiums to the County beginning in 1992 and how it compared with the comparables. Comparison of the County’s premiums with the comparables showed it to be third lowest in the single plan and second lowest in the family plan amongst the seven comparables. Dollarwise the County paid less per month than the average of the comparables for the single plan and for the family plan. The Arbitrator found that comparison to be of “great importance.” The County also argued that it had worked hard over the past several years to control costs. The Arbitrator noted that work had paid off by lowering the cost paid by the County, and that some of the reduction in cost was achieved by reductions in coverage for the employes. The Arbitrator rejected the County’s argued need for employe contribution toward the premium for the single plan so that they would have a monetary stake in controlling costs. There was no evidence presented of a high number of employe claims or excessive deductions from the self-funded account. The Arbitrator also did not find persuasive the County’s arguments that the reasonableness of its position was demonstrated by the law enforcement unit’s willingness to voluntarily accept the County’s offer and that the morale of the law enforcement personnel, as well as the department heads and management personnel, would suffer if the rest of the units were not required to make the same contributions. Four out of the County’s five bargaining units, or 232 of 271 of the County’s employes had not accepted the County’s offer, and the evidence showed that, contrary to the County’s claim, there was no policy that department heads and management contribute toward the cost of their health insurance. Thus, the Union’s offer was considered to be more appropriate.

Black Hawk School District

Case 16 INT/ARB-6112 Dec. No. 27247-A (Bilder, 11-13-92)

Employer offer selected.

This is the first contract and issues in dispute included health and dental insurance, holidays, vacations, sick leave, personal leave, bereavement leave, work day/work week and overtime, lunch and break periods, emergency late start, early dismissal, school closing, letters of appointment, retirement benefits and wages. The District argued for comparables which are contiguous districts or in the same athletic conference, and the Association argued for a broader group in the southwestern part of the State whose support staffs are unionized. The Arbitrator was not persuaded that non-unionized units should not be considered as comparables. The Arbitrator found geographic proximity a relevant market for non-certified works, and adopted the athletic conference schools of Albany, Argyle, Barneveld, Belleville, Darlington, Juda, Monroe, Monticello, New Glarus, Pecatonica, and he added Benton due to its geographic proximity.

The District proposed to maintain 100% of health and dental insurance premiums for the first year and then pay 90% in the second year of the contract. The teachers in the District have a 95% contribution level and the picture is mixed in the external comparables. The Arbitrator deemed the issue too close to call on its own.

The Arbitrator found that the District’s offer of 10 holidays to year round secretaries and 7 holidays to year round custodians was better than most of the comparables, while its offer of 2 holidays for nine-month food service employes and aides was less favorable. On balance, the Arbitrator favored the District’s position on holidays.

The Arbitrator found the Association’s offer on paid vacations slightly more comparable, where the Association proposed one week after on year, two weeks after two years, and three weeks after five years, while the District proposed one week after one year and two weeks after three years. The Arbitrator also found the Association’s proposal on sick leave more comparable, where the Association proposed credit of one day per month cumulative to 90 and the District proposed one day per month to a maximum of 10 days per year and cumulative to 60 days for full year employes and 20 for school year employes.

The District proposed one day of personal leave per year to be deducted from sick leave, and the Association proposed two days of personal leave with no deduction from sick leave. The Arbitrator found the Association’s proposal more comparable, based on the internal comparable of teachers. The same was true of bereavement leave, where the District proposed that bereavement leave be deducted from sick leave and the Association proposed that it not be deducted. The Arbitrator preferred the Association’s position on continuing employment letters, absent any evidence that such written annual notice to employes would be burdensome. Differences between the parties on the issues of jury duty, work day/work week and emergency late starts were deemed insignificant.

The Arbitrator preferred the District’s proposal for an unpaid lunch period as well as the District’s position on early dismissal, namely, that support staff should remain at work unless staying is hazardous. The District’s proposal on school closing (employes called in to be paid their regular rate versus the Association’s proposal of time and a half) was also more comparable.

The Association proposed that the district pick up one half of the employe portion of the WRS contributions, or 3.1%, while the District argued that the external comparables were all over the place on this issue. The Arbitrator considered the Association’s position more comparable based on the internal comparable as well as external comparables. The Arbitrator favored the District’s position on wages. The Association took the position that the parties were very close on wage rates and wage rates were not a key issue in dispute. The Association also argued that the cost difference in the total package was only about $3,600 in the first year and $800 in the second year and should not be a factor in the decision. Where both parties’ offers exceed the cost of living and general patterns of wage increases for other public and private sector employes, the Arbitrator found the district’s offer preferable. The rural economy of Southwestern Wisconsin favored the District’s position.

The Arbitrator concluded as follows:

Looking at the two offers in relation to all of these statutory criteria taken cumulatively and together, the Arbitrator is of the opinion that the factors favoring the Board’s offer are on balance preponderant. The employees here in question are presently at a level of total compensation which compares relatively favorably with that of most other surrounding comparable districts. On balance, the Board’s offer seems closer to the wages, hours and conditions of employment of comparable districts than does the Union’s, at least in most of those respects such as wage increase, holidays, and work schedule which the parties consider especially important, with the health insurance issue a tossup. It is true that the acceptance of the Board’s offer perpetuates some differences in benefits between the school support workers and the Black Hawk teachers, particularly with respect to health and dental premiums and retirement contributions. On the other hand, acceptance of the Union’s offer would, on its part, have the effect of placing the school support employees in a better position than the teachers as to health insurance premiums, arguably creating a difference which might lead to criticism the other way. Moreover, as indicated, the Board’s wage and total compensation package is closer to that of comparable districts and should serve to maintain these employees’ generally good position as compared with other districts. While the Arbitrator has not considered determinative the Board’s evidence that its offer well exceeds the rise in the CPI and that these are economically troubled times for many people in the District and elsewhere, these factors are, in the Arbitrator’s opinion, of some relevance and tend also to reenforce a decision in favor of the Board’s proposal.

City of Sun Prairie (Police Department)

Case 24 MIA-1722 Dec. No. 27345-A (Michelstetter, 11-13-92)

Consent Award

In addition to wages, the parties agreed to certain health insurance changes.

Cornell School District

Case 14 INT/ARB-6069 Dec. No. 27292-B (Zeidler, 11-23-92)

Employer offer selected.

Comparable districts was an issue disputed by the parties, and the Arbitrator found, as argued by the Union, that Stanley-Boyd should be added to the list of comparables. The Arbitrator also stated he would report on the District’s list even though he felt it was of secondary value.

Additional issues in dispute were hours, absences, wages and insurance benefits. On the matter of wages, the Arbitrator found the Union’s offer more reasonable. With respect to health insurance, the Arbitrator concluded that public interest considerations favored adoption of the District offer as the one least likely to cause immediate difficulty in this accretion situation. In the area of dental insurance, the Arbitrator adopted the District’s offer because it better served the public interest whereas the Union offer, while more in line with the comparables, contained ambiguities as to benefit levels. On LTD insurance the Arbitrator found the Union’s offer most comparable to what exists in other districts. On the health insurance option provision advanced by the Union the Arbitrator concluded it was not supported by the comparables. On the last issue relating to call back pay the Arbitrator believed the Union’s position was more reasonable.

Finally, the Arbitrator’s main reason for finding for the District was the problem of ambiguity in the Union’s dental insurance policy.

Cochrane-Fountain City School District

Case 15 INT/ARB-6231 Dec. No. 27234-A (Flagler, 10-18-92)

Employer offer selected.

This was an initial contract and there were sixteen issues submitted to arbitration. Also there was a dispute over which districts should comprise the appropriate comparables. The Arbitrator found the Union’s list of comparables, which covers a radius of 50 miles, more reasonable than the District’s reliance on Dairyland Athletic Conference because it contains more represented units and because it is closer to what he thought the parties would have agreed to had they reached an agreement on their own.

The single most important issue in the dispute involved health insurance. The Arbitrator found the District’s final offer on the insurance package to be the more reasonable.

Thereafter, he briefly individually analyzed the remaining proposals and commented as to whose position was the more reasonable. He commented on wages that while the District’s offer is too little in dollars it generates, the Union’s general across-the-board increase would not only restore but would exacerbate the very inequities that the District sought to resolve in its revisions prior to bargaining. He concluded by finding that “In a proper weighting of key issues which will have the greatest impact on the employees, and the District, however, the District’s composite of proposals emerges as the more appropriate . . .”

Jefferson County (Health Agency)

Case 55 INT/ARB-5855 Dec. No. 27272-A (Malamud, 11-30-92)

Union offer selected.

In this arbitration of the initial contract between the parties, the only issues in dispute were whether the County could hire above the minimum wage and the conditions for granting contingency pay. Since examination of comparables would not be helpful in resolving this dispute, the Arbitrator left the determination of a comparability pool to the parties’ future bargaining, after noting that both parties proposed Dodge County as a comparable.

Regarding the contingency pay issue, the Arbitrator did not find any material difference between the language proposed by the Union and the County. The Union’s language was, however, preferred because it was consistent with the language of the agreements in the other County bargaining units.

The Union argued that hiring above the minimum rate undermines the bargained wage rates, harms morale among incumbent employes and is not supported by any evidence that it is necessary for the recruitment of new nurses. The Arbitrator concluded that while he did not endorse the concept of hiring above the minimum, which distorts the contractual wage schedule, he preferred the County’s language because it had been included in the parties’ stipulation and had been ratified by the Union before the apparent voluntary agreement fell apart and the parties proceeded to interest arbitration. Additionally, he found it was proper to include it in the contract that would expire within 30 days after the issuance of the award. The issue of hiring above minimum was considered more significant than the contingency pay and therefore the County’s final offer was chosen.

Richfield Joint School District #11

Case 5 INT/ARB-6020 Dec. No. 27252-A (Johnson, 12-23-92)

Union offer selected.

In addition to salary, the form of extra-curricular stipends, and the beginning and ending dates of the 2-year contract term, the issues included District proposals restricting personal leave before other off days, and clarifying the layoff/recall/seniority language, and Association proposals adding final and binding grievance arbitration, clarifying layoff, increasing the District’s health insurance contribution from 85 to 90%, improving the long-term disability benefit, adding a District-paid dental plan, and requiring the District to negotiate any change in insurance carrier or benefit level.

Based on prior awards in neighboring Districts, the comparables were deemed to be the Hartford Union High School and all of its elementary feeder Districts.

The Association’s grievance arbitration proposal is preferable because nearly all the comparables have final and binding grievance arbitration even though none use the WERC staff arbitrators proposed by the Association. The Association’s proposal on contribution toward health and dental insurance is “compelling” because most of the comparable districts pay full health and dental. The comparables also support the Association’s proposals regarding LTD, layoff, right to negotiate the insurance change impact and duration language. Salaries are generally below benchmarks among the comparables, so the Union’s offer was preferred on that issue as well.

The comparables support Employer’s position on extra-curricular pay and personal leave restriction.

Overall compensation, while difficult to judge, favored the Association because it was apparent that it was lower than in the comparables.

On balance, the Arbitrator rejected the District’s contentions that the Association was seeking too much at one time without offering any quid pro quo on the grounds of catchup. Adoption of the Union final proposal would put the employment conditions of these teachers at roughly the same level as such conditions for teachers in comparable districts. The Union’s final offer was selected.

Waukesha School District

Case 80 INT/ARB-6358 Dec. No. 27263-A (Vernon, 12-28-92)

Union offer selected.

The sole issue was salary. Absent special and unusual circumstances, comparisons to similar employes in similar communities is the single most important criterion and ordinarily controls. Based on prior awards, primary comparables were held to be West Allis, Wauwatosa, New Berlin, Elmbrook, Hamilton, Kettle Moraine, Mukwonago and Pewaukee; and secondary comparables were held to be Franklin, Muskego, Greenfield, Whitnall, Greendale, Germantown, Menomonee Falls. A lower-weighted third tier, if needed, was held to consist of Hartford, Kewaskum, Mequon, Oak Creek, Shorewood, Slinger, South Milwaukee, West Bend and Whitefish Bay.

The Arbitrator rejects the District’s contention that its offer is in “the ball park” of settlements in the comparables. When compared with settlements among the primary and secondary comparables, the District’s offer is woefully inadequate in terms of how much money teachers get in their pockets. It is well below the lowest settlement and even further below the average of the settlements, whereas the Association’s offer is extremely close to the pattern.

The Arbitrator rejects the District’s contention that its financial and economic situation makes the settlement pattern non-determinative. The evidence showed that the recession and trends in teacher salaries have not impacted any worse on Waukesha taxpayers than on those in the comparable districts. The District’s dramatic decrease in state aid results from the District’s faster rate of increase in equalized property values. The teachers should not be blamed for rising property values and decreases in state aid that substantially account for higher tax bills experienced by District residents. The increased tax attributable to the Association’s offer being selected would be about $29 for a home assessed at $100,000. That does not seem an unreasonable burden to shoulder in order to grant the District’s teachers a comparable increase to that enjoyed by other teachers in comparable districts. The fact that the District had the highest tax rate increase among the comparables from 1991-92 to 1992-93 is not persuasive because it could be for a variety of reasons and the absence of parallel data for several of the settlements reached a year earlier means the record fails to distinguish the District from the comparables as regards the impact of teacher salaries on the interest and welfare of the public.

While the double bump in taxes from the increase in property values and from increases in the tax rate might have suggested a somewhat less than average increase to ease the transition from an aided to a non or minimally aided district, the District’s proposal is just too far out of line with the comparables.

Wittenberg-Birnamwood School District

Case 14 INT/ARB-6170 Dec. No. 27299-A (Yaffe, 01-05-93)

Employer offer selected.

Two issues are in dispute: wages shown above and liquidated damages. The Employer’s offer increases liquidated damages from $100 to $250 after June 1 and $500 after August 1.

The Employer argued that it has maintained a ranking on all benchmarks near the middle of the comparables, which its offer maintains, while the Union’s offer jumps employes ahead at the BA and MA maximums where the Employer already provides a more than competitive salary. The Union argued that its offer best maintains the benchmark relationship and does not leap from any benchmark rankings, while the Employer’s offer deteriorates the ranking of seven of the 15 benchmarks. In terms of liquidated damages, the Employer argued that only one comparable district has a lower penalty, while the Union argued that the District presented no problems that were caused by the current language.

The Arbitrator found that in the first year, the parties proposed wage increases were approximately equally above and below the comparable average. The Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s second year salary proposal seemed to be more comparable than the Employer’s. The Arbitrator also concluded that the Union’s position regarding liquidated damages was more reasonable than the Employer’s in that the Employer failed to demonstrate what problems it has experienced in regard to liquidated damages which would justify this change. Overall, the Arbitrator concluded that the Employer’s total package was significantly more in line with the comparable average, at least in the first year. Therefore, the Employer’s final offer was slightly more reasonable, when viewed in its entirety, than was the Union’s.

Baraboo School District

Case 37 INT/ARB-6214 Dec. No. 27237-A (Yaffe, 11-24-92)

Employer offer selected.

The issues in dispute are sick leave accumulation, emergency leave, arbitration of grievances, discipline and discharge standard, posting of job vacancies, overtime, paycheck distribution, fair share, wages and comparables.

In terms of comparables, the Employer argues that the same districts used in a case involving its maintenance and custodial unit and teacher unit should be used, while the Union argues that the appropriate basis of comparability is the other organized employe groups of the Employer. In terms of the non-wage items, the Union argued that it was seeking the most fundamental of accepted labor contract rights which other employes of the Employer enjoy, while the District argued that the Union is giving nothing in return for the many significant changes to the parties’ agreement. In terms of wages, the Employer argued that the Union’s offer is closer to its comparables in salary-only the first year, while the Employer’s offer is closer in salary-only the second year and in both years for total package. The Union argued that its 4% wage rate increase was reasonable and consistent with its primary comparability group as well as unrepresented employes of the Employer.

The Arbitrator concluded that the Employer’s proposed group of comparables appeared to be somewhat more reasonable than the Union’s. The Arbitrator found that the costs of the Employer’s total package were significantly more in line with both internal and external comparable settlements than the costs of the Union’s proposed package comparable settlement, and that the Employer’s total package was above the comparable averages while the Union’s proposal was significantly greater than practically all of the settlements that have been identified in this record. In terms of non-economic items, the Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s proposal was significantly more reasonable. The Arbitrator reasoned that:

This conclusion forces the undersigned to choose between the District’s total package, which is significantly more comparable in terms of economic consequence, and the Association total package proposal, which is significantly more reasonable based upon the merits of the Association’s non economic proposals. While that kind of choice is a difficult and unpleasant one to make, the undersigned believes that a choice must be made in favor of the District, in view of the fact that the economic benefits it has offered are comparable and fair, and in view of the fact that the public interest will best be served in these difficult economic times if a more prudent, yet reasonable economic package is selected.

This choice is also being made to keep the District in the mainstream regarding the wages and benefits it provides its employees, with the hope and expectation that many of the issues the Association has identified and constructively attempted to address will be successfully addressed in the next round of negotiations.

Based on the above, the Arbitrator selected the Employer’s final offer.

Fort Atkinson School District

Case 27 INT/ARB-5781 Dec. No. 27352-A (Yaffe, 12-16-92)

Employer offer selected.

The Arbitrator found essentially no difference between the total costs of the parties’ proposals for their initial collective bargaining agreement. The issues in dispute were the wage schedule and increments, when employes became eligible for increments, the Employer proposing anniversary date and the Union proposing July 1st of each year except for those employes hired after January 14th who would receive increments on their anniversary date, and eligibility for longevity, with the Employer proposing eligibility be based upon total hours worked prorated based upon a full-time equivalency of 1957.5 hours and the Union proposing actual years worked.

The Union argued that the Employer’s 3.5% minimum increase was insufficient given the employes low rate of pay and the raises given to other District employes, that the use of anniversary dates will create payroll problems, grievances, and is inconsistent with a uniform wage schedule and a contract in which all other benefits renew or are increased on the contractual renewal date, and that the Employer’s proposal on longevity unfairly penalizes the part-time employes, many of whom who had been treated as full-time employes.

The Employer argued that the employes should be compared with the Employer’s Custodian/Cook contract and with City of Fort Atkinson and Jefferson County employes because of similarity of duties. The Employer also held that proration of benefits between full- and part-time employes is an accepted practice and points out the Union has offered no quid quo pro for the longevity benefit. The Employer also held that the Union’s placement of employes on the wage schedule was inconsistently cumbersome.

The Arbitrator held that the wage and salary structure was sufficiently distinguishable to negate the persuasiveness of internal comparables, that there was sufficient diversity in pay systems in comparable school districts to prevent any findings of clear settlement patterns and despite the fact the parties stipulated to a group of external school district comparables, the stipulation did not preclude the Employer from arguing comparability with the City of Fort Atkinson and Jefferson County employes. The Arbitrator then found the City and County not to be comparable because similar job titles does not mean the levels of responsibility and job duties are the same.

The Arbitrator found the core issues were when employes should become eligible for increments and longevity pay and also where and how employes should be placed on the new salary schedule. The Arbitrator found the Employer’s position on placement more meritorious because it comported more with the structure of the schedule because mid-step placements argued by the Union were not supported by comparability arguments and because it would result in less future placement problems. The Arbitrator found the Union’s position on increment eligibility less compelling than the Employer’s finding the Employer’s proposal achieved uniformity and consistency for all employes, where they were employed as school year employes or year round employes, nor was the Employer’s proposal unfair or did it adversely affect any employes. The Arbitrator found the Union’s proposal on longevity more consistent with the concept of pay for years of service; however, the Arbitrator noted the Union’s proposal was flawed in that the Union’s proposal was ambiguous and there was potential for disagreement over the proposal’s unclear reference to time not worked.

In concluding that both final offers were flawed but selecting the Employer’s the Arbitrator found the Employer’s to be less flawed, noting that the Employer’s would result in more uniform pay policies, a more relevant wage schedule, and contract language less subject to differing interpretations and disagreement.

Chippewa County

Case 173 INT/ARB-6228 Dec. No. 27325-A (Friess, 01-18-93)

Union offer selected.

The sole issue in dispute was health insurance. The County proposed that effective July 1, 1992, employes hired before January 1, 1990, would pay 3 1/2% of the monthly premium for single and family coverage, and effective October 1, 1993, such employes would pay 7% of the monthly premium for single and family coverage. Employes hired on or after January 1, 1990, would pay 20% of monthly premium for single and family coverage. The County’s self-funded plan would include a $100 per person or $300 maximum per family deductible and an 80% – 20% co-pay for the first $5,000 of major medical coverage. The County would implement a Sec. 125 and 129 (IRC) plan. The Union proposes to maintain the status quo: the County pays the full cost of the premiums for single and family coverage, except that employes hired after January 1, 1990, are required to pay 20% of the premiums for the first 24 months of their employment, after which the County pays 100%. The current plan contained a $100 per person/$200 maximum deductible.

In addition to the statutory criteria used to determine the reasonableness of an offer, the Arbitrator discussed “change tests” to be applied when a language change is proposed. He concluded the County’s offer was in fact proposing a change consisting of changes that appeared to be “technical,” i.e., corrections, and “ordinary,” i.e., % contribution – items often subject to negotiated changes by the parties, and one change possibly “substantial,” i.e., could affect benefit levels. That being the case, a “normal” level of proof, rather than a “substantial” level, is required and the statutory criteria are sufficient in that regard. The internal comparables, consisting of one unit voluntarily agreeing to the County’s proposal and one unit prevailing in arbitration, did not support either offer. There was little support among the external comparables for an employe contribution as high as the County proposed. While private sector comparables favored the County, little weight was placed on those comparisons. The Arbitrator concluded that the County’s offer would eventually result in all employes contributing 20% towards premiums and found that to be unreasonable. He also concluded that twelve proposed changes in the health insurance provision was “too much, too fast.” Lastly, he concluded that the proposed provision was too complex and lengthy and that the County had not offered a sufficient quid pro quo for the changes.

Palmyra-Eagle Area School District

Case 17 INT/ARB-6460 Dec. No. 27376-A (Zeidler, 01-23-93)

Union offer selected.

The only issue in dispute is a Wage Reopener for 1992-93. The parties agree that the primary comparable is the Rock Valley Athletic Conference. The Arbitrator agreed with the District’s position that all extra-curricular positions which could be filled by bargaining unit members should be costed. While insurance was not a part of the reopener, the parties agreed to a “pre-admission review” which had reduced the proposed 42% increase in insurance to 29.65. The Arbitrator did not accept the Association’s argument that total compensation should not be considered or that the insurance cost-savings should be placed on wages.

The Arbitrator rejected the District’s argument that the parties had agreed to bargain on the basis of total package costs. The Arbitrator found the District’s offer to be more comparable in total package increases, but that the Association’s offer was more comparable in actual dollars paid for salary and total compensation. The Arbitrator found that the interests and welfare of the public were served by having a comparable salary grid.

City of Rhinelander (Police Department)

Case 65 MIA-1698 Dec. No. 27371-A (Oestreicher, 02-01-93)

Union offer selected.

Sole issue was wage adjustment. Arbitrator held that unique nature of police work made external comparables more persuasive than internals, rejecting City’s argument that its other settlements should proscribe deviation from its pattern. The Employer sought use of four other municipalities (Merrill, Antigo, Ashland and Oneida County), while the Association relied on those plus eight others, as had been used in prior arbitrations. Relying on the set of comparables used in prior arbitrations, Arbitrator held for the Labor Organization.

City of Beloit (Police Department)

Case 105 MIA-1644 Dec. No. 27207-A (McAlpin, 02-03-93)

Employer offer selected.

There are five areas of dispute: (1) Wages. The Union proposed a wage freeze for first-year officers. Both sides proposed wage increases of 4% across-the-board January 1, 1992, and 4% across-the-board January 1, 1993. (2) Longevity. The Union proposed a change in the amount of longevity pay by increasing the amount of longevity pay 5 cents per hour per year for each year beginning at six and continuing through 18 years of continuous service. (3) Holiday Pay. The Union would increase to time and one-half plus holiday pay based on an 8 1/2 hour day the amount paid an employe who works on a holiday. The Union would also increase from 8 to 10 paid holidays the number of holidays available to bargaining unit employes. (4) Vacations. The Union would incorporate the municipality’s General Order #20 as to the scheduling of vacations. That Order, constituting a practice between the parties, established a priority sequence for vacations. (5) Grievance Arbitration of Discipline. The Union proposed to allow employes to determine whether disciplinary hearings would be decided by an arbitrator or before the Police and Fire Commission.

The Union contends that the appropriate comparables include Appleton, Janesville, the Rock County Sheriff’s Department, Menomonee Falls, Town of Beloit, Stoughton, Elkhorn and Edgerton. The Union argues that the additional longevity pay is needed in order to stem the current turnover that the Department experiences among senior employes. The Union contends that the savings generated by freezing the entry-level wage will more than pay for the Union’s proposed modifications in the wage schedule. The Union argues that final and binding arbitration has been repeatedly found to be a superior impasse dispute resolution mechanism, and that it ought properly be incorporated into the parties’ agreement. The Union cites its comparables and argues that 10 paid holidays is the standard as is time and one-half plus holiday pay for time worked. Finally, the Union argues that incorporating the general order relative to scheduling vacations is eminently reasonable. The City contends that the comparables include Rock County, Appleton, Eau Claire, Fond du Lac, Janesville, LaCrosse, Oshkosh, Sheboygan and Wausau. These cities were utilized as comparables in a previous arbitration award between these two parties. The City contends that its offer in this case is consistent with both the external comparables and the internal comparables. The 1992 settlement pattern strongly suggests a 4% increase. The Employer argues that the longevity program increases proposed by the Union will cost it an additional $37,000 in the first year with no assurance that the wage freeze for new employes will ever offset this cost. Additionally, the City notes that two-tier systems are normally opposed by labor organizations because of the detrimental impact on morale. The City accuses the Union of forum shopping relative to its position on discipline.

The Arbitrator indicated that when one side or another wishes to deviate from the status quo of the previous collective bargaining agreement, the proponent of that change must fully justify its position and provide strong reasons and a proven need. Here, it is the Union that seeks to alter the relationship between the parties. The Union has asked for a two-tier wage system and unlimited longevity increment, the substitution of arbitration for the Police and Fire Commission in discipline and discharge cases, changes in the holiday pay system adding additional holidays, and altering the pay structure for those who work on holidays. Finally, the Union seeks inclusion of a practice set forth in City’s General Order #20 covering the scheduling of vacations.

The Arbitrator saw no reason why the City would be unwilling to memorialize its own practice with respect to the scheduling of vacations. The Arbitrator also found that the Union’s proposal with respect to grievance arbitration for discipline was useful and could actually serve to save the City time and money. With respect to the Union’s holiday and wage proposals, the Arbitrator found that they included significant cost increases and addressed the justification of those proposals relative to comparables. The Arbitrator concluded that he could find no record evidence to support the Union’s contention that the parties should look at a comparable group other than that which had been historically utilized by the parties in the past. The Arbitrator found that two-tier wage systems foster hard feelings and employe relations problems. After considering the external comparables and the arguments of the parties, the Arbitrator found that the City’s position was favored with respect to the changes in wages and longevity under the collective bargaining agreement. The Union’s holiday proposal was characterized as a significant and far-reaching change in the holiday contractual provision. Because of its financial impact, the Arbitrator considered it as a part of the overall Union economic package. Ultimately, the Arbitrator determined that the two-tier wage system does not adequately cover the additional cost contained in the Union’s proposal, and may cause employe relations problems in the future. The Arbitrator found no support in the comparables, found that the City resources were limited, and found that the internal comparables supported the City. As a result, the Arbitrator concluded that the City’s proposal was more reasonable.

Peshtigo School District

Case 19 INT/ARB-6079 Dec. No. 27288-A (Baron, 02-08-93)

Employer offer selected.

The parties disagreed regarding the comparables. The Employer suggested the unionized support staff units in the M & O Athletic Conference (Coleman, Crivitz, Gillett, Wausaukee) along with the unionized portion of the Marinette School District support staff (custodians only) and two municipal organized units — Marinette County and City of Peshtigo — as comparables. The Union also suggested Coleman, Crivitz, Gillett and Wausaukee as well as the Employer’s own unionized professional teacher unit as comparables. The Arbitrator accepted the Employer’s school district comparables but rejected its non-school district comparables as unsupported by sufficient evidence. The Arbitrator also rejected the Union’s internal professional comparable on the same basis.

The Arbitrator noted that both parties had proposed a major change in the pre-union status quo: the addition of prorated benefits for part-time employes. Therefore, the Arbitrator stated that she would consider the seven substantive open issues on their merits and by comparison with the level of benefits received by similar employes in the selected comparables. The Arbitrator also concluded, contrary to the Association’s position, that master agreements presently in effect for the support staff would not be considered the status quo. The six open issues were: (1) Layoff/Recall Procedure; (2) Hours of Work and Overtime; (3) Leaves of Absence; (4) Vacation; (5) Employe Benefits and Fringes; and (6) Compensation.

(1) Layoff/Recall: The Employer proposed language to allow reductions in work hours under its layoff proposal while the Union did not make a proposal on this point. The Arbitrator found that the Association’s offer was preferred given the lack of support in the comparables for the Employer’s proposal and given the fact that the parties had not discussed this Employer proposal, first given in the final offer process.

(2) Hours of Work and Overtime: Regarding the specific listing of hours of work in the contract proposed by the Union, the Arbitrator found that the comparables failed to support such a proposal. In addition, the Union’s proposal to allow employes to perform emergency overtime without prior Employer authorization was not supported by the comparables. Therefore, the Arbitrator preferred the Employer’s offer on this issue.

(3) Leaves of Absence: The parties disagreed on the number of sick leave days to be granted to both full- and part-time employes. The Arbitrator found the District’s offer of 12, 10 and 9 days per year for 12 month, 10 month and 9 month employes, respectively, was the more reasonable based on the similarity with the comparables. The Arbitrator specifically rejected the Union’s argument that its proposal of 11 days per year for all employes was more reasonable based on the pre-union status quo.

Regarding the Union’s proposed use of sick leave for doctor’s appointments in two-hour increments as opposed to the Employer’s proposed four-hour incremental use of sick leave for such purpose, the Arbitrator preferred the Union’s offer because the Employer had failed to demonstrate either that it needed four-hour increments or that the Union’s proposal was otherwise unreasonable.

Regarding bereavement leave, the Employer proposed a greater benefit than the Union, allowing such leave for “any family member living in the employee’s household.” The Arbitrator found the Employer’s proposal more reasonable and again, the Arbitrator rejected the Union’s argument that the pre-union status quo on this point and sick leave accumulation (contained in its proposal) was more reasonable.

Regarding personal leave, the parties’ sole disagreement concerned the limit the Employer proposed to place on the number of employes in each department who could take the non-cumulative one day per year personal leave on a particular day. The Employer proposed one employe per shift per department per day while the Union proposed one employe per building per department per day. Given the agreed-upon ten working day notice required before employes may take such leave, the Arbitrator found that the Union’s offer was preferred in light of testimony by the department supervisor that both proposals would cause difficulty for him.

Regarding unpaid leaves, the Employer proposed two days of such leave while the Union proposed ten days. The parties agreed that this leave would be available to both full- and part-time employes. The Arbitrator, finding no support for the Union’s proposal among the comparables, preferred the Employer’s offer on this issue.

Regarding emergency school closings, the Union’s offer provided for employes to be paid a full day’s pay whenever schools were closed early and employes were directed to leave. Because no support existed in the comparables for such an offer, the Arbitrator preferred the Employer’s offer. The Employer’s offer provided that employes (who are at work when school is to be closed) be paid for all time worked with a minimum payment of one-half day’s pay. It also allowed some employes to use their personal leave time if school was closed before they arrived at work.

(4) Vacation: The parties disagreed on the number of days of vacation, the length of service necessary, the timing of requests, the role of seniority and the school year limits on the number of employes permitted to take vacation by department and building. Although neither offer resembled the comparables closely, the Arbitrator found that the Employer’s offer resembled the vacation benefits given by the comparables. The Arbitrator specifically rejected the Union’s argument that the District failed to offer a quid pro quo for its reduction in full-time employe vacations and that the pre-union status quo proposed by it should be selected as more reasonable, on the ground that although the Employer’s proposal reduced full-time employe vacations, it added vacation benefits for part-time employes.

In regard to whether vacation could be carried over (Union) or lost if unused before June 30th (Employer), the Arbitrator could find no compelling argument either way and left this issue to be decided by the ultimate selection herein.

Regarding the basis for granting requests, the Arbitrator found that only one of the comparables resolved the issue by seniority when more than one employe had requested the same vacation dates. The Arbitrator again specifically rejected the pre-union status quo and preferred the Employer’s offer.

For the same reasons as she preferred the Union’s proposal on the number of employes to be allowed off on personal leave at one time, the Arbitrator preferred the Union’s proposed one employe per department per building usage.

(5) Employe Benefits and Fringes: Regarding health insurance, both parties’ offers contain coverage for all regular full-time and part-time employes, although the Employer and Union disagreed regarding eligibility. The Employer proposed that for employes working 1,080 to 2,080 hours it would pay 95% of the premium, for employes working from 900 to 1,080 hours it would pay 75% of the premium and that it would pay a prorated portion of the premium for employes working less than 900 hours. The Arbitrator held that because the Employer’s offer was more generous than the comparables it was to be preferred despite the Union’s argument that most insurance companies will not cover employes working less than half time.

Regarding life insurance, the Arbitrator found insufficient evidence to prefer either offer.

Regarding workers compensation insurance, the sole disagreement between the parties concerned when an employe would have to notify the Employer of a triggering injury (“immediately” – Employer, “within 24 hours” – Union). The Arbitrator preferred the Employer’s offer because it would more likely protect future claims of employes and the comparable agreements were silent on the issue.

Regarding long-term disability insurance, both parties proposed that long-term disability be provided at the Employer’s expense. The Union added definitions, waiting periods, notice requirements, limits on the use of sick leave and return to work language as contained in the Employer’s teacher contract. Because the Arbitrator had rejected the teachers group as a comparable and because none of the comparables had such provisions in their contracts, the Arbitrator preferred the Employer’s offer on this issue.

Regarding early retirement, the parties disagreed widely as to the level of benefits. The Union proposed the pre-union status quo (costing more than $25,000), which the Arbitrator found entirely unsupported among the comparables. For the same reasons the Arbitrator rejected the pre-union status quo and the Employer’s teacher contract as controlling this case, and the Arbitrator rejected the need for a quid pro quo, and found the Employer’s offer (costing more than $6,000) to be preferred on this major issue.

(6) Compensation: The Arbitrator noted that for 1990-91 and 1991-92 the parties’ offers were essentially the same (and that the Union admitted this), except for the way in which food service and custodial positions were to be paid and placed on a schedule. The Employer’s offer regarding food service employes was closer to the per hour conference average listed below for such employes for the years listed:

1990-91 1991-92 1992-93

Average: $7.32 $7.60 $7.90

Employer: $7.65 $7.78 $7.88

the Arbitrator preferred the Employer’s offer on this issue. The Union had proposed two job classifications to the Employer’s one and its proposed average increases for 1990-93 were $7.36, $7.83 and $8.20 per hour.

Regarding increases for custodial employes, again the Union proposed two job classifications and two pay rates while the Employer proposed one. The Arbitrator again used the average of the comparables for 1990-93 of “$8.94, $9.27, $8.54.” (sic), with the parties’ average increases and found that the Employer’s figures were closer to the average of the comparables.

Conclusion: The Employer’s offer was thus preferred on all issues except Layoff/Recall and Personal Leave, based upon comparisons to the appropriate comparables, the Arbitrator selected the Employer’s offer.

Chippewa County

Case 174 INT/ARB-6229 Dec. No. 27326 (Vernon, 01-22 & 02-08-93)

Union offer selected.

The sole issue in dispute was health insurance. The Union proposed to maintain the status quo on health insurance: The County paid 100% of the premium for employes hired before January 1, 1990; employes hired on or after January 1, 1990, paid 20% of the premium for the first 24 months of employment and thereafter the County paid 100%; a $100 single/$200 maximum deductible on the basic benefits; $100 single/$300 maximum deductible and an 80% – 20% co-pay for the first $5,000 of major medical coverage. The County proposed to change the health insurance provision to require that: Employes hired before January 1, 1990, would pay 3 1/2% of the single and family premium effective January 1, 1992, and 7% of the single and family premium effective October 1, 1993; employes hired on or after January 1, 1990, would pay 20% of the single and family premiums; eliminate the deductible on basic benefits; and routine physicals up to $100/person and routine mammograms up to $100/person and add a Section 125 and 129 (IRC) plan.

The Arbitrator concluded that the County’s proposal did not reasonably address a relatively limited need in this case to control the cost of health insurance. The evidence showed that in the prior contract year the County did not have a health cost problem relative to other employers. Even at 100% contribution, the County contribution on the premium was the second lowest among the comparables and that remained true in 1992 and 1993. While there was premium sharing among the comparables, it was not as great as that proposed by the County and no other comparable had a two-tiered system and all others had a 100% paid single plan or at least that option was available. The Arbitrator noted that he felt the proposal to have employes hired after January 1, 1990, permanently pay 20% of the premiums was too much, especially given the rate of turnover in the unit, and the insufficient quid pro quo offered on wages (additional .5% over the comparables). The County’s offer did not recognize or reward the employes for their contributions towards keeping health insurance costs down. The one internal voluntary settlement is not sufficient to be controlling. While the County’s wage offer was above the comparables, it was not as unreasonable for the Union to take that “higher-than-justified” increase, as the “deeper-than-justified” cuts proposed by the County.

Argyle School District

Case 14 INT/ARB-6171 Dec. No. 27259 (Vernon, 02-09-93)

Union offer selected.

There were two issues: (1) salary (including structure), and (2) resignation fee.

The Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s offer on salary, as a whole, was more reasonable. In the first year, the Union’s offer would still be lower than all of the other settlements in the Athletic Conference, and in the second year would be lower than the average among the districts settled. The District’s offer would be “dramatically” less than the comparables in both years. Even with the Union’s proposed changes in the status quo, the Union’s offer, over all, was more reasonable. He also concluded that the change in the increments proposed by the Union would put them somewhat above average on the benchmarks, but not as much as the District’s proposal falls short of the average. The impact of the resignation fee was considered to be negligible and some merit was found in not penalizing a part-time teacher who resigned to take a full-time position elsewhere.

City of Rhinelander

Case 67 INT/ARB-6589 Dec. No. 27391-A (Stern, 02-10-93)

Employer offer selected.

Wages for Police Department dispatchers were the only issues in dispute. The Employer offered to increase wages by 3.75% in each year of the two-year contract. The Union wanted wages raised by 2% on January 1, 1992, 3% on July 1, 1992, 3% on January 1, 1993 and 2% on July 1, 1993.

The parties agreed that the appropriate group of external comparables consisted of Oneida County and eleven cities in Northern Wisconsin.

As for internal comparables, the Arbitrator found that the closest comparable consisted of the uniformed staff of the City’s Police Department whose contract dispute was then still in interest arbitration. The Arbitrator stated that the parties should have delayed the arbitration of this dispute until after the results of that arbitration because his decision would be determined by whose offer the arbitrator selected in that proceeding.

But since that could not be done, he selected the City’s offer because its wage proposal was the same as that accepted in the firefighting and public works department bargaining units and because he believed that it was improper to reward the unit that settles late by granting it a settlement in excess of the amount given to already settled units. The Arbitrator decided the case on internal comparables rather than external comparables.

City of New Berlin

Case 70 INT/ARB-6086 Dec. No. 27293-B (Krinsky, 02-12-93)

Employer offer selected.

There was only one issue in dispute: wages. There was a dispute over comparables with the Union arguing for limiting the comparables to five cities, while the City argued for the same 25 communities used in previous arbitrations. The Arbitrator found no reason to limit the number of comparables and therefore considered the previous comparables.

The Arbitrator concluded that both the internal and external comparables favored the City’s final offer. The Arbitrator relied on the fact that the two other bargaining units settled for the same percentage increases for two years as offered to the Union in this case. The Arbitrator reasoned that internal patterns are usually followed by arbitrators because to do otherwise would create instability in the bargaining process. Here the Arbitrator reasoned that the Union offered no rationale to grant it a more favorable increase than that received by the other bargaining units.

With respect to external comparables, the Arbitrator argued that certain wage rates compared less favorably to the five City comparisons made by the Union, but the Arbitrator noted that there was no evidence presented as to the other 20 communities and that the percentage increase of the City was comparable to others. The Arbitrator concluded that even if the wage rates compared less favorably to the other 25 communities, he was not persuaded that there is a demonstrated need for catch-up in this arbitration.

The Arbitrator found the cost-of-living factor supported the City’s final offer more than the Union’s. Based on the above, the Employer’s final offer was selected.

Belleville School District

Case 11 INT/ARB-6348 Dec. No. 27346-A (Levine, 02-15-93)

Union offer selected.

The issues in dispute were salaries and Board contributions toward health and dental insurance premiums. The parties agreed that under the terms of three prior interest arbitration proceedings the Athletic Conference schools were the primary comparables.

The Association contended that the District’s offer was uncompetitive given its ability to pay; the quality of its educational programs; the position of conference schools against the District at key schedule benchmarks; and a settlement pattern among the comparables. Beyond this, the Association contended that its offer served to insulate teachers against a continuing erosion of the wage and benefit package against long term changes in the cost of living.

The Board argued that its offer, viewed as a total package, was more in line with conference settlements than was the Association’s. Beyond this, the Board argued that its offer was closer to recent cost-of-living increases than was the Association’s. The Board also disputed the Association’s benchmark analysis, particularly at the schedule maximum. The Board contended the Association’s proposal to change the lane interval amounted to converting the interval to a percentage, and represented a radical schedule change more suited to the bargaining table. The Board also contended the Association’s conversion of Board insurance contributions to a percentage was out of line with the comparables and should not be awarded through arbitration.

The Arbitrator initially noted that neither offer could be favored over the other based on the interests and welfare of the public. Regarding comparability, the Arbitrator concluded that the Association’s offer was more in line with the comparables on the salary issue, while the Board’s was more in line with the comparables on the insurance issues. More specifically, the Arbitrator concluded the Board’s salary offer evidenced deterioration at virtually all seven key salary benchmarks, both in dollars and percent, from District comparables. The Arbitrator also concluded the Association’s proposal on lane intervals did not distort the salary schedule any more than did the Board’s proposal. The Arbitrator favored the Board’s offer on the insurance premium contribution because that offer roughly maintained the Board’s dollar contribution for insurance at its historical ranking among the comparables. The Arbitrator found neither offer preferable to the other regarding the cost of living. The Association’s offer served to address long-term changes in the cost of living, while the Board’s more closely approximated short-term changes in the CPI. The Arbitrator also found neither offer preferable to the other on the criterion of overall compensation. Regarding other factors, the Arbitrator did not find the Association’s lane interval proposal nor insurance proposals to be major changes in the status quo. Regarding the change to basing Board insurance payments on a percentage basis, the Arbitrator noted: “this matter is not one of great substance as long as the meaning of percentages in dollars, and vice versa, is mutually and unmistakably understood by the parties.” Noting that the case was close, but that the preference for the Association’s salary proposal outweighed the preference for the Board’s insurance proposal, the Arbitrator selected the Association’s proposal.

Maple Dale-Indian Hill School District

Case 21 INT/ARB-6459 Dec. No. 27400-A (Stern, 02-18-93)

Employer offer selected.

Issues in this case are health insurance contribution and second year wages. The parties agree that Nicolet High School and the other two elementary schools which feed into Nicolet are the primary comparables. Since none of the comparables had settled, the parties put forward secondary comparables. The Arbitrator rejected the use of any secondary comparables.

The District proposed that employes contribute 5% on the monthly health insurance premium for 1992-93 and 10% for 1993-94. The Association proposed that the employes pay 10% of the increases in the health insurance premiums over the premiums for the 1991-92 school year. The Arbitrator, rejecting the Association’s argument that the District was asking for too much too fast, found that the comparables supported the contribution level requested by the District.

The Arbitrator found that if the unions prevailed in the interest arbitrations of the District’s comparables, then the increase in the take-home pay of the Association members would be less than that of the comparables. The Arbitrator found that this consideration was outweighed by the fact that the dollar increase in average salaries was comparable and that the benchmark salaries are generally equal or above the average of the comparables.

Giving consideration to the fact that the District’s salary proposal provided benchmarks which were equal to or greater than comparable benchmarks and that the District’s health insurance change brought the parties to the pattern of the comparables, the Arbitrator rejected the Association’s argument that a quid pro quo was needed for the health insurance change proposed by the District.

Turtle Lake School District

Case 34 INT/ARB-6224 Dec. No. 27374-A (Oestreicher, 02-19-93)

Employer offer selected.

The issues in dispute are health insurance contributions, dental insurance premium payments, liquidated damages, and personal leave days.

The Employer proposed 95% Employer contribution for health insurance premium stated in dollar amounts. The Union proposed 100% Employer contribution for health insurance premium stated in collar amounts. The Union proposed the Employer contributes up to an additional 15% premium increase from previous year, after which employes contributes 100% of additional increase in premium.

The Union argued that the Employer’s proposal to implement an automatic 5% employe co-pay provision for health insurance in the first year of the contract was a change in the status quo, that the Employer has not shown a compelling need to change the status quo nor offered a quid pro quo, and that no self-funded districts require employes to pay a fixed percentage of premium. The Employer argued that the Union’s proposal regarding health insurance would result in a far greater change in the status quo than the Employer’s offer, that its offer would slightly change the form of the Employer’s contribution by stating that contribution in dollar amounts equal to a percentage, and that its offer would not change the effect of the existing practice which requires an employe contribution.

The Arbitrator determined that the question of whether Union members should be required to contribute 5% toward the total cost of health insurance premiums was the issue in this proceeding, and that the other differences were minor and, taken together, would not warrant the status of a secondary issue in this dispute. When the two offers regarding health insurance contributions were compared as if in a static position against the existing practices in 14 comparable districts, the Arbitrator concluded there was no way to say that either of the offers was the more reasonable. When evidence of past practices between these parties, trends among comparables, and other public employes are added to the equation, the Arbitrator concluded that the Employer’s offer was more reasonable, which conclusion was confirmed by data relating to wages and benefits granted in the private sector in this community.

Racine County (Sheriff’s Department)

Case 136 MIA-1659 Dec. No. 27324-A (Malamud, 02-28-93)

Employer offer selected.

There was only one issue in dispute: wages. There was also a dispute over comparables. Both parties agreed to a core of six counties: Kenosha, Outagamie, Rock, Waukesha, Winnebago and Brown counties. Both parties wanted to add counties, but the Arbitrator only added Dane County.

The Arbitrator, in selecting the City’s final offer, concluded that when salaries are compared to external comparables, the Union’s demand for a split increase generating a larger lift was not justified. Further, internal comparables did not meaningfully distinguish the parties’ offers. The Arbitrator noted a couple of settlements were higher, but the City adequately explained the higher settlements. The balance of Racine County employes settled at about the 4% level.

Finally, the Arbitrator concluded that the cost-of-living factor favored the Employer.

Based on the above, the Employer’s final offer was selected.

City of Oshkosh

Case 154 INT/ARB-5985 Dec. No. 26923-D (Gundermann, 03-03-93)

Employer offer selected.

As the parties agreed on the wage increase and a series of reclassifications, the primary issue was the extent of change in the health insurance from the current $10 monthly employe contribution toward family coverage. The Employer sought monthly contributions of $30 family and $10 single in 1991; for 1992, Employer sought employe contributions to equal 25% of the cost increase from 1991, not to exceed an additional $20 per month, for a maximum of $50 family and $30 single. The Union sought an employe contribution of 5% for both single and family. The Employer, noting that its five other unions had agreed to this formula, argued for the dominance of internal comparables. The Union sought comparison to the external comparables, which it noted did not support the Employer’s proposal. The Arbitrator, holding that “as a general proposition, arbitrators are inclined to look toward internal comparables rather than external comparables where a clear pattern of voluntary settlements exists,” found that “where there is such a prevailing practice among the internal comparables as has been established in this case, the undersigned can find no basis for ignoring the established pattern.” The rationale is that “internal settlements most accurately reflect what the parties would have agreed to if they had reached a voluntary settlement.” Award for the Employer.

City of Oshkosh

Case 156 INT/ARB-6066 Dec. No. 27003-C (Gundermann, 03-03-93)

Employer offer selected.

The sole issue is the Association’s request for a 5% catch-up wage increase at the beginning of 1991 in addition to the increases offer by the City for 1991.

Assuming, without resolving disputes about the Association’s wage comparison data, that the City’s salaries are below those of the comparables, the City’s offer has a positive impact on the City’s position relative to the comparables because the City’s offer exceeds that of four of the five comparables. None of the comparables granted an increase as large as that sought by the Association. Even though the Association made an insurance concession, the Arbitrator cannot ignore settlements among the external comparables.

The City’s offer is also supported by the internal comparables since the other City units have accepted basically the same wage and benefit settlement that is being offered by the City.

Regarding cost of living, the Arbitrator rejects the Association’s reliance on the 1989 and 1990 CPI increases (of 5.2% and 5.7%) because–due to delays in reaching arbitration–the actual 1991 and 1992 cost-of-living figures (both in the 3% range) are known. The latter figures favor the City’s offer.

Because it is supported by settlements in the internal and external comparables and by the cost of living, the City’s offer was awarded.

City of West Bend (Police Department)

Case 29 MIA-1686 Dec. No. 27300 (Vernon, 03-04-93)

Employer offer selected.

There were three issues in dispute: wages, the Employer’s proposed increases in clothing allowance and vision exam.

The Arbitrator noted that this case was unusual in that the Union’s proposal cost $2,700 less than the Employer’s offer over the term of the contract, and the issue was the structure of the offers with the Union seeking an increased wage rate and the Employer offering increased wages and fringes. The Union asserted that external comparables required catchup and the Employer argued that internal comparables supported its offer. The Arbitrator held that where there is a well-established internal pattern, it prevails unless it results in unacceptable wage level relationships with the external comparables. The Arbitrator concluded that the external comparables suggested by the Union were too selective involving suburban Milwaukee communities and found the Employer’s comparables more appropriate, which included other employers near Milwaukee but not as influenced by Milwaukee as the Union’s comparables.

The Arbitrator found that there was not a wage disparity of such significance to compel altering the internal pattern and selected the Employer’s offer as more reasonable.

City of Eau Claire

Case 203 INT/ARB-6486 Dec. No. 27469 (Vernon, 03-09-93)

Consent Award

Only issue was wages.

Butternut School District

Case 21 INT/ARB-6227 Dec. No. 27313-A (Briggs, 03-16-93)

Employer offer selected.

While the difference between the total wage cost of the two offers was only about $5,000 over three years, there was a great deal of difference as to the way the money is spread across the salary schedules. The Association argues that its offer ranges from 88.7% to 94% of the conference averages, while the District’s offer ranges from 63.6 to 93.4% of the averages. The Arbitrator noted that the averages cited by the Association were inflated by longevity rates in two districts where that rate is not attained until 10 and 15 years of employment, while employes in the District reach the maximum in two years under either parties’ offer. The Arbitrator was also reluctant to adopt the Association’s salary schedule which would leave several employes off schedule at the end of the contract term and provides no guarantee that employes with similar experience in the same classification would receive the same salaries and increases.

Both parties acknowledged that support staff employes have been historically underpaid, and both provided for some catch up in certain job classifications. The District’s offer provided an 8% increase in the first year to positions of administrative secretary, assistant administrative secretary, secretary/health aide, dishwasher, playground aide and teacher aide and/or special education aide, with a 5% to other classifications. The Arbitrator found that the District’s composite wage offer compared favorably with other districts. The Association’s offer accelerated the support staff at a more rapid rate. While the District’s offer did not move employees to the conference average, it would be inappropriate to advance them to that average in one fell swoop through interest arbitration.

The District argued that its offer on health insurance maintained the status quo by providing fully paid insurance on 12-month employes and those working seven hours a day in the school year. The Association’s offer would provide fully paid insurance for all employes working at least 20 hours per week. Only one person would be affected, and she stated that she would opt for cash in lieu of coverage anyway. However, if she were replaced by an employe who opted for coverage, it would cost the District nearly $4,000. The Arbitrator found no compelling circumstances to require the District to make a leap from no cost to $4,000.

Twelve-month employes receive 7.5 paid holidays under both parties’ offers, and the District included one paid holiday for other employes who currently have none. The Association’s offer would provide 3.5 paid holidays phased in over the term of the contract. While the Arbitrator acknowledged that the Association’s offer on this issue seemed slightly more acceptable in one aspect — a choice for disparate religious beliefs — its offer made a larger departure from the status quo, and the Arbitrator emphasized that this was a first contract which should expect to make modest inroads and not blockbuster gains over night.

City of Fond du Lac (Police Department)

Case 113 MIA-1683 Dec. No. 27307-A (Chiesa, 03-19-93)

Employer offer selected.

Issues are a three-year versus a two-year contract, health insurance with substantial changes sought, salary involving “splits,” a good attendance bonus, longevity, differential pay, shift changes and the grievance procedure.

Arbitrator concluded that: 1) multi-year contract creates its own stability. Employer’s offer is preferable. 2) Health insurance is a benefit where internal comparables should be given greater weight. 3) Duration and stability favor the Employer’s proposal. 4) Adoption of Employer’s health insurance proposal saves substantial costs. Because the wage proposals are not that far apart, the case does not necessarily turn on wages. On good attendance program, Arbitrator favors the Employer’s proposal, as with longevity, shift changes and differential pay. Lastly, the Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s two proposals on grievance procedure are insufficient to affect the determination of the offer to be selected. Employer’s offer is adopted.

Walworth County (Lakeland Home)

Case 114 INT/ARB-6244 Dec. No. 27356-A (Levine, 03-24-93)

Union offer selected.

The parties had reached agreement on a contract for 1992 and 1993, without settling a dispute over WRS contribution, a personal day each quarter for perfect attendance, the continuation of a “no sale/no lease” clause in the existing contract, and the scope of retroactivity for the stipulations on salary and other economic benefits. The Union sought to reverse pension concessions made in 1986 to prevent the sale of the nursing home, offering in return to eliminate the “no sale/no lease” provision it had secured for those concessions. The Union also sought to continue a side letter of agreement which had given employes personal days off for perfect attendance. For its part, the County proposed that its retirement contribution be increased by 0.2%, to reflect the increase granted to other bargaining units. This would result in a contribution of 6.2% for employes hired prior to May 1, 1986, 1.2% for those hired after that date with less than five years of experience, and 2.2% for those hired after May 1, 1986, with five years completed at the Home. The County further proposed that the economic provisions of the contract be extended only to those employes on the payroll as of July 14, 1992, the date of the County’s ratification.

The Arbitrator first considered what comparables should be used for this case. The parties agreed to use public sector nursing homes in Rock, Kenosha, Racine, Jefferson and Washington counties. The County proposed to add Ozaukee and Dodge counties. The Arbitrator concluded that, although the two counties had not been used in prior arbitrations involving the County, moderate change in the comparable groups was inevitable and necessary. The two counties were similar in size and socio-economic characteristics to the other comparables, and had AFSCME representation for their nursing home employes. Thus he concluded that the County’s proposed comparables should be accepted.

The Arbitrator concluded that neither offer had substantial support under the “interests and welfare of the public” criterion. The comparability criterion favored the Union’s proposal on WRS contributions. Overall compensation was judged not to be decisive. The Union offered a reasonable quid pro quo for the increased retirement benefit, in the form of removing the “no sale/no lease” clause. The Arbitrator noted that this was the original trade-off found reasonable by the parties themselves in 1986.

The Arbitrator found that the County’s status quo proposal on the personal days/attendance incentive issue was preferable, since the Union’s proposal was vague and ignored the unilateral and experimental nature of the parties’ initial experience with the incentive system. However, the WRS issue was relatively more important than the personal day issue, and dictated an award in favor of the Union.

Crawford County (Sheriff’s Department)

Case 59 MIA-1718 Dec. No. 27508-A (Johnson, 03-25-93)

Consent Award.

The issues resolved in the Consent Award, besides salary, were: (1) health insurance; (2) shift differential; (3) arbitration language; and (4) mileage allowance.

City of Appleton (Police Department)

Case 326 MIA-1720 Dec. No. 27421-A (Kossoff, 03-29-93)

Employer offer selected.

Besides the difference in wage offers, the issues consisted of Association requests for increased shift differential, one day more of holiday pay in 1992 and another day more of holiday pay in 1993.

The external comparables group was not disputed: Fond du Lac, Green Bay, Manitowoc, Menasha, Neenah, Oshkosh and Sheboygan.

The Arbitrator limited wage comparisons to top step police officer, rejecting the City’s additional reliance on comparisons of the City’s enhanced officer classification with the advanced officer classifications in two of the comparables. Correcting various data discrepancies, and comparing annual earnings rather than annualized year-end rates, the Arbitrator found incorrect the Association’s contention that the City’s offer will reduce its rank from second to third among the comparables. The Arbitrator concludes that the settlements and total compensation data regarding external comparables better supports the City’s offer.

Regarding internal comparables, the Arbitrator focuses on settlement pattern rather than absolute comparisons of contract benefits based on testimony showing that the various units were treated substantially equally in terms of cost, and hence in fair alignment overall at the end of 1991, even though there were differences in the kind of benefits emphasized in each unit. The Arbitrator gives weight to the City’s need for a settlement which is more in line cost-wise with the internal comparables to avoid difficulties in reaching voluntary agreements with other units in the future. There is no showing of a special circumstances or equitable considerations warranting the greater deviation from the internal pattern that is proposed by the Association.

The cost-of-living factor was found to favor the City’s offer.

Based on the foregoing, the Arbitrator selected the City’s offer.

Milwaukee Public Schools

Case 240 INT/ARB-6163 Dec. No. 27076 (Oestreicher, 04-02-93)

Union offer selected.

In the negotiations involving the paraprofessionals and teacher aides the parties were unable to agree upon wages, health insurance and three administrative matters. The Employer proposed 3.5% across-the-board for 1991 and 4% across-the-board for 1992. The Union offer contained 4.25% increases for each year. In addition to those increases, each party proposed a different additional incremental increase for the approximately 100 teacher aides who are designated as safety aides. The parties separately argued that the principal issue in this dispute is the Employer’s proposal to require the employes to contribute 5% toward the cost of health insurance premiums. The Union also proposed 3 administrative language changes.

It was the position of the Association that the appropriate comparable for the paraprofessionals and aides is with the District’s teachers, psychologists and administrators. The Association argued that the Employer’s proposal that teacher aides be required to pay 5% of the cost of health insurance is a significant change in the existing benefit and that the Board should be required to show both a compelling need for this change and to provide a quid pro quo. The Association argued that teacher negotiations have generally set the pattern for wages and benefits in the Aide’s unit and that the higher paid teachers as well as psychologists, social workers, assistant principals and principals do not contribute toward the health premium cost. With respect to wages, the Association pointed to the internal comparable of teachers who received a 5% increase and with psychologists, administrators and supervisors who received approximately 4.25%. Other Association proposals included increasing the wages of safety aides by 40 cents on three occasions during the life of the contract; issuing a standard paycheck covering 9 days for every pay period to permit bargaining unit members greater ease in budgeting; and defining the work day for bargaining unit members. Additionally, the Association proposed the creation of a professional assistance program which would serve to identify chemical abuse or mental or emotional disorders which may be affecting the employe’s performance which would allow the employe to voluntarily seek professional assistance to avoid a negative evaluation or discipline.

The District pointed to the 10 largest school districts in the State of Wisconsin as the intra-industry external comparables. The 10 largest school districts in Wisconsin were found to be the most appropriate comparables during a prior arbitration proceeding between the District and the teacher unit of the MTEA. The District further pointed to public employers in Milwaukee County, including MATC, the Sewerage Commission, the City of Milwaukee, Milwaukee County and the State of Wisconsin. The District believed its health insurance proposal was supportable by practices in effect in comparable school districts. The District further contended that its proposal was supported by similar contributions paid by non-professional bargaining units of District employes. With respect to wages, the District pointed to external school district comparables and indicated that the historic rating of the District’s aides would be undisturbed by the selection of either wage proposal. It was the District’s proposal that the 9-day paycheck would create an administrative burden which it was prepared to incur for the sake of a voluntary agreement, but not willing to incur in the context of this arbitration. The District opposed the definition of the work day arguing that it would jeopardize the Board’s ability to adequately and safely supervise students after school. Buses often run late, and there are problems associated with after-school occurrences. The District argued that it had offered a two-fold quid pro quo. The first is an increase in benefits in the major medical and vision coverage areas. The second is that the District contended it offered an extra 1 1/2% wage increase above and beyond that offered other employes.

The Arbitrator found the paraprofessional and aides unit to constitute a unique group of employes who are not easily likened to any other bargaining unit in the Milwaukee School District. The Arbitrator noted that a relatively small percent of the aides were enrolled in the high cost district indemnity plan compared to 60% of all District employes and concluded that the aides contributed less to health care cost inflation than did the average employe of the District. Comparing the insurance benefits with external comparables, the Arbitrator found that comparison to favor the Union’s health insurance offer in this dispute. The Arbitrator found that more than 75% of all the employes who negotiated 1991-92 contracts with this Employer were not required to make any contribution toward health insurance premium cost. Further, a much higher percent of those employes who have contracts are insured by, but not contributing to, the higher cost indemnity plan than the percent of teaching aides who have that high cost coverage. The pattern of 1991-92 contracts between this Employer and the Employer’s other bargaining unit supported the Union’s position on health insurance. The Arbitrator concluded with respect to the wage issue that professional bargaining units have been able to negotiate higher wage increases with this Employer than have the non-professional bargaining units. The Arbitrator drew two overall conclusions. The first was that the small difference between the two wage proposals has a much greater impact upon the earning potential for these employes than any settled bargaining unit. The 5% contribution by these employes toward health insurance premium costs would cost them proportionately more than the employes in any bargaining unit which has settled with the District. These conclusions favor the Union’s offer. The Arbitrator went on to say that if the Employer’s position were adopted, it would extract contribution from these employes, with limited earning capacity, which would be disproportionately greater than the contribution required from the vast majority of other classified employes who are required to contribute toward health care premiums. This realization and the fact that the majority of the District’s highest-paid employes are not required to make any contribution toward health insurance costs make the District offer inequitable under the circumstances. The District found that the Employer’s proposal relative to an additional increment for the safety aides was more reasonable. The Arbitrator found that the 9-day pay period proposal was a reasoned one, and favored the Union on that matter. The Arbitrator found that the Employer’s concern over sick leave utilization on the professional assistance proposal was misdirected and therefore favored the Union’s proposal on that issue. Finally, the Arbitrator found that the Board’s position was more reasoned on the defined work day. Based primarily on the health insurance premium contribution, the Arbitrator found for the Association.

Menominee County

Case 44 INT/ARB-6369 Dec. No. 27336-A (Friess, 04-04-93)

Employer offer selected.

Wages and health insurance were in dispute. On wages, the Arbitrator found that this county was exceptionally poor, with generally low wages and an ability to tax on only 2.3% of the County property owners. He dismissed other counties offered as comparables because of these factors. A 1990 agreement under which employes in this professional unit received an average of 20.7% was taken into account in finding that a proposal which “pushed the limits of reasonableness” was still more acceptable than a Union wage proposal which paid no attention either to the County’s ability to pay or to a large wage gap between certain jobs in this unit and other jobs, notably in the deputies’ unit, which the Arbitrator found somewhat comparable in overall responsibility.

As to health insurance, the Arbitrator found that both parties believed this to be a minor issue, and that the offers were “essentially identical” upon investigation. The Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s argument that the Employer proposal would change past practice in unpredictable ways was a “straw man” and outweighed by the fact that internal comparable units had adopted essentially the same language. The Arbitrator therefore found for the Employer on both issues.

Riverdale School District

Case 24 INT/ARB-6421 Dec. No. 27306 (Tyson, 04-06-93)

Union offer selected.

In addition to the dispute over the salary increases for the second and third years of the agreement, the parties disagreed over the District’s proposal to convert one non-contact day to a contact day, and to have the first three snow days made up during spring break rather than at the end of the academic year. The parties also differed over the amount paid for certain summer assignments. Further, the Association proposed to consider as comparables CESA #3 plus the Southwest Athletic Conference, while the District would have used the Conference by itself. Finding that CESA #3 served a different clientele, and would produce some redundancy, the Arbitrator relied solely on the Conference comparables. Despite finding that the statutory criterion of “interests and welfare of the public” favored the Employer’s offer, the Arbitrator concluded this was not a new phenomenon and further relying on statistical comparisons of benchmark salaries, found the Labor Organization’s salary proposal “more reasonable,” as measured against the pattern within the comparables. Award to the Labor Organization.

City of Chippewa Falls (Police Department)

Case 95 MIA-1645 Dec. No. 27423-A (Christenson, 04-07-93)

Employer offer selected.

Besides the wage dispute, at issue were holiday work pay and educational incentive. Specifically, the Association proposed an increase in the premium for work performed on a holiday from 1.5x to 2x. The City proposed that employes receiving discretionary book and tuition reimbursements must remain with the department three years rather than one year following course completion to avoid an obligation to return the reimbursement to the City. The City also proposed that the City be permitted to carry over budgeted educational incentive sums not used in a given year up to a maximum accumulation of $8,000. The existing agreement provides that the City would budget $4,000 for the educational incentive program, and neither party proposed a change in that arrangement.

The Arbitrator finds all of the communities proposed by both parties sufficiently comparable to be relevant. Accordingly, the comparables consist of nine communities (not identified in the Award) geographically proximate to the City plus Marshfield, Altoona, Barron, Black River Falls and Ladysmith.

The parties agree that the first year wage dispute controls the outcome of the dispute. The City relies primarily on internal comparables, but also on maintaining its rank relative to the external comparables, and being closer to the cost of living and more in line with the interest and welfare of the public in light of plant closings, layoffs and similar conditions in the community. The Association cites a special bonus agreed upon with City firefighters and a 1992 5% increase granted to police supervisors as undercutting City reliance on internals, and that the City’s offer would cause the unit’s dollar relationship to external comparables to decline.

The Arbitrator finds it significant that the City has an established internal pattern for all of its non-supervisory employes, and an admittedly higher first year pattern for all of its supervisory employes. The other internal non-supervisory settlements were reached despite the supervisory group’s treatment.

While the City’s offer would involve a modest decline in dollar relationships with comparables proposed by the Association, it keeps the unit’s position above the average wages for the comparables as a whole and maintains the City’s rank in relation to the comparables’ wages. Therefore consideration of external comparables does not persuade the Arbitrator that the wage increase for the unit should deviate from the established internal non-supervisory pattern.

Accordingly, the City’s offer was selected.

City of Green Bay

Case 216 INT/ARB-6193 Dec. No. 27141-A (Reynolds, 04-12-93)

Employer offer selected.

The sole issue in dispute was the Union’s proposal to add a $75.00 per month premium for those employes drawing blood from patients. The Arbitrator found that there was insufficient proof that the task of drawing blood had changed in some significant way or increased in frequency from past contracts, and thus concluded that the Union had failed to prove that a special task rate was justified. He selected the City’s final offer.

Bloomer School District

Case 27 INT/ARB-6017 Dec. No. 27407 (Slavney, 04-13-93)

Employer offer selected.

The only issue in dispute involves health insurance. The Union proposes that the Employer pay the full premium expressed in dollar amount in 1992-93 and 1992-93. The Employer proposes to pay 98% of family and single premium in 1991-92 and in 1992-93 up to 115%, more than paid for family in 1991-92.

The Arbitrator noted that the premium costs for health insurance had risen considerably in the term of the agreement, and the Employer’s offer required it to pay a greater premium than the dollar amounts set forth under the expired agreement, so the status quo no longer existed and the District was not required to provide a quid pro quo over and above its offer, which required it to pay a premium over and above the amounts in the expired agreement. The Arbitrator rejected all outside comparables and considered the Employer’s teacher’s bargaining unit as the most comparable group. The teacher’s unit had voluntarily agreed to the same offer the Employer was proposing. The Arbitrator rejected the Union’s argument that the teacher’s unit should not be considered the appropriate comparable because of a provision which provided for health insurance to early retirees, noting the lack of evidence of any demand by the Union for this provision or that any employe would meet the age requirements in the early retirement provision.

The Arbitrator selected the Employer’s offer as more appropriate under MERA.

Holmen School District

Case 23 INT/ARB-6209 Dec. No. 27395 (Vernon, 04-16-93)

Employer offer selected.

There were several issues in addition to the dispute concerning second year wages. The Association proposed introducing a sick leave payout provision to the Agreement; clarifying the health and dental insurance language; elimination of the one-year waiting period for eligibility for retirement annuity contributions; eliminating the 720-hour qualifying threshold for a 13 cents per hour contribution for those not eligible for the option plan or retirement annuity and the addition of a 2% and then 3% local retirement plan for employes working more than 600 hours; and introducing a life insurance benefit fully paid by the District.

The Arbitrator identifies comparables as follows: primary group–Onalaska, Sparta, Gale-Ettrick-Trempealeau (G-E-T) and West Salem; secondary group LaCrosse and Melrose, because of size difference. Although G-E-T and Melrose are non-union, their wages and benefits are generally consistent with those in unionized schools, making them relevant as a part of the same labor market. The Arbitrator finds teacher comparables different because their professional qualification creates a different kind of labor market.

The Arbitrator finds the most important of the issues is the Association’s proposal for addition of a local retirement plan with a significant cost impact. Support in comparables for retirement benefits for employes who work more than 600 hours is overwhelming, and the absence of a retirement plan similar to that enjoyed by such employes in nearly all the comparables is “indefensible.” The status quo provides only a portion of the employes with a small fraction of the 6% or more contributed by the comparable employers, and “this doesn’t cut it.”

However, the Arbitrator concludes that the Association’s final offer does not reasonably address the need. the parties would be better off living with the present system for the time being and coming back in the next round of bargaining and addressing retirement in a more conventional way (to wit, the Wisconsin Retirement System) than be saddled with the Union’s unconventional and technically flawed final offer. That, together with the additional burdens of the life insurance, sick leave payout and annuity eligibility threshold changes render the Association’s offer too much to swallow at one time, especially where comparables support is mixed and there is no quid pro quo offered. Even if the retirement proposal stood alone, it might have been appropriate for the Association to offer a concession such as phasing it in or proposing less than the full WRF initially.

For those reasons, the District’s offer was adopted.

City of LaCrosse (Fire Department)

Case 208 MIA-1704 Dec. No. 27488-A (Michelstetter, 04-29-93)

Employer offer selected.

The only issue was health insurance. The Union proposed no change for 1992, but an increase in the employe’s share of the family premium from $8.00 to $16.00 a month effective January 1, 1993. The Employer proposed that effective January 1, 1993, it pay 100% of the premiums, but with a $100 deductible on the single plan and a maximum of three $100 deductibles on the family plan.

The Arbitrator found that the significant difference between the two proposals, both of which increase employes’ out-of-pocket costs, was that the Employer’s proposal “shifts costs to those employees who use the services instead of uniformly spreading the costs to the employees.” The Arbitrator found that the Employer had demonstrated a need for a change in the existing health plan in that its City-wide premium equivalent has risen faster than other premiums and is among the highest rates by any measure of comparison. The Arbitrator gave “heavy weight” to the testimony of an insurance expert called by the Employer, who testified that “those who share in the health insurance cost based upon their usage tend to use the benefit more judiciously and without significant effect upon their health.” The Arbitrator found that the police bargaining unit had accepted the same Employer proposal, and that in the external comparisons in the record, the vast majority used deductibles rather than employe contributions. The Arbitrator therefore found the Employer’s offer preferable.

City of Greenfield

Case 104 INT/ARB-6384 Dec. No. 27399-A (Mueller, 04-30-93)

Union offer selected.

The Union as a part of its wage proposal also asked that in 1991 the Environmental Health Specialist salary be made equal to that of the Public Health Nurse. In 1992 the Union, as part of its wage offer proposed the following “catch-up” lump sum adjustments:

Assistant City Engineer $1,500.00

Assistant Building Inspector $2,000.00

Engineering Technician $1,500.00

Plumbing Inspector $1,250.00

Code Enforcement Officer .40/per hour

Environmental Health Specialist $ 500.00

Public Health Nurse $ 500.00

Deputy City Assessor $ 500.00

Other issues before the Arbitrator were improvement in cash pay out for unused sick leave upon retirement and a change in the payment date for the uniform allowance.

The Arbitrator stated that based upon the amount of evidence and argument on the “catch-up” issue, clearly the parties considered said issue to be dominant and controlling. The other two issues were viewed as minor. On the pay out of sick leave the Arbitrator found the Union’s most favorable based upon internal comparisons, whereas the City’s position on time for payment of uniform allowance was favored on the basis of administrative needs, and internal comparisons.

On the controlling issue of “catch-up” adjustments the Arbitrator concluded the Union’s position was supported by both the internal and external comparative considerations and therefore favored. The Employer argued against external comparables because many such comparable communities did not have comparable positions and, overall, the comparables were not reliable.

Walworth County Handicapped Children’s Education Board

Case 14 INT/ARB-6439 Dec. No. 27422-A (Rice, 05-03-93)

Employer offer selected.

Employer sought to continue the self-funded health insurance plan, revising the benefit structure to a comprehensive major medical plan with front-end deductibles of $100/$300, and 80/20 co-pay, to a maximum of $500/$1,000 calendar year out-of-pocket costs. Labor Organization sought abandonment of self-funding for major medical plan paid for 100% by Employer, with front-end deductibles of $100/$300. Noting that either other bargaining units of the Employer have agreed to the plan proposed by the Employer, and finding that “interest arbitrators usually find that internal comparables rather than external comparables determine the outcome of fringe benefit disputes,” the Arbitrator found it unnecessary for the Employer to offer a quid pro quo, inasmuch as “both parties recognize that the health insurance program had to be changed in order to control the costs.” He concluded that the Employer had reached agreement with all of its other employes on a single self-funded plan and that it would be unrealistic to impose a separate plan with somewhat better benefits for the employes represented by the Association when all of its other employes would be denied them. Award for the Employer.

Peshtigo School District

Case 22 INT/ARB-6504 Dec. No. 27491-A (Zeidler, 05-10-93)

Employer offer selected.

While the District proposed using the eight districts in the Marinette and Oconto (M & O) Athletic Conference as the comparables, the Association, noting the paucity of M & O settlements for the years in question, proposed using data from districts in CESA 18. The Arbitrator agreed with the Association. The Arbitrator found the comparison of actual dollars expended in salaries, rather than comparison of dollar and percent increases for the average teacher, to be a dominant consideration, and that the District offer met comparability on this criterion more closely than did the Association’s. The Arbitrator also found the District’s offer to be more comparable to raises in public sector employment in the locale, and by other measurements. The Arbitrator found the Association’s proposal on extracurricular salaries to produce a more comparable result by avoiding the slippage inherent in the District’s offer. The Arbitrator concluded that “the weight of the factors of wage comparability, internal comparability in the public sector, and cost of living changes accrue to the Board offer.” Award for the Employer.

Grant County

Case 39 INT/ARB-5898 Dec. No. 27122-A (Reynolds, 05-13-93)

Union offer selected.

The only issue subject to arbitration if the salary increases to be provided to Social Worker I and II employes.

The Union proposed eliminating the City of Lancaster and the Unified Board of Grant and Iowa Counties as comparables because the City does not employ social workers and the Unified Board had not completed negotiations. The Arbitrator felt that the entire group of comparables should be retained, reasoning that all forms of compensation should be reviewed.

In finding for the Union, the Arbitrator identified that retention of Social Worker I and II employes had become a problem. The Arbitrator identified that since the fringe benefit package was competitive, the problems seemed to be wages. The Arbitrator concluded that the Union’s offer would better address the retention problem for this group of employes.

Herman Consolidated School District #22

Case 9 INT/ARB-6414 Dec. No. 27472 (Stern, 05-14-93)

Consent Award

This was a settlement agreement submitted to the Arbitrator, which included a provision for the District to pay up to 6.2% of each teacher’s contribution to the WRS and that figure shall be changed if the contribution percent changes in the 1993-94 school year. The parties also agreed to a plan of health insurance benefits and wages for three years as part of the settlement agreement.

City of Eau Claire (Police Department)

Case 202 MIA-1723 Dec. No. 27322-A (Petrie, 05-14-93)

Employer offer selected.

The issue in this case was a wage reopener for July 1992 to July 1993. The Arbitrator rejected consideration of historical evidence of past wages and benefits agreed to in past negotiations as to do so would relitigate each preceding arbitration, and instead, disregarded considerations which preexisted the parties’ last negotiated contract and considered only those which had arisen since that time. The Union had argued that supervisory personnel were eligible for a 2% merit increase on top of the 4% wage increase they received; however, the Arbitrator noted that the merit pay program was in existence at the time the parties negotiated the present contract and thus gave this factor little weight. The Arbitrator, relying on the parties’ bargaining history, concluded that primary emphasis shoul be placed on internal comparisons. In 1992 and 1993, the internal settlement pattern was well established at 4%; therefore, the Arbitrator selected the Employer’s final offer.

Salem Joint School District No. 7

Case 14 INT/ARB-6420 Dec. No. 27479-A (Krinsky, 05-17-93)

Union offer selected.

At issue are Association proposals opposed by the District, including: an employe option of waiving health insurance in favor of a tax sheltered District contribution with the right of the employe to reacquire coverage under specified circumstances; Employer paid life insurance; Employer contributions toward retiree family health insurance benefits; reduction from 13 to eleven salary steps and elimination of schedule half-steps and size of salary increase.

Agreed-upon comparables consisted of Burlington, Lake Geneva Elementary, Badger UHS, Brookwood, Traver, Woods, Central UHS, Salem Elementary, Wheatland, Bristol, Paris, Brighton, Union Grove High School, Union Grove Elementary, Raymond $14, Kansasville, Waterford Elementary, Waterford UHS, Washington-Caldwell, Drought, North Cape, Wilmot UHS, Randall, Twin Lakes and Wilmot Elementary. The Arbitrator rejected nearby Lake County, Illinois districts because there were ample Wisconsin comparables agreed upon and because no evidence was adduced to establish the Illinois Districts’ comparability in terms of size, economic characteristics, regulations and methods of state financing.

The Arbitrator found the case “extremely close.” He favored Association proposals for paid life insurance based on comparables and low cost; retention of the standards clause because although without comparables’ support it is a longstanding contract provision and the parties need to communicate better before it can be known whether the standards clause must be altered; and average dollars per teacher increase and benchmark dollars and rank because the District’s offer would further deteriorate already comparatively low salaries. He favored District’s proposals: resisting introduction of retiree health insurance because it was a new benefit more generous than some of the comparables that had not been unsuccessfully sought repeatedly during past bargains; and retaining salary structure, exceeding the comparables’ salary percentage increases (though not their dollar increases) and opposing catch-up because low rank is product of many bargains and not a basis, alone, for catch-up. The Arbitrator found cost of living and private sector increase data supportive of the District offer, as well. He found both parties’ offers lacking an adequate quid pro quo for significant changes, making that “other factor” supportive of neither offer.

On balance, removal of standards clause was deemed a greater injustice than implementation of retiree health and other less significant insurance changes because the parties could bargain again about the latter before it costs the District any money. The Association maintains District rank and avoids falling further behind the comparables in dollar terms. While the Association changes the salary structure, that can be bargained about in the future. On balance, the Association offer was selected.

Beaver Dam Unified School District

Case 20 INT/ARB-6431 Dec. No. 27412-A (Mueller, 05-18-93)

Employer offer selected.

The Arbitrator found that the agreed-upon primary appropriate school district comparables consisted of those comparables found in a prior interest arbitration case between the parties. Rejecting the Employer’s contrary claim, he also found that a set of secondary comparables should be established consisting of some of the other school districts in the nearby geographic area, i.e., Dodgeland, Horicon, Hustisford, Lomira and Mayville.

The Union argued, and the Employer disputed, that the total package cost was the best way to determine whether the employes herein were receiving the same settlements offered to teachers in other school districts. Both parties agreed that the wage issue was the most important issue in dispute.

The Arbitrator found that “the Employer’s final offer is the closest to the average of the comparables on a ‘wages only’ comparison” and also for “total package costs.” He further found that the Employer’s offer was closer to what other local municipal employes had received and that it was also closer to the CPI. That, the Arbitrator held “serves to add further support for the Employer’s final offer on the salary issue.”

On another issue, the Employer proposed a Section 125 plan which the Association objected to in part on the ground that the plan was only offered to those teachers paying 14% of their health insurance premiums, as opposed to those paying 10%. Agreeing that “the Employer could have gone further in its proposal,” the Arbitrator found it preferable to the Union’s offer since participation was voluntary and since it could result in savings to both employes and the Employer.

The Arbitrator accepted the Employer’s offer because its salary proposal was more fully supported under the applicable statutory factors and because its Section 125 plan saved money for both employes and the Employer alike. There were a few other issues, but the Arbitrator reasoned that “no other issue in dispute poses any reason to override the application of the findings on the salary and insurance issues from having applied to the total final offer.”

Kickapoo Area School District

Case 12 INT/ARB-6545 Dec. No. 27470-A (Baron, 05-21-93)

Union offer selected.

Arbitrator adopted the conference as the comparable and did not compare state-wide districts as argued by the Association. Arbitrator was not as impressed by overall compensation inasmuch as case involved a reopener. According to Arbitrator, what is at issue here is not the long history which has led to above-average salaries but the change in the amount of salary returning teachers are to receive in the second year of the two-year contract. Association offer maintains the status quo in ranking and percent increment comparisons and is preferable.

With respect to welfare and interest of the public, Arbitrator recognized the concerns of those citizens who testified at the open hearing, but concluded that the greater weight of the evidence did not support a conclusion that the circumstances in the Kickapoo School District are significantly different from those which existed in the comparables at the time their teacher contracts were voluntarily settled.

Prentice School District

Case 19 INT/ARB-6177 Dec. No. 27459-A (Oestreicher, 05-26-93)

Employer offer selected.

There was a dispute over comparables. The Arbitrator selected the athletic conference because of comparable size of enrollment, geographic location, the number of full-time employes and equalized value. The Arbitrator rejected the Union’s position to not consider non-unionized units but rather concluded that it is something that should be considered in determining what weight should be given to such comparisons.

This is a first contract between these parties and there were a number of issues in dispute. The major disagreement between the parties was over wages for the second and third years, employer contributions toward employe retirement benefits, and the Union’s insistence that the District purchase prior service credits for employes who are currently employed but were not previously enrolled in the Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS). The Union saw the prior service credits for WRS as so significant that it offered a wage freeze in the second year for a quid pro quo.

The Arbitrator noted that the employes have had low wages and minimum benefits, and the lack of a retirement program was the motive to organize. The Arbitrator further noted that by the time the final offers were submitted, the exasperation with each other’s position resulted in two unreasonable offers presented for arbitration.

The Arbitrator concluded that neither party’s wage only offer was reasonable, but that the Union’s wage offer was preferable in regard to the comparables. However, it failed to address inequities between employes or bridge the gap between them and comparable districts. Because of the dispute over prior credits for WRS, negotiations reached impasse before salary schedules could be addressed. The Arbitrator further found both parties’ offers on health and dental insurance premium sharing to be unreasonable.

The Union offer would require the District to pay all of the employees’ share of contributions to the WRS plus purchase 50% of the retirement benefits that employes would be entitled to if they had been enrolled in the WRS during all of their employment. The District offer would enroll the support staff in the WRS and pay 1% of the employees’ contribution. The Union’s demand for back credits on benefits has a one-time cost of $239,878, which can be amortized over 36 years.

The Arbitrator found no precedent for the Union’s request for the prior retirement credits. He noted that it would be inequitable to include this benefit in this arbitration award and ignore the fact that the employes were neglected or unable to negotiate the benefits previously. While the Union offered significant wage concessions for the retirement benefit, the Union was working with only minimal wages and benefits to begin with and was unable to offer a quid pro quo for the prior credits. Because of the low wages and benefits levels, the Arbitrator determined that the $239,878 for prior service credits was unreasonable, and that whatever funds the District was able to raise should be spent to improve this staff’s wages and benefits as well as the educational system.

St. Croix Falls School District

Case 32 INT/ARB-6435 Dec. No. 27460-A (Rice, 05-27-93)

Union offer selected.

Three issues were in dispute: wages for th 1992-93 school year, subcontracting and bus driver wages.

The main difference between the two proposals is that the Employer proposed a 2% wage increase for the 1992-93 school year and the Union proposed a 4% increase for that year. The Employer proposed to continue the current language with respect to bus driver wages while the Union proposal defined a long route, a kindergarten route and the Barrens route and provided that routes such as Cushing and Dresser be paid the extra-driving hourly rate with a one hour minimum per trip. The Union proposed to continue the current subcontracting language while the Employer proposed changing that language to permit it to subcontract if it guaranteed the affected employes the same number of hours and the same hourly rate of pay from either the Employer or the provider of the subcontracted service for one year.

Because the Employer’s subcontracting language was more flexible and offered at least some job security to the employes, the Arbitrator found it to be somewhat more acceptable than the position of the Union. Likewise, the Arbitrator found the Employer’s proposal with respect to the bus drivers’ wage provisions preferable to that of the Union. However, the Arbitrator found the wage issue to be the dominant issue in the arbitration and determinative of the outcome. Because the Union’s position with regard to wages was similar to the average wage increase in the comparable group for the 1992-93 school year and because it accepted a wage freeze for the 1991-92 school year as its share of the increased cost resulting from a previous interest arbitration award extending health insurance to previously uninsured employes, the Arbitrator preferred the Union’s position on wages, and concluded that the Union’s final offer more closely adhered to the statutory criteria than that of the Employer and should be incorporated into the successor agreement. The Arbitrator rejected the Employer’s proposal that employes pay for most of the cost of increased insurance by taking a smaller wage increase, reasoning that it was the Employer’s turn to pick up the increase.

City of Oshkosh

Case 169 INT/ARB-6381 Dec. No. 27273-A (Chatman, 06-07-93)

Union offer selected.

This was a limited reopener in which the sole arbitrated issue was whether or not to change the contractually specified monthly employe health insurance premium contributions from $10 single and $30 family to $17.17 and $50, respectively.

The City argued that its family plan premium increases in excess of 105% in four years, while not uncommon among external comparables, demonstrate a need for increases in employe contributions. The City also argued that its proposal for salary lift and its parallelism with internal voluntary settlements and internal interest awards provide compelling support for its offer.

The Union argued that the City created the shortfall it relies on and that the City alone should be responsible for funding that shortfall; that the City’s voluntary settlements were with two very small units, neither of which was AFSCME represented, and that because there is general inconsistency among the internal comparables’ settlements and agreements and because the Employer is offering no quid pro quo for the change, there is no persuasive basis on which to grant the City’s proposed change.

The Arbitrator agreed with the Union that internal comparables should be limited to groups with statutory collective bargaining rights. He also agreed with the Union that the interest awards issued in two of the units were not dispositive because the City’s insurance proposal had been agreed upon in one of those cases was awarded but not the controlling issue in the other. The Arbitrator stated that the City’s desire to maintain internal benefit comparability is not sufficient, by itself, to control the outcome, either.

The Arbitrator acknowledged that the City’s wage offer exceeded the cost of living for 1991 and 1992. However, looking more closely at the CPI data, the Arbitrator found relevance and substantial merit in the Union’s contention that the City had underfunded its plan, such that it was requesting “employee health premium increases of 77.5% and 66.7%” compared with National U.S. City Average CPI medical care cost increases of 10.6% for 1991 and 11.5% for 1992. The Arbitrator therefore awarded the Union’s offer.

City of Oshkosh (Public Library)

Case 170 INT/ARB-6382 Dec. No. 27274-A (Chatman, 06-08-93)

Union offer selected.

The comparables were agreed upon: Appleton, Fond du Lac, Green Bay, Menasha, Neenah and Sheboygan.

This was a limited reopener in which the sole arbitrated issue was whether or not to change the contractually specified monthly employe premium contributions from $10 single and $30 family to $17.17 and $50, respectively.

The City argued that its family plan premium increases in excess of 105% in four years, while not uncommon among external comparables, demonstrate a need for increases in employe contributions. The City also argued that its proposal for salary lift and its parallelism with internal voluntary settlements and internal interest awards provide compelling support for its offer.

The Union argued that the City created the shortfall it relies on and that the City alone should be responsible for funding that shortfall; that the City’s voluntary settlements were with two very small units, neither of which was AFSCME represented; that this unit already pays more toward insurance than para-professional employes of the external comparables; and that because there is general inconsistency among the internal comparables’ settlements and agreements and because the Employer is offering no quid pro quo for the change, there is no persuasive basis on which to grant the City’s proposed change.

The Arbitrator agreed with the Union that internal comparables should be limited to groups with statutory collective bargaining rights. He also agreed with the Union that the interest awards issued in two of the units were not dispositive because the City’s insurance proposal had been agreed upon in one of those cases was awarded but not the controlling issue in the other. The Arbitrator stated that the City’s desire to maintain internal benefit comparability is not sufficient, by itself, to control the outcome, either.

Regarding external comparables, the Arbitrator agreed with the Union that it was paying far more than employes in the external comparables, but that this may be due in whole or in part to the fact that the City’s insurance program is far superior to the comparables’ plans.

The Arbitrator acknowledged that the City’s wage offer exceeded the cost of living for 1991 and 1992. However, looking more closely at the CPI data, the Arbitrator found relevance and substantial merit in the Union’s contention that the City had underfunded its plan, such it was requesting “employee health premium increases of 77.5% and 66.7” compared with National U.S. City Average CPI medical care cost increases of 10.6% for 1991 and 11.5% for 1991. The Arbitrator therefore awarded the Union’s offer.

Birchwood School District

Case 15 INT/ARB-6587 Dec. No. 27452-A (R.U. Miller, 06-09-93)

Employer offer selected.

The only issue in dispute was the upgrade of the secretary and the custodial worker as the across-the-board increase of 4.25% was the same for each final offer. The Arbitrator found that both of these positions were upgraded for the first year of the 1991-93 contract and the Union failed to provide convincing evidence of any significant job changes since then. The Arbitrator also rejected the Union’s catchup argument because the comparable status quo had not changed and the catchup argument was based on the alleged change in duties which the Arbitrator had found was not supported by the evidence. The Arbitrator therefore selected the Employer’s final offer.

Monroe School District

Case 16 INT/ARB-6142 Dec. No. 27451-A (Krinsky, 06-15-93)

Employer offer selected.

The issues in dispute are salary as shown above, dental benefits, and language regarding evaluation material in personnel files. A small dispute exists regarding comparables.

The Union argued that, in addition to the athletic conference, Madison be included as a comparable. The Employer disagreed. The Employer argued that evaluative material, favorable and unfavorable, should be kept in personnel files for more than five years, while the Union argued that no evidence was presented to support this change. The Union argued that the dental benefits it seeks will be provided to the Employer at low cost relative to the comparable districts, while the Employer argued lack of a quid pro quo and no showing of a need to change the benefits. Both parties argued that an analysis of benchmark salaries supported their final offers.

Since no persuasive reason was given for including Madison, the Arbitrator used the athletic conference schools as comparables. The Arbitrator was persuaded that the Employer’s taxpayers are less well off financially than are the comparison districts and, yet, the Employer’s final offer provides average increases in salary and total compensation. The Arbitrator was not persuaded that the Employer should be called upon to do more than that at this time. While the comparables clearly supported the Union’s offer regarding dental benefits, the Arbitrator did not view the need for those benefits as so compelling as to require the Employer to implement them now. Finally, the Arbitrator was persuaded that the unilateral deletion of contract language pertaining to teacher files, while a real negative in the Employer’s final offer, was not a significant item and did not justify a decision to not select the Employer’s entire final offer because of it.

City of Madison

Case 159 INT/ARB-6458 Dec. No. 27406-A (Stern, 06-18-93)

Union offer selected.

The sole issue is whether the agreement should contain the following clause proposed by the Union:

Employees covered by the terms of this Labor Agreement shall not be restricted in their right to choose their place of residency.

The Employer proposed that the agreement, like previous agreements, contain no language on residency. There is, however, a residency ordinance which applies to the unit of employes herein.

The background of the residency requirement in the City of Madison is as follows:

When the City in 1983 was declared the Employer of the Teamsters unit of the Madison Transit System, the Employer had to, under federal law, honor the transit employes’ existing right to choose where they wanted to reside. Subsequently the Madison police and fire employes who had a “me too” clause in their contracts with any other City employes with respect to residency were relieved of their residency requirement when the transit employes became City employes.

Based on the above background and external comparables, the Union argues that its position of “no residence restriction” is more reasonable. The City argues that internal and external comparables support the City’s position and that the Union has not established a need for a change from status quo nor has it provided a quid pro quo. Further, the City argued that the Union’s position should not be taken too seriously because the Union did not even discuss its residency waiver language for about five months until late in the mediation process.

The Arbitrator found that the residence issue was raised and discussed on innumerable occasions in past negotiations and the Union’s failure to raise it until late in the process is not grounds for concluding that it is not important to the Union. Further, the lack of a quid pro quo is not fatal to the Union because (1) no quid pro quo was sought by the City and (2) no evidence was introduced to show that a quid pro quo had been given by the bus drivers, policemen or firefighters in return for a waiver of the residency requirement.

The City made policy arguments in favor of a residency requirement as follows: Employes who live in the City are more knowledgeable about the City, employes will have a personal stake in the City because they will be customers, there is an economic impact of the purchase of housing, groceries, automobiles, etc. by City employes and diversity in the work force would be maintained in the City and white flight would be avoided. The Arbitrator gave little weight to such arguments in that no evidence was produced in support of same. The Arbitrator reasoned:

The arbitrator believes that the fact that the residency requirement has been waived for three of the five major groups with which the City bargains covering 848 of its employees outweighs the fact that a majority of Madison’s unrepresented and represented employees are required to live in Madison. The arbitrator is influenced by his own belief that the police and firefighter units are the pattern setters for the other Madison units and that these are two of the units which have secured a waiver of the residency requirement through their me-too clauses.

As the arbitrator has stated previously (See pp. 5-6), the residency pattern among major Wisconsin Cities and among jurisdictions bordering Madison is mixed. . . .

In conclusion, the arbitrator wishes to make one general comment. In reaching his decision, he has avoided the general philosophical question of balancing the rights of citizens to live where they wish with the right of the City to require that its employees live within City limits. Instead, the arbitrator is relying heavily on the comparability criterion in the statute and other factors generally taken into account in bargaining.

Furthermore, the arbitrator notes that, although it has been the desire and policy of the City to maintain a residency requirement, practical considerations have forced the City to subordinate this policy to its need to secure funding for projects deemed important by the City. The extent to which it has done so, when coupled with the patterns covering the public employees in this geographic area, means that under the criteria in the municipal interest arbitration act, the City policy will not prevail when challenged by unions. Understandably, the City has had to subordinate its residency policy in order to obtain Federal UMTA funds for busses and to gain Dane County financial support for the convention center (Exs. 49 & 50). However, this need to subordinate the residency requirement to practical considerations has weakened the residency policy to the point where this arbitrator finds that under the statutory criteria he must choose the Union final offer in this dispute.

Brown Deer School District

Case 27 INT/ARB-6393 Dec. No. 27408-A (Vernon, 06-18-93)

Employer offer selected.

The issues before the Arbitrator were the amount of increases to the basic salary schedule and the supplemental salary schedule. The Arbitrator determined that the offers on the basic schedule controlled the outcome of the case and the supplemental schedule was ancillary.

The parties’ disagreed over the selection of comparables with the Union urging the athletic conference and school districts in the immediate vicinity as the comparables and the Employer urging a group of five schools in the athletic conference using size, staffing and equalized value. The Arbitrator concluded that while ordinarily the athletic conference would be the appropriate group for comparables, only one had settled for 1993-1994, and therefore, it was necessary to look to secondary comparables. In 1992-1993, when average wage increases were examined, the comparables supported the Union’s position but when the wage settlement was adjusted for increased teacher insurance contributions, the Employer’s position was supported. The Arbitrator found in this case that the linkage between employe contribution to health insurance and salary increases should be considered especially where employers were willing to pay more in salary to induce employes to contribute toward insurance. The Arbitrator noted that one group of employes had a high contribution for 1992-1993, so this skewed the result. When 1993-1994 salary and insurance contributions were examined, the parties’ final offers were both very close to the comparables. The Arbitrator then examined the same comparables for 1993-94 on a two-year basis and found that the Employer’s offer was closer to the overall adjusted two-year pattern of the secondary comparables, and therefore concluded that the Employer’s offer was more reasonable.

Buffalo County (Sheriff’s Department)

Case 44 MIA-1682 Dec. No. 27523-A (Weisberger, 06-21-93)

Employer offer selected.

The issues were wages and the years of service necessary to be eligible for a fourth week of vacation. The Union proposed changing the 20 year requirement to 15 years and the County proposed changing it to 16 years.

The Arbitrator resolves comparability using the pool established in prior awards as rebuttably presumed to be applicable, rejecting the Association’s proposed addition to that pool of Barron County. The Arbitrator states that at least “some recognition” is to be given to costs associated with moving employes through the salary schedule steps, especially because overall compensation is one of the statutory factors. The Arbitrator also gives some recognition to the undisputed evidence regarding the difficult economic circumstances of this rural county.

The Arbitrator finds the comparability data supports the Employer’s wage offer, both in terms of external and limited internal comparables. The inclusion of a majority of civilians in this unit makes the internal comparisons with other civilian units entitled to more weight. The Arbitrator rejects the Association’s contention that morale and retention would be adversely affected by selection of the County’s offer because no evidence was submitted to support those arguments. The internal and external comparability evidence also persuades the Arbitrator that the County’s vacation proposal incorporates a generous improvement to a competitive vacation policy.

For those reasons, the County’s offer was adopted.

Douglas County

Case 185 INT/ARB-6437 Dec. No. 27379-A (Yaffe, 06-22-93)

Union offer selected.

A wage scale for Forestry Department employes was the only issue in dispute after the parties had already agreed to across-the-board raises.

The Union proposed a wage scale which provided the following steps for the classification of Conservation Tech (CT): Start; 6 months and 18 months. The Union proposed the following rates for the positions of CT I, CT II and CT III:

CTI $8.00 $ 8.50 $ 8.96

C.T. II $9.00 $ 9.50 $ 9.96

C.T. III $9.50 $10.50 $10.96

The Employer’s proposal provided the following steps for the classification of Conservation Tech (CT): Start; 6 months; 12 months and 18 months. The Employer proposed the following rates for the positions of CT I, CT II and CT III:

CT I $6.94 $7.35 $ 7.76 $ 8.17

CT II $7.98 $8.45 $ 8.92 $ 9.39

CT III $9.14 $9.68 $10.22 $10.75

The Arbitrator concluded that the best external comparables consisted of similar forestry jobs in Bayfield, Burnett, Iron, Sawyer and Washburn Counties. Based upon these comparables, he concluded that the Union’s offer for the C.T. (Conservation Tech.) II classifications matched up with what is paid elsewhere for similar jobs and that the Employer’s offer was more in line for comparable C.T. III positions.

As for internal comparables, the Arbitrator found that the Employer’s offer better matched up with what is paid to other County employes. He also found that the Union’s offer was more comparable to what the County paid its Equipment Operator I and IIs in its Highway Department.

Calling both proposals somewhat “flawed,” the Arbitrator selected the Union’s wage offer because it would bring wages more in line with both internal and external comparable wages.

Village of Plover (Police Department)

Case 4 MIA-1560 Dec. No. 27471-A (Zeidler, 06-23-93)

Employer offer selected.

In addition to the wage increase, there were a number of issues, including the implementation of a drug testing policy, the Employer’s proposal for a new, three-tiered salary schedule, and the Association’s proposal for amendment to the grievance and arbitration procedure. Comparables used were Plover, Stevens Point, Mosinee, Wausau, Rothschild and Weston; Portage, Waupaca, Wisconsin Rapids and Marshfield were given secondary value. The Arbitrator found that the Employer’s drug testing program, “because of its provision for incident testing, and because of the feature of random testing in which no particular officer is singled out by reason of suspicion, more nearly fits the public interest.” The Arbitrator also found the Employer’s wage offer more comparable and reasonable, “because it is moving toward closing a catch-up situation.” The Arbitrator found the Employer’s offer for a change in the pay structure less comparable than the Association’s offer. The Arbitrator found the Employer’s offer on grievance sustained “on the ground that the present language has not been shown to be inadequate by past experience.” Award for the Employer.

Rhinelander School District

Case 35 INT/ARB-6555 Dec. No. 27532-A (Oestreicher, 06-23-93)

Union offer selected.

The parties disagreed regarding the appropriate comparables. The Employer suggested Antigo, Merrill and Tomahawk School Districts as well as the City of Rhinelander and Oneida County clerical units. The Employer also suggested clericals employed by Peterson Health Care Clinic should be a secondary comparable. The Employer noted that in 1987 Arbitrator Imes had established and found the Employer’s primary comparables (suggested here) were appropriate. The Union suggested as comparables support units in the schools contained in the athletic conference: Merrill, Antigo, Wausau, D. C. Everest, Marshfield, Stevens Point and Wisconsin Rapids (Wisconsin Valley Conference), also five contiguous districts (Tomahawk, Elcho, Three Lakes, Northland Pines and Lakeland UHS) and four K-8 districts.

The Arbitrator found the Union had not submitted sufficient evidence to support a change in the previously established comparables found by Arbitrator Imes. Therefore, comparables were those suggested by the Employer excluding Peterson Health Care. The Arbitrator, noting that there was only one comparable district settled for 1993-94, took into consideration, for this proceeding only, the settlements reached in D. C. Everest and Northland Pines for 1993-94.

In the area of compensation the District’s offer raised a separate issue because the District’s second year offer was 4% total package so that the District could reduce the 1993-94 wage only increase by any increase in insurance for that year. The District also proposed to delay step increases and to delay implementation of 1993-94 wages to January 1, 1994, contrary to past practice under the labor agreement. The Union offer did not address these matters.

Based on a detailed analysis of the parties’ wage offers, the Arbitrator found that the Employer had starting and maximum wages for its staff significantly lower than similar positions among the comparables. The Arbitrator found that discounting step increases, the parties’ wages for 1992-93 were similar although the Union’s (at 5.36%) was to be preferred slightly. However, the Arbitrator observed that for 1993-94 the Employer’s offer was unknown and he was forced to assume (as the Employer had done) that it would represent a 1.87% salary only increase assuming a 15% rise in insurance costs. In addition, only two of five comparables had settled 1993-94 wage rates. On this point the Arbitrator noted that the settlements at D. C. Everest, Northland Pines and Antigo School Districts supported the Association’s 4.5% offer while the City of Rhinelander offer supported the Employer’s 4% (or less) offer.

The Union’s final offer also contained items it asserted the Employer had tentatively agreed upon in bargaining. These items were vacation for 9 month employes, summer pay for 9 month secretaries, premium pay for large study hall monitoring by aides, and incremental increases for certain employes. The Arbitrator found that the Union had failed to support a conclusion that it needed these items and therefore the Arbitrator preferred the Employer’s offer on these points.

The Arbitrator held that the Employer’s employes enjoy a less-than-average wage and benefit package and that the Employer’s 1993-94 money offer would result in a further erosion of the employes’ wages if a 15% health insurance premium increase were suffered and if cost controls and/or levy limits became reality. The Arbitrator noted that the Employer sought to place all of the risks for these occurrences upon the employes which the Arbitrator found made the Employer’s offer appear to be unreasonable given the low starting and maximum rates for the Employer’s staff. The Arbitrator therefore found the Union’s offer was the reasonable of the two and awarded it.

Milwaukee Public Schools

Case 242 INT/ARB-6199 Dec. No. 27187-B (Slavney, 06-24-93)

Union offer selected.

Although there were some other issues, the parties agreed the main issue was the District’s proposal to include a 5% employe health insurance premium contribution rather than leaving the existing (and moot) me too clause providing that if the teacher contract provides for such contributions, so will the Substitutes’.

The Arbitrator finds the case presenting two questions: Is the District’s proposal an appropriate response to its rapidly-rising health care costs. About 1/4 of the District’s employes now pay the 5% while the remainder, particularly the teachers, do not. Some other public employes in the area as well as private sector employes pay part of their premiums. Substitutes in seven of the ten largest school districts have no paid insurance while Green Bay and Madison have some form of insurance. To which group is this group of employes to be compared?

The Arbitrator states that, because the District is proposing a significant change, it must make a compelling case that its proposal is a remedy or has intrinsic merit and that it offers an adequate quid pro quo or has clear support among the comparables. Increases of 75% – 150% over 1984 premiums demonstrates a premium cost problem exists, but the District admits it cannot show that the District’s proposal will provide any reduction in the overall premium cost.

The Arbitrator rejects the District’s assertion that the State’s ten largest school districts’ substitute teachers are an appropriate comparable pool. Comparisons are difficult due to wide variations in categorization of substitutes among the ten. The parties have not historically based their bargaining on comparisons with the “big 10.” Rather, they have drawn their comparisons and their me too clause with regard to the MPS teachers’ unit.

The District’s reliance on the District’s treatment of classified employes is rejected because there have historically and deliberately been separate internal wage patterns between certificated and classified employes. Hence, the District’s 4% wage offer compared with the 3% classified wage settlement does not constitute a quid pro quo for its insurance proposal. The District granted the other certificated teacher unit a 5% salary increase with no insurance cost sharing, and in most years the substitutes’ settlements have been closer to the pattern of the certificated employes than to the classified employes.

Those factors control as against the support the District offer draws from private sector and external public sector comparisons. The insurance issue controls as against the other proposals, none of which is outrageous or sufficiently repugnant to the public interest to require otherwise. Accordingly, the Association’s offer was adopted.

Fond du Lac School District

Case 43 INT/ARB-6612 Dec. No. 27443-A (Vernon, 06-29-93)

Employer offer selected.

The sole issue here centered on whether the Employer should continue to pay all health insurance premium as previously provided, or whether employes should start paying 5% of the cost for the family plan premium and 3% for the single plan premium.

The Arbitrator stated that when a party such as the Employer wants to change the status quo, there are four general criteria to follow: whether there is a demonstrated need for change; whether the proposal reasonably addresses the need; whether there is support for the comparables; and the nature of the quid pro quo, if offered. Saying that a proposal to change insurance must be addressed on a case-by-case basis, the Arbitrator stated that such decisions are judgment calls which are dependent on the particular “mix” of factors.

Applying these principles here, the Arbitrator found that the Employer has demonstrated that there is a problem with the high cost of its health insurance and that it needs to be addressed because its family health insurance premium was $425.99 as opposed to the medium rate of $359.00 at other schools.

He further found that the Employer’s request to reduce its cost by $22 a month via an employe contribution was reasonable because it still left the Employer with a monthly premium higher than other comparable employers in the public and private sector. Saying that he is obligated to “consider, apply and give weight to all the (statutory) criteria,” the Arbitrator stated that a “basic benefit” such as premium sharing by private sector employers and municipal employers (other than school districts) formed an appropriate basis of comparisons; that they clearly favored the Employer; and that they must be considered along side the fact that comparables among other school districts slightly favored the Union’s case for no premium-sharing. In doing so, the Arbitrator also stated that “The question really is one of relevancy of the other public sector and private sector data” and that such data must be considered under the statutory framework.

The Arbitrator further found that the Employer offered some quid pro quo in the form of its other contract proposals and a lightly higher wage offer than comparable teachers, but rejected its claim that its proposal for a Section 125 represented a real quid pro quo.

The Arbitrator also stated that employe premium-sharing is equitable in light of the very high insurance costs being faced by the Employer and that the strong support among the private sector and other public sector comparables did not require a “blockbuster quid pro quo” under these “unique facts” since “the Section 125 plan and the moderate value of other changes in the contract were enough of a sweetener . . .” so that the Employer’s offer should be selected.

Denmark School District

Case 4 INT/ARB-6232 Dec. No. 27181-A (Vernon, 11-27 & 12-21-92)

Employer offer selected.

There were two issues in dispute in this case. The most hotly contested was the identity of the comparable grouping for the District and its teachers. The Association contended the District was an edge school, comparable to several athletic conferences, other Brown County schools, and, for some purposes, statewide averages. The District argued that the primary comparables should be the Olympian Athletic Conference. If additional comparisons were necessary, certain schools of the smaller schools of the Packerland Athletic Conference should be used. The Arbitrator found that the Olympian Conference, minus Sturgeon Bay, was the appropriate comparability grouping, based upon prior awards in the area and the relative size of the districts.

The difference on salary was very slight. The Association’s two-year offer was $259 above average, while the District’s offer was $130 below the two-year average. Since neither offer caused a significant change in benchmark rankings, the fact that the District’s offer was closer to the average on teacher-to-teacher comparisons dictated an award in its favor.